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Abstract 
Among the eldest of its kind in Asia, the Communist Party of India (CPI) pioneered the 
spread of Marxist politics beyond the European arena. Influenced by both Soviet 
revolutionary practice and radical nationalism in British India, it operated under conditions 
not provided for in Marxist theory—foremost the prominence of religion and community in 
social and political life. The thesis analyzes, first, the theoretical and organizational 
‘overhead’ of the CPI in terms of the position of religion in a party communist hierarchy of 
emancipation. It will therefore question the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin on the one 
hand, and Comintern doctrines on the other. Secondly, it scrutinizes the approaches and 
strategies of the CPI and individual members, often biographically biased, to come to grips 
with the subcontinental environment under the primacy of mass politics. Thirdly, I discuss 
communist vistas on revolution on concrete instances including (but not limited to) the 
Gandhian non-cooperation movement, the Moplah rebellion, the subcontinental proletariat, 
the problem of communalism, and assertion of minority identities. I argue that the CPI 
established a pattern of vacillation between qualified rejection and conditional appropriation 
of religion that loosely constituted two diverging revolutionary paradigms characterizing 
communist practice from the Soviet outset: Western and Eastern. The specific tradition 
condensed in the latter eventually would render it plausible to the party to support the 
Muslim League’s Pakistan demand in the 1940s. 
Keywords: Communism, South Asia, Communist Party, Marxism, Religion, British India 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Als eine der ersten ihrer Art außerhalb Europas war die Kommunistische Partei Indiens 
(CPI) bei der Ausbreitung des Marxismus jenseits des europäischen Rahmens vorne mit 
dabei. Zu ihren prägenden Einflüssen zählten die sowjetische Praxis der Revolutionsjahre 
und zeitgenössische radikale Spielarten des Nationalismus in Britisch-Indien. Von Beginn 
an musste sie sich unter Bedingungen behaupten, denen in der Theorie wenig Beachtung 
zugekommen war – zuvorderst der ungebrochenen Bedeutung von Religion und 
Gemeinschaft für das politische und soziale Leben des Subkontinents. Die Arbeit untersucht 
zunächst anhand der Werke von Marx, Engels und Lenin sowie der Komintern den 
theoretischen und organisatorischen ‚Überbau‘ der CPI auf den Stellenwert von Religion in 
einem parteikommunistischen Emanzipationsgefüge. In der Folge widmet sie sich den oft 
biografisch eingefärbten Ansätzen und Strategien der Partei und ihrer Mitglieder, unter dem 
Primat der ‚Politik für die Masse‘ mit den Verhältnissen auf dem Subkontinent umzugehen. 
Sie beleuchtet kommunistische Perspektiven auf Revolution anhand konkreter Fälle wie 
dem passiven Widerstand Gandhis, dem Moplah-Aufstand, der Arbeiterschaft, religiösem 
Kommunalismus und dem erstarkenden Gemeinschaftsgefühl religiöser Gruppen. Es zeigt 
sich, dass die Partei beständig zwischen qualifizierter Ablehnung und bedingter 
Unterstützung religiöser Kultur schwankte, die schematisch zwei divergierende und seit der 
russischen Revolution erkennbare revolutionäre Paradigmen bilden: ein westliches und ein 
östliches. Der in Letzterem kondensierte Strang politischer Tradition ermöglichte es 
schließlich, dass der Partei die Unterstützung für die Pakistanforderung der Muslim League 
in den 1940er Jahren plausibel erschien. 
Schlagworte: Kommunismus, Südasien, Kommunistische Partei, Marxismus, Religion, 
Britisch-Indien  
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Preface 
 
This book is the result of an inspiration from a visit to the Republic of India. In January 
2004, a large multi-party rally demanding reforms in the health sector was held in 
Hyderabad. The Communist Party of India (CPI) contributed a significant number of 
demonstrators adorned with party insignia—mostly hammer-and-sickle flags. Among them 
was a bloc of black-clad, largely veiled Muslim women waving these very flags. What 
occurred to me at the time as just another uncommon sight among the many uncommon 
sights India offers to outsiders came back to me again a few years later and prodded me 
forward to explore the matter.  
After all, what had been undermined was a pillar of my own left-wing socialization: the 
principled opposition of communism—as a committed effort (at least in theory) at 
emancipation of mankind from its self-wrought social and ideological chains—to religion 
and spirituality. Doesn’t Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right commence with the 
apodeixis that criticism of religion was the prerequisite of all criticism? And hadn’t Lenin, 
the practically minded but ruthless disciple of Marx, once declared that there could be 
“nothing more abominable than religion”?1 How, then, could it happen that the official 
Communist Party of India, generally viewed as a more “ossified” specimen of its kind, 
could so blatantly betray its own agenda by cooperating with pious religionists?2 
My ensuing studies, where I endeavored to trace the root of the matter to the early years 
of the CPI, revealed more than I had expected: A superficially orthodox party forced into 
uncommon and often creative approaches to the complex of religion by the latter’s sheer 
social weight, which it struggles to shrug off to the present day. This thesis explores the 
preconditions and trajectories of these approaches. 
The present study could only materialize with the contribution of the following individuals 
and organizations, whom I would like to express my gratitude to in no particular order.  
I am especially indebted to Prof. Michael Mann for supervising my thesis and ever 
providing insightful criticism and competent assistance, as well as necessary grounding. 
Thank you greatly for the cordial and fruitful cooperation. I am similarly obliged to PD 
                                                 
1 Letter from Lenin to Maxim Gorky, quoted in J. M. Bochenski, “Marxism-Leninism and Religion,” in 
Religion and Atheism in the USSR and Eastern Europe, ed. B. R. Bociurkiw et al. (London: Macmillan 1975), 
11. 
2 Robert Hardgrave and Stanley Kochanek, India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation, 7th ed. 
(Boston: Thomson Wadsworth 2008), 352 (quote). 
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Dietrich Reetz for co-supervision, substantial and sympathetic support, and most fertile 
discussions on Marxism. Prof. Franz-Josef Brüggemeier and Dr. Amar Farooqi both deserve 
my heartfelt gratitude for additional co-supervision and productive input during various 
stages of the project. 
Archive research in India would not have been possible without financial support, for 
which I am indebted to the DAAD and the Erasmus Mundus program, and notably Florian 
Schumacher of the latter. I am also greatly obliged to the staff at Delhi University, the 
International Students’ Hostel, and the institutions whose facilities and services I made use 
of: the Center South Asia, Heidelberg; the CeMIS Göttingen, especially Anna Sailer and 
Aditya Sarkar; in Delhi, the National Archives of India and its director, Mushirul Hasan, 
ever attentive to researchers’ woes; everyone at the Nehru Memorial Archives and Library 
for their competence, welcoming stance, and helpful cooperation; Sucheta Mahajan and her 
exceptionally supportive and committed team at the P.C. Joshi Archive of Contemporary 
History; and the CPI for comradely allowing me to access the party archive at Ajoy Bhavan 
and benefit from the resourcefulness and proficiency of its most extraordinary librarian, M. 
Balan; in Kolkata, the National Library of India; the Sikh Library; everyone at the Center 
for the Study of Social Sciences for the inspiring and supportive environment; the staff at 
the Shakespeare Sarani branch of the West Bengal State Archive; and the comrades in the 
library of the CPI(M)’s Ganashakti office for the outstandingly hospitable atmosphere, 
which made returning there a joy in its own right; in Hyderabad, the Andhra Pradesh State 
Archives, and the staff at Sundarayya Vignana Kendram. 
Others who were indispensable in one way or another to this book include, but are not 
limited to, my parents, Fio and Wolf, and my nrother, Nicolas; Florian Doster, Florian 
Deurer, and Christoph Ewald, all of you for being who you are; the mighty Assorted Nails; 
Franz and Sebastian for your friendship and not ceasing to debate political and philosophical 
matters with me; the ISH batch, notably Sattar, Rahim, and Tuukka, as well as Vini, 
Andrew, Suresh, Hia and the Sen family, Anna and the Sarkar family, and all at Bull Engine 
for making the sojourns in India come to life; the ISF Freiburg, Anil Rajimwale, and Jörg 
Huber for fruitful discussions and critical input; my former flatmates for bearing with me; 
and, last but possibly most, Anna, my ever-vigilant muse. 
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Introduction 
      
 Faith is the power of believing things 
that we know to be untrue. 
—Samuel Butler 
 
 
A number of indicators support the assumption that communism and religion are 
fundamentally incompatible. Beyond the pointed criticism and famous polemics in Marx’s 
oeuvre and Marxist tradition, nigh all communist countries have a record of curtailing and 
suppressing religious activity. More often than not, this included the believers themselves. 
In case of the Soviet Union, the effective dissolution of the Russian Orthodox Church after 
the October Revolution and the 1979 intervention in Afghanistan in support of a modernist 
left-wing regime seem to constitute early and late pillars of an anti-religious continuum. 
Occasional cooperation, such as the reinstitution of the Orthodox Church during World War 
II, appears as a strategically conditioned affair. Other observers diagnose a lack of 
dedication to Marxist3 doctrines, or a gradual erosion of the communist project under 
imperatives of political pragmatism. In general, however, ‘proper’ communist views on 
religion are located in a spectrum ranging from indifferent secularism to aggressive atheism. 
By and large, this holds also true for the Communist Party of India (CPI). Even as vote-
bank politics and electoral alliances have exacted their realist toll, communists have 
maintained their staunch reputation as the least communalized political formation on the 
subcontinent.4 Yet, highlighting only the areligious side of the medal does injustice to 
another, less prominent aspect of the interrelation of communism and religion. It is marked 
by unproblematic cohabitation, close approximation, and at times even partial conflation. 
This is not to suggest that a lasting marriage of both had taken place. However, especially in 
an Asian context religious politics and movements often were (and are) not anathema to 
communists—not only out of political considerations, but also due to the very structure and 
thrust of their critical argument. The present study aims to explore the subcontinental 
communist movement’s religious track record in colonial times. By discussing the 
                                                 
3 “Marxism” here refers to the mainstream analytical tradition established after Marx and Engels authored their 
seminal works. More precisely, it means Soviet Marxism—the strand that attained most influence, 
prominence, and prestige in the period under review. 
4 “Communist” and “communist party” here denote only ‘official’ communism as represented by the national 
branches affiliated to the Comintern. Furthermore, “subcontinent” and “subcontinental” are used in lieu of 
“India” and “Indian.” Cf. Sobhanlal Datta Gupta, “The Rise and Decline of Communism in South Asia: A 
Review Essay,” Twentieth Century Communism 3 (2011): 175. 
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circumstances of its evolution, it endeavors to contribute to communism’s cultural profile 
from a conceptual and intellectual angle.5  
From the perspective of paradigms and debates of the present, research gaps often appear as 
keys to the universal understanding of past phenomena. Concretely, in the light of the 
contemporary popularity of matters of culture and identity, the lack of a dedicated 
exploration of the communist religious profile is felt all the more strongly. Yet, the present 
effort considers itself a contribution to rather than a complete representation of the CPI’s 
colonial period. It aims to add a novel layer to the long-standing congruence between 
researchers and the respective communist parties: Both have mostly focused on the national 
and social dimension of the communist project and committed only minor efforts to 
problematize the intellectual—as against the political—dimension of the religious and 
communal issue.6  
Apart from a recent and much-needed measure of diversification, most existing studies 
fall into one of two categories. The first consists of functionalist and pragmatist political 
history, which tends to de-ideologize party communism and concentrates on its supposed 
‘core’ business: winning power. The second encompasses Marxist studies analyzing the 
movement’s development under the criterion of ‘correct’ implementation of Marxism. Both 
currents concur in that they deny the status as a relevant factor in subcontinental 
communism to the complex of religion; the first because of its emphasis on pragmatism, the 
second out of the subordinate position allotted to religion in Marxist theory. Both share the 
implicit conviction that an intellectual history of religion in a communist context would be 
as insubstantial as religion itself from a Marxist point of view. The heritage can still be felt. 
The major body of research, including seminal works on the CPI, has been written from 
these perspectives. Probably the most authoritative, Gene Overstreet and Marshall 
Windmiller conceded half a century ago that the tendency to live in an ideal world full of 
ideological formulae was pronounced among communists. At the same time, however, they 
                                                 
5 Steps in this direction have recently been taken; see, for example, the excellent study on M. N. Roy’s 
intellectual history: Kris Manjapra, M. N. Roy: Marxism and Colonial Cosmopolitanism (London: Routledge 
2010). With regard to ‘Marxist epistemology,’ the problems arising from postulating an ‘abstract’ or 
‘fundamental’ epistemology independent of concrete phenomena in Marx’ writings have been convincingly 
emphasized in Alfred Schmidt, “Einleitung,” in Beiträge zur Marxistischen Erkenntnistheorie, ed. Alfred 
Schmidt (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1969), 7. Yet, this does not preclude that a sub-complex adaptation of 
Marx’s epistemological premises—such as on the part of Soviet Marxism, and hence also the CPI—exhibits 
certain generalizable features. 
6 The lone exception is Jha Gulab’s study Caste and the Communist Movement (Delhi: Commonwealth Publ. 
1990), which however takes a sociological rather than historical perspective and restricts its scope to a district 
in northern Bihar. 
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claimed that it was perfectly feasible to plausibly assess the CPI by altogether disregarding 
Marxism and focusing on political pragmatism.7  
Although their merits are numerous, pragmatist and functionalist approaches (and their 
postmodern revenant, discursive linguistics) tend to exhibit a lack of analytical versatility. It 
appears in their inability to grasp the qualitative dimension of history once the pragmatic 
argument fails. Accordingly, Overstreet and Windmiller were not alone in offering only 
“highly speculative” and equally unsatisfying explanations for the CPI’s politically 
disastrous pro-Pakistan episode in the 1940s.8 The exclusive focus on tactical and strategic 
considerations of the respective context neglects crucial features that get into sight only if 
the perspective takes into account political traditions and doctrinal tendencies.  
Furthermore, even though the pragmatist school argues against the assertiveness of 
political Marxism’s doctrinal content, it shares the latter’s epistemological monism by 
focusing on an ‘essence,’ a sole principle directing the course of events. The difference is 
only that Marxism posits class struggle as the subcutaneous driving force of history, 
whereas in pragmatism—resembling a kind of negative anthropology—it is considerations 
of viability, and ultimately power, that occupy center stage. And lastly, a communist party 
tends to undermine functionalist premises, as Debnarayan Modak points out. Simply put, it 
is not just another party: “It is very natural for a liberal political party to switch over from 
one position to another due to the pragmatic reasons of politics. But […] a Communist 
party, which takes shape with the pledge of emancipation […] has to justify all its policy 
and the shifts therein ideologically.”9 
Also, both Marxist and pragmatist studies usually neglect to account for the fact that 
religion was not a matter of secondary importance in British India. Quite the contrary: 
Fueled by a mixture of divide-and-rule politics and orientalism ‘from above’ and 
reciprocating reform movements in the major communities ‘from below,’ modernized 
religion evolved into a formative instance through which all kinds of political, social, and 
economic aspirations came to be articulated. By the turn of the 20th century, the religious 
community had thus grown into a social and political determinant in its own right. 
                                                 
7 Gene Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, Communism in India (Berkeley: University of California Press 
1960), 5, 352. See also J. S. Brar, The Communist Party in Punjab: The Politics of Survival (Delhi: South Asia 
Books 1990), 173; Paul Brass, “Political Parties of the Radical Left in South Asian Politics,” in Radical 
Politics in South Asia, ed. Paul Brass and Marcus Franda (Cambridge [MA]: MIT Press 1973); Brass, Caste, 
Faction and Party in Indian Politics, vol. 1, Faction and Party (Delhi: Chanakya Publ. 1983), 2–3. 
8 Overstreet and Windmiller, Communism in India, 216. 
9 Debnarayan Modak, Dynamics of the National Question in India: The Communist Approach (1942–1964) 
(Kolkata: Progress Publishers 2006), 36.  
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Communism understood itself as a radically alternative draft by centering on class as the 
main factor of social processes and political action alike. Still, it was impossible to simply 
bypass the prominent role of religion as a category central to social formation. Therefore, 
the religious complex necessarily asserted itself explicitly and implicitly in communist 
activity on the subcontinent. It molded the CPI’s social and ideological profile and informed 
its meaning—in doubt, behind the party’s back and against its will. 
If a measure of intellectual (or indeed ideological) history is admitted into the 
consideration, the party’s religio-cultural profile becomes meaningful behind its apparently 
rigid doctrinal façade. In this view, communist theory and practice attest to the versatility of 
not the categories of Marxism, but their content.10 For example, the difference in 
composition and outlook of the subcontinental proletariat to its Western European 
counterpart manifested not in a different set of regulatory terms, but under the universalizing 
cover of classical Marxist vocabulary on the one hand. On the other, ‘culturephiliac’ 
political and intellectual strands in the party materialized in the ‘nationality period’ of the 
1940s. It testifies that community and religion could even be accommodated explicitly 
within a Marxist framework—in this case, by drawing on Lenin’s nationality theory. 
Identifying the resulting illocutionary divergence within these Marxist categories creates the 
space for an understanding and assessment of the quality of subcontinental communism. 
Therefore, this study asks not whether, but how a Marxist frame of reference worked under 
subcontinental conditions; how a revolutionary subject was etched despite, or even because 
of, the prevalence of religious and communal outlooks, what implications the latter caused, 
how they were addressed, and in what way the “silent compulsion” (Marx) of empirical 
conditions affected the communist vision of emancipation—that is, its meaning—itself.11  
This approach implies that the debates surrounding the ‘history of ideas’ acquire a degree of 
relevance. The assault of both social and new cultural history has discredited the focus on 
elite thought associated with the traditional history of ideas. Most pointedly, Robert Darnton 
contrasts the elitist concentration on selected philosophical texts with a supposedly more 
down-to-earth “grubbing in archives” for insights into the actual social incidence of ideas. A 
                                                 
10 E. M. S. Namboodiripad’s claim that Marxist-Leninist theory had been “enriched” by the experiences of its 
practical application needs to be understood in this way: Namboodiripad, “The Communists’ Contribution to 
the Theory and Practice of Indian Politics,” in Documents of the Communist Movement in India, ed. Jyoti Basu 
et al., vol. 1, 1917–1928 (Calcutta: National Book Agency 1997), 4 (hereafter Documents). Conversely, 
Bhabani Sen Gupta claims that the CPI had not added to the creative spectrum of applied Marxism: Bhabani 
Sen Gupta, Communism in Indian Politics (New York: Columbia University Press 1972), 39. 
11 See also Manjapra, M. N. Roy: Marxism. 
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second major gripe concerns the question of context. In his polemic against Arthur Lovejoy, 
Quentin Skinner forcefully argues for a rigorously contingent understanding of ‘ideas.’ 
According to him, their explanatory power exhausts itself in contextual use, which denies 
the possibility of meaning accruing to them beyond concrete time and place.12  
And yet, these expedient reminders have not been able to delegitimize core concerns of 
the history of ideas. As Darrin McMahon points out, Darnton’s own results tend to blur the 
distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ texts. Lovejoy himself opposed the formalist 
immanence of New Criticism and from an early stage insisted that a proper understanding of 
a text requires “going beyond the work itself,” that is, into its context.13 And the rigid 
grounding of ideas in and their exclusivist limitation to the concrete context of their 
appearance tends to substitute ahistorical parochialism for mythological universalism.14 
The implications of these debates for the current undertaking are obvious. The 
interventions of Darnton and others underscore the need for a complementary reading of 
philosophical-programmatic writings and the practices, including textual ones, ‘from 
below.’ Not only those of the CPI proper, but of as many of its individual members as 
possible will have to be considered. Much in the same vein, the immediate context certainly 
went a long way to determine the CPI’s handling of religion and religiousness. At the same 
time, the latter’s roots and consequences point beyond it. Peter Gordon rightly cautions 
against fetishizing “contextualism as a global and exhaustive theory of meaning.”15 Even if 
an idea’s practice is limited to a certain context, the image of this practice radiates beyond it 
and entwines itself with its theoretical concept. For an understanding of the meaning of even 
localized communism it is pertinent to raise the perspective beyond concrete local, regional, 
or even national confines. This means weighing in seminal theoretical and practical input 
from the leading revolutionary authorities—(Bolshevik) Marxism and Soviet revolutionary 
practice.  
The present study undertakes to formulate an intellectual history of the political: Of the 
relevance of religion for, and its impact on, subcontinental communist theory and practice. 
                                                 
12 Robert Darnton, The Business of Enlightenment: A Publishing History of the Encyclopedia 1775–1800 
(Cambridge [MA]: Harvard University Press 1979), 1 (quote); Quentin Skinner, “Meaning und Understanding 
in the History of Ideas,” in Skinner, Visions of Politics, vol. 1, Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2002). 
13 Arthur Lovejoy, “Reflections on the History of Ideas,” Journal of the History of Ideas 1, no. 1 (1940): 13 
(quote); Darrin McMahon, “The Return of the History of Ideas?,” in Rethinking Modern European Intellectual 
History, eds. Darrin McMahon and Samuel Moyen (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014), 20 
14 See the essay by Peter Gordon, “Contextualism and Criticism in the History of Ideas,” in McMahon and 
Moyen, Rethinking Modern European. 
15 Ibid., 33. 
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Certainly, this is not an operation in a vacuum. In order to understand communist 
approaches to religion, it is necessary to understand the constellations that made these 
approaches plausible. Such constellations are probed in a number of cases, including 
communist self-localizations vis-à-vis spiritualized nationalist and anti-imperialist politics 
of the early 1920s; the Moplah rebellion on the Malabar coast and the Akali movement in 
the Punjab; the problem of communalism; the working class; the ascent of community 
politics in the 1930s; and the CPI’s appropriation of religion and culture during the 
‘nationality period’ of the 1940s. 
Any history that sets out as an intellectual history is obliged to provide a plausible 
background for the evolution of the respective ‘ideas.’ This has often led to extended 
searches for ‘influences’ that emphasize the erudition of the researcher rather than situate 
the object of research. Given that the present narrative centers on a party, I limit the scope of 
relevant creative input for communist policy formulation and practice to political traditions, 
social constellations, and events ‘on the ground’—all of them formative instances for South 
Asian communist individuals—on the one hand. On the other, there is Marxism, that is, an 
eclectic mixture of Marx and Engels’s theoretical heritage, early Soviet post-revolutionary 
practice, and guidelines of the Third or Communist International (Comintern). Notably the 
Soviet role model is important. Leading party theoretician Elamkulam Manna Sankaran (E. 
M. S.) Namboodiripad’s appraisal that the “guiding star” in the early days of the CPI had 
been “the practical experience of what was happening in the Soviet Union” attested to the 
immediate eminence of its revolutionary example.16 
Emphasizing relations of dominance rather than inspiration, recent studies reiterate the 
early party’s dependence on the Soviet Union in general and the Comintern in particular. By 
now, it is again a commonly cited reason for the “failure” of the CPI. Echoing studies from 
the cold war era, Thomas Nossiter emphatically denied the existence of an independent 
communist movement before the 1950s.17 Dushka Saiyid traces the CPI’s inability to 
respond adequately to conditions on the subcontinent to the “highly centralized and 
erroneous policy of the Comintern.”18 Robert Hardgrave and Stanley Kochanek agree that 
                                                 
16 E. M. S. Namboodiripad (interviewee), recorded by Raman Pillai and Hari Dev Sharma (interviewers), 25 
October 1978, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Delhi, Oral History Project (hereafter: NMML-OHP), 
AccNo 794, 64–5. On the activist temper of South Asian communists, see also Colin Mackerras and Nick 
Knight, Marxism in Asia (Delhi: Select Book Service Syndicate 1986), 273–8. 
17 Thomas Nossiter, Marxist State Governments in India: Politics, Economics and Society (London: Pinter 
1988), 163–8; see also Sen Gupta, Communism in Indian Politics, 13. 
18 Dushka Saiyid, Exporting Communism to India: Why Moscow Failed (Islamabad: National Institute of 
Historical and Cultural Research 1995), v. 
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the young party “was largely under Comintern control and followed Moscow directives.”19 
Sobhanlal Datta Gupta reiterates that subcontinental communism’s early history made sense 
only in the context of the revolutionary parent organization, and identifies a number of 
occasions when the CPI’s destiny had been “decisively shaped” by intervention from either 
the Comintern or the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB).20 
However, injunctions from above cannot form exhaustive explanations for concrete 
politics, let alone for the evolution of peculiar political traditions. This is especially true for 
a comparably neglected affair such as religion. As it mostly went below the communist 
radar, efforts to address it could respond to conditions and developments on the ground—
and to ambiguities in Marxist theory—with a greater degree of autonomy. It is a heartfelt 
concern of the present study to argue against the commonplace contention of communist 
‘alienness’ occasioned by the ostensible otherworldliness of Marxist concepts. Quite the 
contrary. For example, party founder Manabendra Nath (M. N.) Roy (1878–1954) found it 
perfectly feasible to integrate the fanatical Muslim khilafat émigrés into the fledgling CPI. 
Similarly, he could claim the early 1920s Akali movement in the Punjab for the 
revolutionary cause while explicitly affirming its identitary religious character. Both 
examples contributed to the evolution of traditions that could be, and were, reactivated later, 
reaching a situated pinnacle in the ‘nationality period.’  
Moreover, core tenets of policy formulation remained substantially unchanged by the to 
and fro in the Comintern’s general line. The most important among these was a positive 
stance towards the ‘masses.’ Communists entertained a self-image of being the vanguard of 
rising ‘mass consciousness’—a concept that remained remarkably vague throughout. They 
invariably viewed it as expressing currents running counter to the social order, ultimately 
aiming to transcend it. This perception did not result from an overly positive appreciation of 
the ‘masses’ per se—communists by and large were well aware of the pervading religious 
outlook on the subcontinent. Rather, they identified mass aspirations as expressions of 
paramount forces of history. The CPI, then, was to be their midwife, or the method applying 
itself to its object: the inevitably—if unconsciously—revolutionary ‘masses.’21 
                                                 
19 Hardgrave and Kochanek, India: Government and Politics, 346.  
20 Sobhanlal Datta Gupta, Comintern and the Destiny of Communism in India: 1919–1943; Dialectics of Real 
and a Possible History (Kolkata: Seribaan 2006), 2, 297–9. However, the controversy is not settled yet; 
Suchetana Chattopadhyay argues that one of South Asian communism’s central features is its ability to 
“criticize and go beyond Comintern directives”: Suchetana Chattopadhyay, An Early Communist: Muzaffar 
Ahmad in Calcutta 1913–1929 (Delhi: Tulika Books 2011), 232. 
21 See Muzaffar Ahmad, Myself and the Communist Party of India 1920–1929 (Calcutta: National Book 
Agency 1970), 417. 
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In comparison, the frequent and violent vacillations in Comintern policy concerned 
mainly the approach to political formations and social actors such as political organizations 
and trade unions. The various shifts directly impacted the range of non-communist agents 
considered suitable allies for the—minimalist or maximalist—agenda of the day. While 
these policies greatly influenced the leeway for communist activity, they only indirectly 
concerned the courting of the revolutionary subject, the ‘masses.’ An episode such as the 
emphatic turn towards popular folk culture could indeed have only manifested under the 
peculiar circumstances and imperatives of “people’s war” in the 1940s. Even so, 
approximation to indigenous culture had been mooted a decade earlier, when party members 
such as K. B. Krishna had meditated on the merits of indigenous (religious) culture, and 
party pamphlets had called for measures only against foreign religious bodies.  
It follows that the fault lines of grand policy centering on social and national revolution 
certainly influenced those of the communist cultural and religious profile, but were far from 
exhaustively determining them. A tentative periodization could look thus: Following a 
period of accommodation of grass-roots movements lasting until the early/mid-1920s, 
skepticism towards straightforward mass politics and its religious ideologemes governed the 
remainder of the decade. The CPI’s political eclipse from 1929 to the mid-1930s witnessed 
a cautious, theoretically grounded rapprochement to religious categories of social 
organization and political articulation. This approximation blossomed into a phase of full-
fledged appropriation of communal separatism after the 1937 elections that reached its 
pinnacle in the ‘nationality period’ from 1942 to 1946. Late in that year, the increasing 
bitterness between Congress and League, and indeed Hindus and Muslims, convinced the 
party once more to approach the ‘masses’ on culturally neutral terrain. 
The CPI’s reception of Marxist epistemology and the criticism of religion, including the 
modifications and reifications by Lenin and Stalin, constituted another formative influence. 
Notably Stalin’s stature as a Marxist theoretician is disputed, and for good reason. His 
contributions are relevant mostly in the context of the various factional wars inside the 
Soviet communist party. Not a single text of his has achieved a lasting reputation as a 
classic.22 Yet, the fact remains that he left a lasting imprint on contemporary Marxism by 
way of his political stature, and his eventual intra-Soviet monopoly of exegesis of Marx’s 
and Lenin’s works. Concretely, his implementation of Leninist nationality policy in his 
capacity as People’s Commissar for Nationality Questions decisively influenced both the 
                                                 
22 On the flexible rigidity—as opposed to orthodox dogmatism—at the core of Stalinism, see Sören Pünjer, 
“Dogmatisch und Unorthodox: Was ist Stalinismus? Ein Kurzer Lehrgang,” Bahamas 54 (2008): 34–5.  
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Soviet state’s character and its outward effect. Stalin molded its imprint on revolutionaries 
all over the world as a role model and influenced their vision of revolutionary 
transformation. Therefore, in the context of this study he will be included among the 
authoritative sources—less on the merits of his genius than on account of the “normative 
power of the factual” (Georg Jellinek).  
Stalin’s contribution is particularly relevant with regard to a peculiar kind of revolution 
in ‘Eastern,’ nationally “suppressed” countries. In contrast to the impetus of cultural self-
criticism inherent in the ‘Western’ proletarian revolution, the incorporation of ‘national’ 
(including cultural and religious) traditions distinguished the ‘Eastern’ variety. The 
character of this revolution has met with appreciation only in the handful of studies looking 
beyond Soviet realpolitik. Yuri Slezkine’s call for attention to the early Soviet government’s 
fervor to promote ‘national’ (including cultural and religious) particularisms has been slow 
to find its way into the canon of research. However, his diagnosis, inspired by the earlier 
work of Edward H. Carr, of a deep-rooted “chronic ethnophilia” is to the point.23 
Furthermore, endowing cultural appropriation with Bolshevik theoretical blessing questions 
a widespread tenet. It stipulates that the low level of theoretical schooling of subcontinental 
communists caused by the British censorship of Marxist texts lay at the heart of this 
purportedly ‘un-Marxist’ practice.24 
Elaborating upon and furthering this point, the present study will demonstrate that the 
CPI’s efforts to address the challenge of religion vacillated between the culturally diverging 
paradigms of anti-imperialist ‘Eastern’ and socialist ‘Western’ revolution.25 The communist 
obligation to achieve a revolution that was both socialist and nationalist accentuated rather 
                                                 
23 Yuri Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic 
Particularism,” Slavic Review 53, no. 2 (1994): 414–16. Nevertheless, clues to this insight have been available 
for decades—in Soviet history no less than in the published works of Lenin and Stalin, and even in statements 
such as this one from a CPGB activist in 1966: “The approach of Marxists to questions of culture and 
nationality was one which did not want people to forget their origins and language.” Andrew Flinn, “Cypriot, 
Indian and West Indian Branches of the CPGB, 1945–1970: An Experiment in Self-Organisation?,” Socialist 
History 21 (2002): 47. 
24 This is not to say that the question of actual access to Marxist education is irrelevant. Yet, concrete reference 
figures and modalities of their appropriation are often remarkably similar across ‘educated’ and ‘uneducated’ 
Marxism. Moreover, the lack of availability of even basic canonical literature in most communist parties in the 
1920s was endemic. See Ryazanov’s 1924 summary in Protokoll des V. Kongresses der Kommunistischen 
Internationale (Erlangen: Karl Liebknecht Verlag 1971), 942–4. For a detailed enquiry into the British 
colonial government’s practice of censorship and its limits, see Norman Barrier’s illuminating study Banned: 
Controversial Literature and Political Control in British India 1907–1947 (Columbia [MO]: University of 
Missouri Press 1974). 
25 Single quotation marks are used to indicate potentially problematic terms, especially ‘mass[es].’ With other 
terms, such as ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ revolution, quotation marks appear sparingly in order to avoid over-
cluttering. Furthermore, the terms ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ refer to the revolutionary paradigms elaborated in 
chapter I.3 and nothing else. 
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than softened the contradictions between both. Exonerating empirical ‘mass’ outlook from 
the odium of reaction—and, hence, defining the meaning and scope of ‘progress’—could 
well mean two entirely different things: On the one hand, the universalist socialist or 
Western paradigm rejected religion and religiousness. At the same time, it also tended to 
bypass their empirical manifestations by drawing on a truncated understanding of Marx’s 
epistemology, declaring religion essentially insubstantial and insignificant. On the other, the 
particularist anti-imperialist or Eastern paradigm bypassed even the epistemological 
question of appearance and essence by directly appropriating ‘nationality’ including its 
religio-cultural adjuncts. On the whole the overarching imperative to connect to the 
revolutionary subject mostly precluded criticism of religious mass phenomena. Still, the 
strategies for their reconciliation to a Marxist framework exhibited considerable, and 
meaningful, discrepancy.  
Scope-wise, this book aims to bring together the different regional and individual strands 
between 1920 (the party’s foundation) and 1947 (the end of colonial rule). The focus will be 
on the northern part of the subcontinent, as the communist movement in the South—that is, 
Kerala and the Malabar coast—has developed a complex and rather unique political-cultural 
profile that would have been beyond the resources of the present study to properly 
incorporate. Besides, in the course of the regionalizing trend in research there have been a 
number of illuminating publications on the matter.26 
Indeed, self-limitation to either one of the regional sub-units has become the common 
tune in research, with the turn towards individual biographies as a comparably recent 
addition.27 The reason is that the party displays vastly uneven regional silhouettes on 
political, social, and cultural accounts. A weak or virtually non-existent central party 
organization has further detracted from a possible protagonist role: Repression was ever 
most effective against the All-India body. Also, it has ever depended on the assertive 
regional units, whose existence predates that of the national organization (on the 
subcontinent proper at least). In fact, the CPI may with some justification be described as a 
                                                 
26 See, for example, P. M. Mammen, Communalism vs. Communism: A Study of the Socio-Religious 
Communities and Political Parties in Kerala, 1892–1970 (Calcutta: Minerva Associates 1981); Thomas 
Nossiter, Communism in Kerala: A Study in Political Adaption (London: Hurst 1982); Dilip Menon, Caste, 
Nationalism and Communism in South India: Malabar, 1900–1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1994). 
27 For a number of 21st-century biographical studies, see the grandiose, but unfortunately incomplete work of 
Sibnarayan Ray, In Freedom’s Quest: A Study of the Life and Works of M. N. Roy, 4 vols (Kolkata: Minerva 
Associates 1998–2007); Suchetana Chattopadhyay, An Early Communist; Manjapra, M. N. Roy: Marxism; and, 
although on the same level neither in sophistication nor diligence, Mortuza Khaled, A Study in Leadership: 
Muzaffar Ahmad and the Communist Movement in Bengal (Kolkata: Progressive Publishers 2001). 
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segmental party in analogy to Burton Stein’s conceptualization of the medieval principality 
of Vijayanagara.28 
Nevertheless, a broad perspective merits reconsideration. Comparison, juxtaposition, 
and synthesis promise a more comprehensive introspection than regional studies have to 
offer. Certainly, they have done invaluable work without which this study would not have 
been possible. Considering regional particularism helps to access centrifugal tendencies 
inherent in the central body. Conversely, it can also foster an understanding of unifying 
factors bestowing legitimacy on the notion, and indeed the very existence, of such a central 
body.29  
The danger of cursoriness is mitigated by the fact that the reticence of communists to 
comment on matters of religion reduces the amount of relevant source material, inviting a 
broader perspective. Moreover, it should be emphasized that the All-India party 
organization did occupy a crucial position in subcontinental communism despite its relative 
weakness. It was the instance channeling financial support and higher communist 
knowledge to the activists on the ground. While the sub-units generally held few sympathies 
for the interventions of, or respect towards, the All-India center, it was a necessary nuisance 
guaranteeing their own existence as part of official communism and their partaking in 
prestigious revolutionary wisdom via affiliation to the Comintern. The center possessed a 
degree of ‘guideline competence’ grudgingly acknowledged by the provincial units. 
Therefore, it is only pertinent to complement the consideration of regional communist 
perspectives with a central perspective. 
Writing an intellectual history relating to ‘religion’ is almost poised to run into conceptual 
haziness. This is less due to the diverging ways in which communists address religion rather 
than to its multiple layers of meaning and its complex interrelation with society at large, 
whether subcontinental or Western.30 There is considerable conceptual overlap with other 
categories such as ‘tradition’ or ‘culture,’ the latter even being considered “one of the two or 
three most complicated words.”31 It is not surprising that the considerable and ever-
                                                 
28 Burton Stein, Vijayanagara (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989), esp. 61–7. 
29 For a discussion of this concept with regard to India, see Ainslie Embree, “Indian Civilization and Regional 
Cultures: The Two Realities,” in Region and Nation in India, ed. Paul Wallace (Delhi: American Institute of 
Indian Studies 1985). 
30 Understanding Religion and Popular Culture: Theories, Themes, Products, and Practices, eds. Terry Ray 
Clark and Dan Clanton, Jr. (London: Routledge 2012); see also Keith Yandell and John Paul, “Introduction,” 
in Religion and Public Culture: Encounters and Identities in Modern South India, eds. Keith Yandell and John 
Paul (Richmond: Curzon 2000), v. 
31 Raymond Williams, Keywords, rev. ed. (London: Fontana 1988), 87. 
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increasing number of studies on the matter has hitherto not led to a universally accepted 
definition of ‘religion’ or ‘culture.’  
That said, contributors agree that religion continues to be “one of the most pervasive 
and important characteristics of human society” whose impact as a factor on human history 
has, if anything, been underestimated.32 Yet, defining religion abstractly as a coherent 
system of beliefs and practices “directed toward that which is perceived to be of sacred 
value and transforming power” is of limited analytical value.33 Similarly, definitions of 
‘culture’ along the lines of a “particular way of life […] of a people, a period or a group” 
whose function is “to signify, to produce or to be the occasion for the production of 
meaning” hardly resemble a manageable tool of analysis.34 Robert Segal comes no further 
than distilling a common denominator of regarding religion as “distinctive, irreducibly 
religious part of other domains of life.”35 
Therefore, in view of the close entanglement of religion with other categories of human 
social life, the lack of a working definition of the concept itself, and the highly subjective 
transcendent element in religion, this study opts for a phenomenological approach. Instead 
of discussing religious phenomena and the merit of their identification themselves, the 
incidence of religious imagery or religious content in political mobilization or social 
developments (identified with the help of existing studies and source material alike) will be 
related to the reception in communist quarters. The same principle applies to communist 
texts whenever they occupy themselves with religious, communal, and also cultural content. 
 
Party journals, pamphlets, and internal documents of the CPI, as well as personal 
testimonies of individual communists in the form of memoirs, archived interviews, and 
correspondence form the source material’s mainstay. British files supplement it where 
pertinent. Notably evidence presented in bigger anti-communist trials, the Kanpur 
Conspiracy Case (1924) and the Meerut Conspiracy Case (1929–34), contains a plethora of 
otherwise unavailable material. Personal testimonies have been approached with as much 
diligence as the author could muster. Loaded with personal vanities, factional rivalries, and 
                                                 
32 Clark, “Introduction,” in Clark and Canton, Understanding Religion and Popular Culture, 3. 
33 John Livingston, Anatomy of the Sacred: An Introduction to Religion (Upper Saddle River [NJ]: Prentice 
Hall 2008), 10. 
34 John Storey, Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: An Introduction (New York: Pearson Education 2009), 
1–2. See also Stephen Welch, The Theory of Political Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013), 112–
17. For an anti-theoretical definition of ‘culture,’ see Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Culture Troubles: 
Politics and the Interpretation of Meaning (London: Hurst 2006), esp. 21–3, 86–96, and 145–8. 
35 Robert Segal, “Introduction,” in The Blackwell Companion to the Study of Religion, ed. Robert Segal 
(Oxford: Blackwell 2006), xviii. 
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generally “full of more fiction than facts,” retrospectives and personal accounts of 
individual communists merit special caution.36 So do government sources, notably during 
the scare years around 1920, when surveillance agencies exhibited a pronounced tendency 
to lump together Bolshevism and pan-Islamism.  
The portfolios of the National Archives of India and the Nehru Memorial Museum and 
Library, both Delhi, provided the lion’s share of the sources. The Information Bureau files 
from the West Bengal State Archives, Kolkata, also contain a lot of valuable material, 
especially internal documents and private correspondence. Unfortunately, they have been 
reclassified as of now (2018). A plethora of party papers is available at the library of the CPI 
headquarters at Ajoy Bhavan, and in the well-kept collection of the P. C. Joshi Archive of 
Contemporary History, both Delhi. The Andhra Pradesh State Archives contribute ancillary 
material. Apart from these, the portfolios of the Center for the Study of Social Sciences, the 
National Library of India, and the Ganashakti office, all in Kolkata, and the Sundarayya 
Vignana Kendram, Hyderabad, also have been mined for this study. A surge in the amount 
of material available online has contributed handsomely to the corpus of sources, most 
importantly in the shape of the collection of the Gokhale Library and the complete online 
archive of the Times of India. Unfortunately, both vaults are not freely accessible (anymore). 
Lastly, edited sources comprising mainly the works of Marx and Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, 
reports from Comintern Congresses, and selections of communist party documents complete 
the material at the core of this study.  
The opening chapter provides the background on Marxism and Soviet legacy. Its first part 
discusses those statements of Marx, Engels, and Lenin most relevant to the formation of the 
CPI’s approach to religion. These are (a) Marxist epistemology, (b) the criticism of religion, 
(c) the question of revolutionary subjectivity, that is, of the concrete social group and its 
consciousness that was to bring about revolutionary transformation, and (d) the changes 
induced by Lenin’s postulate of the “right of nations to self-determination.” Their discussion 
proceeds non-dogmatically, that is, does not posit them as a legacy against which to measure 
the CPI’s own theorizing or performance. Rather, they figure as sources taken up by and 
reflected in later communist practice. The chapter’s last part centers on early post-
revolutionary Soviet practice and highlights Stalin’s implementation of ‘nationality policy,’ 
focusing on the bifurcation of revolution into a Western and an Eastern paradigm.  
                                                 
36 Gautam Chattopadhyay, Communism and Bengal’s Freedom Movement: 1917–1929 (Delhi: People’s 
Publishing House 1970), v. 
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Chapter II shifts the perspective to the subcontinent. Its first part explores the direct and 
indirect influence of the swadeshi and khilafat movements and the North American ghadr 
party on the future subcontinental communists. It highlights the intellectual atmosphere 
upon the foundation of the CPI, the education of the first cadres, and the religiously tainted 
anti-imperialism pervading both. The chapter’s second part deals with the CPI’s first years 
until the 1925 Kanpur communist conference. After an exposition of contemporary takes at 
revolution and socialism, it scrutinizes the cultural networks of, the religious allegiances 
forged, and the political connections built by the early protagonists of subcontinental 
communism. These were the Calcutta group of Muzaffar Ahmad, the Bombay communists 
around Sripad Amrit (S. A.) Dange’s journal Socialist, and the Madras trade union activist 
Singaravelu Chettiar. The concluding section on the Kanpur conference illustrates the 
contemporary closeness and overlap of communist and religious notions and idioms. 
Focusing on communist endeavors to enroot in a subcontinental environment, the third 
chapter takes a closer look at three grass-roots complexes forming central instances of 
communist attention during the 1920s. The first part examines the modalities of communist 
appropriation of the Moplah rebellion and the Akali movement. The second section 
discusses the communist understanding and handling of communalism. If Roy established a 
strongly anti-bourgeois narrative in his émigré analyses, local conditions could prompt 
communists ‘on the spot’ to resort to diverging characterizations of communal unrest. This 
was true especially of the 1926 Calcutta riots. The last portion concentrates on the 
communist definition and appropriation of the subcontinent’s proletariat. It problematizes 
the plausibility and feasibility of communist epistemology and categories vis-à-vis the 
realities of working-class consciousness, epitomized in the 1929 communal riot in Bombay. 
Chapter IV accompanies the CPI into the 1930s. It broaches the issues of the failure of 
communist front organizations, the twists and turns in the Comintern line, the leadership’s 
self-education in Marxism at the Meerut prison, and the gradual opening up of 
subcontinental categories of political articulation from a communist angle, specifically 
‘community.’ For the latter development, the approach of the CPI’s political neighbor, the 
Congress Socialist Party (CSP), will be drawn on. By discussing the interrelation of the 
overarching political line with the—at first theoretical—programmatic approximation to 
indigenous religion and community, the conditions for and patterns of future communist 
communophilia are mapped. The chapter’s final segment focuses on the prelude to the 
‘nationality period’ of the 1940s: The interpretative reconfiguration and eventual 
appropriation of Muslim communalism in the aftermath of the 1937 elections.  
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The closing fifth chapter is dedicated to the portrayal of the CPI’s episode of supreme 
situatedness from 1942 until shortly before independence. Tracing the party’s impulse to 
devise new ways of national unity by implementing a highly localized version of Leninist 
nationality policy, the chapter explores the blatantly cultural and religious dimensions of 
this intense and outstanding phase in the party’s history. It discusses the extent to which 
“national,” religious and cultural propaganda became indistinguishable, leading to a 
comprehensive ‘culturalization’ of the communist view of the subcontinent by the mid-
1940s. Finally, the closing part focuses on the last-minute efforts of the CPI to ditch its 
nationality policy, and on the limits of communist epistemology by showcasing the 
unflinching efforts to retain revolutionary optimism in the face of the 1947 hecatombs. 
 
If not indicated otherwise, all emphases are original.  
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I Delimiting Progress 
 
I.1 Epistemology, Consciousness, and Revolution 
 
I.1.1 The Essence as Science 
 
Dissatisfaction with the apparently phenomenal character of things has ever been a feature 
of the quest for understanding. The approach of distinguishing between content and form, 
between the essence and appearance of a thing has informed much of what is understood as 
the modern apex of epistemology: science.37 Typically, within this dichotomy the focus of 
interest has been on the former component, leading to the tendency for form and appearance 
to gradually become “symptoms rather than causes.”38 After the demise of religious dogma 
as the central instance of objectivity, recognition of something as ‘scientific’ has conferred 
the highest level of acclamation and respectability. Marxism, a child of the classical 
bourgeois age, was no different. Referring to Hegelian dialectics, the materialist analysis of 
society developed by Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) undertook 
to adhere to the standards of scientific procedure, notably in its later days. Soon, their 
followers claimed to wield a “proper science which could produce all that was to be 
expected from such a science.”39  
The relation of appearance and essence is of fundamental importance to Marx’s oeuvre. 
His peculiar dialectical treatment of the question is best illustrated in the analysis of the 
commodity, the core element of the critique of political economy. Basically, a commodity 
has a double character: Being simultaneously a material thing and an abstract container of 
working time, it is a sensory–non-sensory thing. A material thing can have usage value 
without having (exchange) value, but not vice versa: Usage value is a thing’s materiality 
upon which the exchange value thrives and endows the thing with qualities wholly unrelated 
to its material self. However, this is not just an illusion. Under the predominance of 
capitalist relations of production and exchange, the thing appears primarily as something it 
                                                 
37 See Frank Kuhne, “Marx’ Ideologiebegriff im Kapital.” In Das Automatische Subjekt bei Marx: Studien zum 
“Kapital,” ed. H.-G. Bensch and F. Kuhne (Lüneburg: zu Klampen 1998), 20–1. 
38 Thomas Ryba, “Phenomenology of Religion,” in The Blackwell Companion to the Study of Religion, ed. 
Robert Segal (Oxford: Blackwell 2006), 95.  
39 Lucien Sève, Marxismus und Theorie der Persönlichkeit, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt: Verlag Marxistische Blätter 
1977), 23–4. This ‘scientification’ manifested itself in frequent recourses to natural sciences, whose believed 
almightiness was often invoked to support Marx’s tenets: Iring Fetscher, “Von der Philosophie des Proletariats 
zur proletarischen Weltanschauung,” in Marxismus-Studien: Zweite Folge, ed. Iring Fetscher (Tübingen: Mohr 
1957), 27–8. 
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is not: as a bearer of value, of abstract, crystallized societal labor—in short, a commodity. If 
the usage value refers to the sensual, material quality of a thing (the content of its essence), 
the value represents the ideological quirks and twists (the form of its appearance) that the 
thing acquires as a consequence of being produced and circulated in a capitalist society.40  
The implications of this realization for the consciousness of the members of capitalist 
society prompted Marx to include an excursus of crucial importance—the section on the 
commodity fetish in the first volume of Capital. Basically, Marxism’s impellent message 
consists of making society’s proletarian section conscious of the nature and cause of their 
misery—that is, the production of commodities instead of things—and, secondarily, 
acquainting them with the means to rid themselves of it. In contrast, the section on the 
commodity fetish implicitly but incisively questions the prerequisites for revolutionary 
action by emphasizing capitalism’s totalizing tendency. This tendency affects each section 
of society equally, including the proletariat: The hybrid and contradictory quality that 
products of labor assume when they are produced as commodities becomes a natural quality 
of these products in the minds of the members of a commodity-producing society. Marx 
termed this mental naturalization ideology, “necessarily wrong consciousness.” It is this 
entanglement of and confusion around essence and appearance that lies at the heart of the 
quasi-automatic reproduction of capitalist relations by the members of capitalist society.41  
This cursory glance illustrates the centrality of the analytical distinction between 
essence and appearance to Marx’s approach—and his recognition of the far-reaching 
enmeshment of the two. Separating them from each other was “abstract mysticism” to 
him.42 In contrast, mainstream Marxism has tended to favor a simpler, essence-heavy 
interpretation of social relations. And yet its characteristic reductionism could link up to and 
further certain notions developed in Marx and Engels’s oeuvre. The Critique of Hegel’s 
Philosophy of the State concluded that if appearance contradicted essence, the latter was 
more central to understanding.43 In Capital, Marx remarked that the appearance of things 
often inversely represented their “true” nature.44 Engels cast the matter in a more 
                                                 
40 Karl Marx, Capital: Third Volume, MEW 25:51–8; and 293–6 for a description of “merchant capital” as 
“pure being.” 
41 Marx, Capital: First Volume, MEW 23:85–90. See also Kuhne, “Marx’ Ideologiebegriff,” 20–4. The section 
on the commodity fetish has been a highly formative factor in the genesis of later critical Marxist thought in 
the vein of Karl Korsch, the early Georg Lukács, and the Frankfurt Institute of Social Study. 
42 Marx, “Critique of Hegelian State Law,” in MEW 1:265 (quote); see also Hans-Georg Backhaus, “Zur 
Dialektik der Wertform,” in Beiträge zur Marxistischen Erkenntnistheorie, ed. Alfred Schmidt (Frankfurt am 
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straightforward mold: where chance was fiddling about on the surface, “it is governed by 
inner hidden laws, and it merely becomes a matter of discovering these laws.”45 
It was also Engels’s work that provided the template to manageably hierarchize the 
relationship between appearance and essence. In his immensely influential analytical 
division of society into base and superstructure, production relations in their entirety formed 
the basis of every social environment. A certain kind of superstructure complemented the 
base according to the historical stage of development. It consisted of both a legal and an 
“ideological apparatus” comprised of morals, philosophy, and religion, among others. Even 
if the relations of production could not exhaustively determine the superstructure, the latter 
depended heavily on them.46 
Most subsequent historical materialists conceded only very limited autonomy to this 
“ideological apparatus.” In their view, its only role as a ‘useful’ part of the society it 
belonged to was to legitimize the configuration of the base.47 While determined, its own 
power of determination was negligible. Engels admitted the operation of “innumerable 
crisscrossing forces” in the constitution of historical events. However, in the final analysis 
he could bring himself no further than conceding that elements belonging to the 
superstructure determined the form of social struggles, but never their (invariably economic) 
content. Engels’s late admission that his and Marx’s formulations were “partly to blame for 
the fact that the younger people sometimes lay more stress on the economic side than is due 
to it” went largely unnoticed—no more than a footnote in the historical tragedy of 
Marxism.48  
 
 
I.1.2 The Physics of Metaphysics 
 
In Marxist tradition, it was religion and religiosity that became prime examples of the 
operation of forces of the superstructure. They formed standard cases for the unequivocal 
hierarchization of appearance and essence, and form and content. Even though Marx never 
wrote a treatise on religion proper, his statements on the matter (besides earning him a place 
among the most pointed critics of metaphysical belief systems) serve as argumentative 
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pillars for a sustained de-essentialization of religion. Also, he saw no need to pay special 
attention to it. Henri Chambre comments that while reading Marx “one gets the impression 
that he refers to religion and the religious problem only in passing,” on the occasion of 
another topic.49  
In the vein of Ludwig Feuerbach, Marx started out by considering god and religion as 
creations of man, instead of the other way round.50 Ultimately dismissing the state as a 
factor in the emancipation from religion in On the Jewish Question, Marx turned to a 
“practical-materialist” interpretation in the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. This 
latter piece contains his most famous phrases on the subject: “The criticism of religion is the 
prerequisite for all criticism [.…] Religion is indeed the self-consciousness and self-esteem 
of man who either hasn’t yet found himself or has already lost himself again.”51 Its roots lay 
in the social relations: 
This state and this society produce religion, which is an inverted consciousness of the world, 
because they are an inverted world. Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopedic 
compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d’honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral 
sanction, its solemn complement, and its universal basis of consolation and justification. It is the 
fantastic realization of the human essence since the human essence has not acquired any true 
reality. The struggle against religion is therefore indirectly the struggle against that world whose 
spiritual aroma is religion. Religious suffering is at one and the same time the expression of real 
suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the 
heart of a heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.52 
From these formidable aphorisms, Marx deduced the necessity for philosophy to become a 
radical, socially transformative force: “The criticism of religion ends with the doctrine that 
for man the supreme being is man, and thus with the categorical imperative to overthrow all 
conditions in which man is a debased, enslaved, neglected, and contemptible being.”53 The 
criticism of religion led to criticism of the world that made religion necessary: 
That the secular basis detaches itself from itself and establishes itself as an independent realm in 
the clouds can only be explained by the cleavages and self-contradictions within this secular 
basis. The latter must, therefore, in itself be both understood in its contradiction and 
revolutionized in practice.54 (Emphasis added.) 
Yet argumentative patterns and numerous allusions suggest that Marx didn’t regard religion 
as utterly insubstantial. Although “religious sentiment” was the product of social conditions, 
Marx was clear that the result was in fact an “independent realm” whose illusionary 
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character—much like the exchange value in the case of the commodity—was nonetheless 
real.55 This was because religion was not an ontic given, but resulted from human agency 
within certain social conditions that in turn endowed the products of this agency with sense. 
The relation between spiritual phenomena and material social conditions therefore could not 
be a uniformly hierarchical one as the former could claim a degree, however limited, of 
ideological autonomy.  
Marxism, beginning with Engels, tended to separate religion from human agency, and 
reduced the former to a structural appendix of society. In the Anti-Dühring, Engels 
dismissed religion as “nothing else than the phantasmagorical reflection in the minds of men 
of those external forces which dominate their daily existence, a reflection in which earthly 
forces assume the shape of supernatural forces.” Gods were nothing more than 
representatives of historical forces. The power of the gods lasted only as long as these forces 
reigned supreme. Their overthrow would end the religious reflection, “for the simple reason 
that there will be nothing left to reflect.”56  
This straightforward and manageable characterization of religion as a secondary mental 
reflex to relations of production would govern mainstream Marxism. More sophisticated 
considerations and complications of the relation of religion, consciousness, and material 
conditions could not win through. Rather, the dominant Marxist vein of criticism of religion 
would lean on one of Marx’s dicta that seemed to trace all sorts of ideology to an easily 
identifiable stratum:  
In every epoch, the ruling thoughts are the thoughts of the ruling class. […] The class which 
disposes over the means of material production simultaneously disposes over the means for 
spiritual production, hence it disposes over the commonality of thoughts of those lacking the 
means for spiritual production. The ruling thoughts are nothing more than the ideal expression of 
the ruling material conditions.57 (Emphasis added.) 
Importantly, the Marxist mainstream would read Marx’s de-personalizing caveat in the last 
sentence as a re-personalization. Capitalist society would be understood less as the objective 
and abstract rule of capitalist relations of production than as the subjective, concrete rule of 
the bourgeois class. From the point of view of Marxist agitators, capitalism, dominance, and 
religion were bourgeois capitalism, dominance, and religion. All of these were real among 
non-bourgeois social strata not so much as a result of totalized, anonymous social processes 
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involving all parts of society, but of the meddling of class enemies who artificially 
implanted them from outside.58  
 
 
I.1.3 “Proletarian Consciousness” 
 
Indeed, when it came to the population segment that was to take up the struggle for 
socialism, problematization of consciousness had to yield before historical optimism. This 
optimism, subsequently systematized into a dogma in Marxism, derived from the role and 
position of the working class, or proletariat, in the process of production. 
The Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right characterized the proletariat as an “estate 
which is the liquidation of all estates.” The proletariat was “not the mass oppressed 
mechanically by the burden of society, but emerged from its acute liquidation.”59 This 
liquidation had come about by industrialization, which had deprived the small producers of 
their means of production and forced them to sell their labor force. Similarly, 
industrialization had summarily dealt with other vestiges of traditional society: “It destroyed 
as far as possible ideology, religion, morality, etc. and where it could not do this, made them 
into a palpable lie.”60 
In spite of all the misery, deprivation, and suffering concomitant with this process, 
Marx hailed it as progressive because it ended the parochial narrowness of pre-bourgeois 
society. Communism was the answer to this development, its negation and fulfilment at the 
same time. And it was ‘automatically’ growing out of social conflicts of the epoch: “The 
theoretical tenets of the communists are in no way based on ideas or principles that have 
been invented or discovered by this or that do-gooder. They are only general expressions of 
actual relations of an existing class struggle.”61 Here Marx and Engels made their most 
crucial designation: The existence of a declassed and exploited stratum of society 
necessarily implicated the existence of class struggle. Under capitalism, the proletariat was 
the “only revolutionary class” and the agent of “proletarian consciousness.”62  
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The last category, essential for the proletariat if it were to develop from an objectively 
disadvantaged class (a ‘class in itself’) to one consciously pursuing its interests (a ‘class for 
itself’), turned out to be most precarious. For what constituted “proletarian consciousness?” 
Was it the actual mind-set of the empirical working class, or the avowed determination to 
overthrow the present order of society? If these were not one and the same, to what extent 
would a non-revolutionary “proletarian consciousness” be excused by being proletarian 
socially, and thus the mere quality “proletarian” ontologized as a category of progress in its 
own right?  
To answer this question, it is important to understand that ‘truth’ was not an intellectual 
concept for Marx, but very much a matter of sensory practice in a social process—and 
thereby related to ideology, false consciousness. Hence he proceeded from the assumption 
that the truth of communism—including practical “proletarian consciousness”—had to be 
performed in order to be at all conceivable. Nothing less than revolution itself was required 
for the production of communist consciousness. “In the revolutionary act changing oneself 
merges with changing the conditions,” with the proletariat shedding “all that still had 
remained with it from its previous social position.”63  
However, the proletariat had already cast off much of its ideological ballast in the 
process of its constitution. “If the mass ever had some theoretical ideas, for example, 
religion, they have since long ago been dissolved by the circumstances.”64 The Communist 
Manifesto stipulated that “the laws, morals, religion are to [the worker] bourgeois prejudices 
behind which hide as many bourgeois interests.”65 In his famous studies on the Condition of 
the Working Classes in England, Engels concluded that if the workers had ever had “some 
religion it is only nominal, not even theoretical—practically [they live] only for this world.” 
And further: “Among the masses one finds complete indifference towards religion 
everywhere.”66  
Moreover, Engels himself went on to practically demonstrate the elasticity of the 
boundaries of irreligious ‘proletarian consciousness’ on the example of Christian 
“communist” peasant communities in the USA. Engels emphasized the religious tolerance 
of the “Harmonists,” who conceded to all members their own opinion “so long as they let 
the others be and abstain from sowing dissension on matters of faith.” Obviously, Engels’s 
vague appraisal could well cover repressive communitarian religiosity. Neither that the 
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village school rejected “sciences” nor the fact that the community had built a “palace” for 
the priest to live in seemed to trouble him.67 He regarded it as an “obvious matter of 
indifference whether those who prove by their actions the practicability of communal living 
believe in one God, in twenty or in none at all; if they have an irrational religion, this is an 
obstacle in the way of communal living.”68 This ambiguous formulation conveniently 
ignored the specific character of both “irrational religion” and “communal living.” This 
complex would evolve into a sore spot in Marxist heritage, as even Marx failed to arrive at a 
consistent position on pre-bourgeois forms of “communal living” such as the Russian 
peasant commune.69  
 With this in mind, the slogans fleshing out the role and activity of “the communists” 
acquired a somewhat different flavor. The Communist Manifesto proclaimed that they “have 
no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole.” They “support 
every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things.”70 In 
the implementation of this pledge, the meaning of what constituted “revolutionary” was to 
become crucial. Buoyed by the Zeitgeist of 1848, Marx and Engels assumed that the 
remodeling of social relations would naturally take place along the lines of the Communist 
Manifesto. But as it would turn out, their phrasing allowed for the support of quite diverse 
efforts at social remodeling as long as they could be linked to the “interests of the 
proletariat.”  
Partly as a precaution against arbitrary use of the term ‘revolutionary,’ Marx had laid 
down a much-neglected minimum demand for communists worth their salt in the 18th 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte: To shed the “traditions of all dead generations” weighing 
“like a nightmare on the brains of the living.” He cautioned that they could assert 
themselves even under the guise of revolutionary change, and advocated the avoidance of 
those who “anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service, borrowing from them 
names, battle slogans, and costumes.” A modern revolution could derive its “poetry” only 
from the future, and it could not begin until it had “cast off all superstition in the past.”71 
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I.2 From Philosophy to Function. The Bolshevization of Marxism 
 
As the protagonist of the first ‘successful’ revolution under the banner of Marxism, 
Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (1870–1924), alias Lenin, probably deserves the distinction of 
being the most seminal implementer of Marxism in history. Two main factors determined 
his approach: the (still largely feudal) conditions in his native country Russia, and the 
impulse to translate Marxist tenets into practical politics. 
 
 
I.2.1 “Third-Rate Opinions”: Bolshevik Atheism 
 
Due to the eminent position of the Russian Orthodox Church in both Czarist government 
and Russian society, Lenin’s record of occupation with religious matters is more 
comprehensive than Marx’s and Engels’s. His practical disposition drove him to prefer 
unambiguous stances on social phenomena over intricate dialectics, and peremptory 
solutions to potential twists and contradictions over a philosophy of self-doubt. In the first 
place, he held that inferior considerations must not obstruct revolutionary mobilization: 
Addressing the village poor, Lenin declared that the social democrats advocated freedom of 
conscience including the right to proselytization.72 Also, he was ready to countenance 
cooperation with priests and churchmen in the struggle against despotism. “We socialists 
must lend this movement our support, carrying the demands of honest and sincere members 
of the clergy to their conclusion.” The criterion was whether the priests were ready to use 
the “spiritual power” of their “weapon” (!) in the socialist sense. In addition, he maintained 
that Czarist oppression rendered even religion a victim, and even regretted that the workers 
had failed to extend support to it. This inclusive stance was possible because history had 
purportedly divested religion of its hold over the core Bolshevik constituency:73  
The modern class-conscious worker, reared by large-scale factory industry and enlightened by 
urban life, contemptuously casts aside religious prejudices, leaves heaven to the priests and […] 
takes the side of socialism, which enlists science in the battle against the fog of religion.74 
Under conditions of modernity, the anti-religious thrust of the communist movement lost 
urgency. Rather than being a separate doctrine, atheism was to proceed from the entirety of 
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the party program, the implementation of which would solve the problem of religion. Lenin 
was all for combating the half-heartedness of  
‘Christians’. But that does not mean in the least that the religious question ought to be advanced 
to first place, where it does not belong at all; nor does it mean that we should allow the forces of 
the really revolutionary economic and political struggle to be split up on account of third-rate 
opinions or senseless ideas, rapidly losing all political importance, rapidly being swept out as 
rubbish by the very course of economic development.75 
Yet in case that the “economic development” lacked secularizing punch, Lenin would 
conflate the “ruling thoughts” (Marx)—or any un-communist consciousness, for that 
matter—with the concrete ruling class, disregarding abstract social relations. Endemic 
religiosity, he declared, was kept alive artificially: 
The economic oppression of the workers inevitably calls forth and engenders every kind of 
political oppression and social humiliation, the coarsening and darkening of the spiritual and 
moral life of the masses. […] Religion is one of the forms of spiritual oppression which 
everywhere weighs down heavily upon the masses.76 
It was the “reactionary bourgeoisie” that took to resurrecting religious politics and sectarian 
unrest in order to divert the “masses” from the struggle against society’s fundamental 
political and economic relations. The ‘false,’ religious part of consciousness—tellingly, a 
falseness that in Lenin’s view extended no further than interreligious strife—was reduced to 
bourgeois meddling. This anticipated the departure from criticism of religion as an ideology 
towards its perception as a technique of rule. Operationalizing it as one of the “instruments 
of bourgeois reaction that serve to defend exploitation and to befuddle the working class,” 
Lenin bent Marx’s famous quote on religion as “opium of the people” (emphasis added) 
almost to the point of declaring religion an opium for the people, administered by the 
cunning hands of the bourgeoisie.77 
Accordingly, Marxists had “to know how to combat religion,” which necessitated a 
“dialectical materialist” approach—the core of which consisted of leaving the fight against 
religion to the changing socio-economic conditions. Class war assumed priority over atheist 
propaganda.78 Lenin was ready to countenance the consequences of this stance. For 
example, in the case of a strike, Marxists were  
obliged to prioritize the success of the strike movement and to work decidedly against splitting 
the workers into atheists and Christians. […] Under these circumstances atheist propaganda can 
be redundant, even obnoxious […] from the point of view of true advance of the class struggle.79  
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It was only logical, therefore, that Lenin would relegate atheism to a secondary phenomenon 
on the revolutionary party’s agenda: “We are absolutely opposed to giving the slightest 
offence to their [pious workers’; PH] religious convictions, but we recruit them in order to 
educate them in the spirit of our programme.”80 
Even taking recourse to socialism’s affinity to the world of religious terms was a 
perfectly viable option. An “agitator” could employ idioms “most common to the 
unenlightened mass” for educational ends. Communists had to avoid creating the impression 
of “overemphasizing” the struggle against religion, which could lead to “obfuscation of the 
difference between bourgeois and socialist struggle against religion.”81 What mattered in the 
assessment of religion and the struggle against it alike, then, was their social location more 
than anything else. 
When it came to the application of these formulae after the October Revolution, the 
imperatives arising from the precarious situation of the Bolsheviks confirmed the theoretical 
thrust: As a pragmatist, Lenin had a keen sense of the limited viability of attacks on ‘mass 
culture,’ especially in the tense post-revolutionary years; and as a historical materialist, 
religiosity hardly mattered in the final analysis anyway. The resulting hierarchy of 
emancipation of the Bolsheviks accordingly compromised libertarian principles. For 
example, in 1918 Lenin exhorted the delegates at the first All-Russian Female Workers’ 
Congress to be patient on the issue of abolition of patriarchal customs. The injurious effect 
of such measures on religious sentiment would outweigh the ideal damage to a communist 
project of emancipation tolerating these customs—ignoring the very material disadvantages 
women were told to put up with.82 
His 1919 draft of the program of the Communist Party of Russia (Bolshevik) (CPR[B]) 
envisaged the separation of state and church as the first stage on the way to the attainment of 
the “factual emancipation of the working masses from religious prejudices,” aided by 
“scientifically enlightening and anti-religious propaganda.” However, “injuring religious 
sentiments” had to be avoided because it “merely leads to the reinforcement of religious 
fanaticism.”83 The exact nature of the envisaged propaganda remained obscure, since he did 
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not reveal the secret of how to combat “religious prejudices” without hurting “religious 
sentiments,” or even how to properly distinguish between the two. Lenin’s maxim was to 
avoid “sharp measures” as they “could rouse the masses against us.”84 Be that as it may—
but what “masses,” and what about the workers, the proper subject of revolutionary change? 
 
 
I.2.2 Exit Workers, Enter the ‘Masses’ 
 
Although the proletariat was the proper revolutionary class, by the early 20th century there 
had still been no comprehensive proletarian upheaval. The problem was, as August 
Thalheimer put it, that “under capitalist conditions, only a minority of the workers was able 
to liberate their minds entirely.”85 Lenin for once arrived at the insight that the messianic 
class had trouble living up to its historical role, and came to repose remarkably little faith in 
its innate revolutionary capability. As early as 1902, he had argued in What Is to Be Done 
that the workers “were not, and could not be, conscious of the irreconcilable antagonism of 
their interests to the whole of the modern political and social system […] theirs was not yet 
Social-Democratic consciousness.” If left to themselves the workers would develop only 
“trade-union consciousness,” that is, “the conviction that it is necessary to combine in 
unions, fight the employers, and strive to compel the government to pass necessary labor 
legislation, etc.”86  
In this situation, “political consciousness can be brought to the workers only from 
without.” The state of affairs demanded “a high degree of consciousness from us Social-
Democrats.” ‘True’ social democrats had to provide the workers with “real, comprehensive, 
and live political knowledge.” This was to be the task of the “vanguard”—an organization of 
professional revolutionaries.87  
Apart from conceiving of a vanguard party as the guiding light towards revolution, this 
early text by Lenin introduced another novel category: the “masses.” Formally, they 
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constituted the “majority” comprising not only workers, but also all other exploited 
population segments. Lenin explicitly referred to the rural proletariat and poor peasants.88 
Yet the course of the term’s application revealed the vagueness of its meaning and scope. It 
provided a convenient way of referring to large population sections whose explicit 
identification would have invited disquieting investigations into the adequacy of their 
inclusion in the revolutionary phalanx (notably the peasantry, which Marx had regarded as 
hopelessly backward). This vagueness turned out to be advantageous for the term’s career. 
In comparison to the workers, the stocks of the “masses” rose steeply in Lenin’s model of 
revolution, even more so once the extra-European world came into revolutionary 
perspective. The task of a communist avant-garde worth its salt consisted of “serving the 
masses and expressing their correctly identified interests.”89 Lenin imagined the ideal social 
democrat as a “tribune of the people” rather than a petty trade union secretary.90 Postulates 
along these lines left considerable space for the interpretation of what exactly “serving” the 
“people” meant, and what was identified as the essence of their “interests.”  
To the extent that an innate ‘proletarian consciousness’ evolving into mere “trade-union 
consciousness” was explicitly distrusted, the working class lost its distinctiveness as a 
revolutionary factor. In fact, Lenin’s considerations ushered in the gradual replacement of 
proletarian—that is, socialist—revolution with mass—that is, populist—revolution. The 
consequence was the transfer of an ontologized notion of progress from the proletariat onto 
the ‘masses’ as the rising agent of revolutionary essence. This transfer would really come 
into its own in Lenin’s most fateful revolutionary innovation: the discovery of the national 
question. 
 
 
I.2.3 The National Extension  
 
Benedict Anderson stipulated that nationalism had proven “an uncomfortable anomaly for 
Marxist theory and, precisely for that reason, has been largely elided, rather than 
confronted.”91 Even while this is correct insofar as Marxism has produced little in the way 
of systematic analysis of nationalism, Anderson missed the point. What is remarkable is not 
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that Marxism has elided nationalism. It is rather that despite the chasm between both frames 
of reference and the resulting, oftentimes fierce, mutual opposition, there has been such an 
abundance of interplay of these two largely historically parallel and even contingent 
concepts; and that mainstream Marxism became guilty of, as Neil Lazarus has put it, 
“overestimation of the emancipatory potential of independence.”92 
In a historical materialist view, the homogenization of population and territory 
associated with the creation of nation-states clearly was more progressive than feudal 
fragmentation. Marx regarded large and economically contiguous territories as helpful for 
the unfolding of capitalism, and hence the proletariat’s power. In other cases, a bourgeois 
form of government constituted a preferable alternative to feudal despotism. Generally, 
however, national questions never attracted much of Marx’s and Engels’s attention, let alone 
sympathy.93 
This changed appreciably over the course of Marxism’s development. When Lenin 
published his seminal 1914 essay On the Right of Nations to Self-Determination, the matter 
had long been the subject of heated debate.94 His contribution consisted of declaring 
nationalism an indispensable part of history. Since the bourgeoisie’s victories over 
feudalism had everywhere been won with the help of national movements, it was a 
necessary component of the transition from a feudal society to a bourgeois one. Also, 
production and distribution of commodities could flourish only when the bourgeoisie 
conquered the “inner market” and created a contiguous territory. The full and free 
development of said territory’s language and literature was another requirement for “truly 
free and comprehensive trade corresponding to modern capitalism.”95  
For all these reasons, the process of national unification was a “huge historical 
progress.”96 The deceptive appearance of reactionary nationalism concealed the seeds of 
socialist progress burgeoning in the “awakening of the masses from the feudal slumber,” in 
their fight for people’s rule and national sovereignty. The struggle for socialism had to 
phrase all democratic questions—including the national one—in a revolutionary way.97 This 
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was especially relevant for colonial countries. With regard to them, Lenin declared that the 
“class-conscious proletarians can take no other path than the national.”98 
Such a characterization implied two crucial designations. First, regarding the creation of 
nation-states as a prerequisite for socialism endowed nationalism itself with an innately 
progressive quality. Furthermore, in contrast to Marx, who had ever argued the case for the 
establishment of bourgeois-capitalist relations in whatever shape, Lenin defined their most 
common political form—the bourgeois nation-state—as the intermediary goal. Second, by 
advocating the creation of linguistically and—as illustrated by the reference to literature—
culturally contiguous territories, the communist project of universal emancipation developed 
a soft spot for ethnic, linguistic, and religious particularism. Lenin’s avowals to the contrary, 
dismissing “national culture” as a bourgeois maneuver, could not prevent the logic of the 
identification of the two from unfolding—particularly because mobilization for the right of 
all nations to their own nation-states soon grew into the proletariat’s “most important 
practical task.” The supreme Bolshevik himself held that those who did not seize every 
popular movement against imperialism in order to further the proletariat’s struggle for 
socialism were bad revolutionaries.99  
Even though it may seem tempting, it is not sufficient to label this approach mere 
political pragmatism in the face of mushrooming national movements. Beyond his 
operationalizing impetus, Lenin insisted that Marxism had to remain at the pulse of the 
current of history in order to retain its relevance as a revolutionary philosophy. Large-scale 
mobilization outside its purview indicated that it had lost touch with the historical 
development which, according to historical materialism, inevitably unfolded towards 
socialism. An infuriated Lenin, exhibiting the typical synthesis of philosophical esotericism 
and pragmatic politics, maintained in a heated discussion over national self-determination 
with CPR(B) theoretician Nikolai Bucharin that it was absurd not to acknowledge what was 
happening as it would assert itself anyway.100  
Put bluntly, the very existence of popular movements made them into proponents of 
socialism irrespective of their agenda. Both the political necessity to broaden the 
revolutionary base and the conviction that the fostering of revolution was inevitable even in 
seemingly unconnected quarters, interacted in shaping the specific Leninist approach. 
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Theoretically, the appropriation of nationalism mirrored the turn towards the ‘masses’ in 
lieu of the proletariat. In time, this led to the obfuscation of Lenin’s own distinction between 
progressive nationalism and reactionary national culture, and introduced religion and culture 
into the core of Marxist campaigns. 
 
 
 
I.3 Progress Applied: The Eastern Face of the Soviet Janus 
 
Herbert Aptheker, senior member of the Communist Party of the USA, reproduced a 
common misunderstanding when he opined that the Russian revolution marked the dawn of 
the “post-religious phase of human history.”101 With regard to Soviet Muslims, the opposite 
might be argued; besides, Aptheker’s assessment does not hold even with respect to 
Christianity. William G. Rosenberg concludes that the CPR(B)’s anti-religious measures 
were “remarkably mild.” This is even more noteworthy if one takes into account the 
Orthodox clergy’s vehement anti-Bolshevist stance during the civil war. Even though the 
Russian Orthodox Church had been expropriated and relieved of most of its social functions 
after the revolution, the Bolshevik focus on the Church as an institution implied that the non-
institutionalized parts of Soviet Christianity were beyond the reach of religious legislation 
and anticlerical measures.102 For instance, evangelical sects prospered under the new regime. 
On a related note, it has been argued that Soviet morals essentially conformed to 
conservative Christian norms.103 However, as the focus of this study is on the example 
provided by the Soviet approach towards the ‘East,’ it is Islam rather than Christianity that 
will be considered in the following and the unfolding of Bolshevik policy suggests that an 
examination of the religious issue is best undertaken on the premises of Soviet nationality 
policy.  
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I.3.1 The Cultural Divide of Revolution 
 
Fleshing out self-determination of nations after the revolution was left to Lenin’s 
lieutenants, notably Josef Vissarionovich Jugashvili, alias Stalin (1879–1953), the People’s 
Commissar for Nationality Questions in the immediate post-revolutionary years. In 
principle, Stalin shared Lenin’s conviction that nationalism, although historically important, 
diverted attention away from the class struggle and was opposed to socialist 
internationalism. “The principle of self-determination must be an instrument in the struggle 
for socialism and must be subordinated to the principles of socialism.”104  
Nevertheless, Stalin’s nationality policy exhibited a peculiar interpretation of these 
“principles of socialism.” Nationalities were to receive regional autonomy, special rights, 
and were technically even entitled to leave the Soviet state. Even though neither Lenin nor 
Stalin would countenance actual secessions, practically equating them with counter-
revolution, these concessions represented their honest conviction that nationally and 
culturally unfettered development was considered a revolutionary achievement in its own 
right, and best attained under the tutelage of the Bolsheviks, who obviously deemed 
themselves the better nationalists. Stalin even declared that every nation had the right to 
return to its traditional order if it wished to.105  
On the cultural plane, Stalin was ready to foster such a return himself. For while the 
CPR(B) considered the population of the Eastern territories “culturally backward,” a 
revolutionary perspective demanded that the nationalities themselves, as a historically 
progressive factor, be judged more respectfully. Their delayed evolution was declared a 
consequence of Czarist oppression, and the Russian proletariat, belonging to the erstwhile 
oppressing nation, had to proceed with “special caution and special attention towards the 
[…] national feelings among the working masses of the suppressed […] nations.”106 The 
way to “raise the cultural level” consisted of the “development of maximum autonomy,” 
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apparently the silver bullet of emancipation. It was only logical, then, that the obvious 
difference of such an ethnophiliac approach to the considerably more culturally self-critical 
thrust of the revolution in the Russian heartland led Stalin to distinguish between the 
“proletarian revolution of the West and the anti-imperialist movement of the East”107 
(emphasis added).  
This conceptual division merits closer attention. The distinction between a class-centric 
approach on the one hand and one based on culturally defined collectives (or nationalities) 
on the other would assert itself to the degree of dissolution of any unitary vision of 
emancipation. Given the remote, tenuous, and above all hypothetical character of the link 
between the branches of revolution—in Stalin’s words, nebulous educational efforts—what 
he really seemed to envisage and proceeded to give practical shape to were two diverging 
kinds of revolution: On the one hand, Russian culture was considered to be infested with the 
vestiges of Czarist rule and therefore urgently in need of reform. On the other, in the case of 
the East, the Bolsheviks regarded questionable cultural features such as patriarchy and 
religiosity as artificially fostered and as basically external phenomena.108 
From this viewpoint, the major obstacle to the implementation of revolutionary tenets 
could only be the “haste, often becoming gross tactlessness […] in the matter of sovietiz-ing 
[sic] the border regions.” Their population was to partake in the “higher moral and material 
proletarian culture,” albeit in “forms corresponding to the way of life and the national 
imprint of these masses.” For example, if the people of Dagestan, “heavily infected by 
religious prejudices, follow the communists ‘on the grounds of the sharia’ it is clear that the 
direct path of struggle against religious prejudices in this land has to be replaced by indirect, 
more cautious paths.”109  
These “more cautious” paths to the “higher and material proletarian culture” culminated 
in Stalin’s declaration in November 1920 at the Congress of the Peoples of Dagestan that 
“the Russian government grants the full right to self-determination according to its own 
laws and customs to every people. The Soviet government deems the sharia a […] justified, 
traditional right.”110 After the victorious conclusion of the civil war, this could be no 
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admission of weakness. The mullahs of the Terek region equally benefited from the 
benevolence towards Islamic law when Stalin reassured them that the Soviet government 
had no intention “to declare war on the sharia.”111 
This had not materialized out of thin air. Already in December 1917, the Kremlin had 
issued a manifesto addressed to the “working Moslems” declaring inviolable all their “faiths 
and customs” together with national and “cultural institutions.”112 In January 1918, a 
Commissariat for the Internal Affairs of Muslims (Muskom) was established; a central 
Bureau for Muslim Communist Organizations followed in November. Already in July, the 
Bolsheviks had appealed to Muslim workers to join a socialist army made up exclusively of 
Muslims. A separate Muslim communist party was also set up.113 
A similar pattern was adopted towards ‘national-revolutionary’ currents among the 
Buddhist population, in whose case the Bolshevik vision linked up with the tradition, rituals, 
and messianic expectations of the Lamaist world.114 As long as there were no efforts at 
political separation, which—such as the Basmachi rebellion—were ruthlessly crushed, 
accounting for the “forms corresponding to the way of life” generally discouraged 
intervention into, and rather promoted, their ‘internal’ cultural affairs. These endeavors to 
revolutionize Muslims in the Eastern way fortified rather than transformed their societies 
and, through continued positive reference to Islam, relegated them to a different 
revolutionary class. 
 
The Congress of the Peoples of the East, convened in Baku in September 1920, epitomized 
the Bolshevik approach. The call for attendance had already likened participation at the 
gathering to the “Hajj” and undertook to situate itself in the traditional horizon of its 
addressees: “Formerly you used to cross the desert to visit the sacred places: Now cross 
deserts and mountains and rivers to meet together and discuss how to free yourselves from 
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the chains of servitude.” The overwhelmingly conservative outlook of the delegates did not 
bother Grigori Zinoviev, the conference’s convener and General Secretary of the 
Communist International: “We know that most of you […] hold different views from ours. 
This does not matter [….] All we ask you is to struggle against capitalism and to throw off 
the foreign political yoke.”115  
The speakers after him translated these exhortations into their own terms. Enver Pasha, 
an iconic figure of the contemporary pan-Islamic movement, stated that his life followed the 
path charted out by Allah. An unnamed Egyptian delegate gave a “very curious account” 
(Carr) of his view of how Bolshevik inspiration could lead the “Oriental peoples” to liberty: 
“The Orient” expected Bolshevism to bring about the revival of Islam, for which he 
considered it the crucial ingredient.116 Narbutabek, a lawyer from Turkestan, demanded that 
Muslim Central Asia be rid of foreigners, including Russians; and Jalal-ud-din Korkmasev 
from Dagestan boasted of having embarked on ghazawat, a “holy war.”117 And a petition 
from Abdur Rab Barq, head of the Revolutionary Association of subcontinental national 
revolutionaries in Tashkent (see chapter II.1.4) called for support for the struggle of 
oppressed India without intervention in the family or religious life of the population.118 
Zinoviev himself demonstrated, to the delight of the audience, that the notion of 
ghazawat went down well with the Bolsheviks:  
Comrades! Brothers! The time has come when you can start on the organization of a true and 
holy people’s war against the robbers and oppressors. […] Brothers, we summon you to a holy 
war, in the first place against English imperialism! (Stormy applause. Prolonged hurrahs. The 
members of the congress rise from their seats and brandish their weapons. […] The delegates 
stand and clap applause. The cry rings out: ‘We swear it’).119 
Karl Radek averred that “the eastern policy of the Soviet Government is […] no diplomatic 
manoeuvre […] to win advantages for the Soviet republic,” an avowal underpinned by 
Stalin’s simultaneous institution of sharia law.120 The framework of Eastern mobilization 
was a consequence of firm revolutionary ‘othering’ replete with its own set of revolutionary 
categories. They centered on ‘nation,’ which implied culture and religion—in the Soviet 
case, notably Islam. The enthusiasm for native religion is aptly demonstrated by a 
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temporarily popular, if ultimately marginal, strand of left-wing thought: Muslim national 
communism. 
 
 
I.3.2 “Muslim National Communism” 
 
The Bolshevik thrust to accommodate Central Asian Islam clearly resonated among the 
latter. After the October Revolution, a number of reformist-minded movements emerged 
with the aim of setting up a kind of ‘Muslim communism.’ They proclaimed, and proceeded 
to give theoretical substance to, a fundamental compatibility of communism and Islam. 
Among them, the group around Volga Tatar strongman Mirsaid Sultangaliev (1892–1940) 
played a pioneering role. Their “Muslim national communism” could do without most tenets 
of Marxism. Instead of the workers, it was the suppressed nations that formed a class on a 
global scale, and therefore class struggle took place on an international plane only: “Muslim 
peoples are proletarian peoples.”121 This directly referred to Lenin, who had stated in 1919 
that  
socialist revolution will not only and not in the main be a struggle of the revolutionary 
proletarians of each country against their own bourgeoisie, no, it will be a struggle of all 
countries suppressed by imperialism against international imperialism.122 
Sultangaliev stressed the need to renounce atheist criticism: “No anti-religious propaganda 
will succeed as long as the Eastern peoples remain exploited.”123 Rather, the Muslim 
national communists undertook to situate socialist and communist principles in their 
respective cultures in order to legitimize ‘indigenous’ forms of communism. Historical 
analogies harked back to the glorious days of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane. Islam was the 
common bond uniting Muslim national communism and the ‘golden age’ of Muslim 
civilization.124 
For some years, Sultangaliev enjoyed considerable prestige as the pre-eminent Muslim 
communist in the CPR(B) and served as Stalin’s main expert on Muslim questions. He was 
also a professor at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East (see chapter II.1.5) 
and edited a journal on nationality questions. Many of his tenets easily connected with 
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Bolshevik ones. Sultangaliev’s 1923 expulsion from the CPR(B) didn’t occur on the 
grounds of his Islamophilia—as a matter of fact, Stalin defended his theoretical capacities in 
the very speech calling for his ousting—but because of conspiratorial activities.125  
In fact, there materialized a degree of ‘harmonization’ between Islam and communism. 
Soon after the Bolshevik takeover, the head of the Kazakh Council of Peoples’ Commissars 
dedicated an unequivocal poem to the revolution: “Today is a glorious day for the whole of 
celebrated Islam […]. Today the gates of paradise open and true believers offer obeisance 
devoutly.” In Turkmen folklore, Lenin’s lieutenants were likened to Sufi disciples, and 
Lenin himself seems to have been worshipped religiously. In one of the “Lenin legends” 
from Central Asia, he appears as Allah’s chosen sent to establish a divine order.126 
Inversely, a romanticist strand among Bolsheviks, represented most prominently by Larissa 
Reisner, indulged in similar, if less religious, mystifications of Islamic Central Asia.127 
Nevertheless, two qualifications have to be kept in mind. First, tolerance and support of 
Islam were not unconditional: The assertion of religious and cultural ambitions in a 
separatist political framework was always met with ruthless repression. Thus, the Central 
Asian Basmachi rebellion was put down by force. Yet, significantly, the accompanying 
propaganda railed against feudal-bourgeois separatism, not Islamic traditionalism.128 
Second, the inclusive stance changed from the late 1920s onwards, when a more militant 
course of action was adopted. Still, in view of the readiness of Soviet governments to resort 
to bloody coercion in the enforcement of their aims, repressive measures against Islam seem 
comparably mild.129  
In order to gradually shift the perspective towards the subcontinent, the last part of this 
chapter deals with Bolshevik policies in Central Asia. Soviet Turkestan provided a 
formative experience for various groups of exiled revolutionaries, some of whom would 
form the CPI. The Soviet environment would constitute an important influence in the 
molding of their revolutionary perspectives.  
                                                 
125 On the “Sultan-Galiev Affair,” see Smith, The Bolsheviks and the National, 228–36; on Stalin’s role, Fazal-
ul-Rahir Khan Marwat, The Basmachi Movement in Central Asia: A Study in Political Development 
(Peshawar: Emjay Books 1985), 115–16. 
126 All quotes in Sarkisyanz, Rußland und der Messianismus, 269–72.  
127 See Schwartz, “Kommunismus und Islam,” 132–3, and Cathy Porter, Larissa Reisner (London: Virago 
1988), 116–20. 
128 Haugen, The Establishment of National, 82–4. 
129 The worst Azade-Ayse Rorlich manages to discern is a “multi-lingual media campaign” against Volga 
Tatar Islam: Rorlich, “Islam under Communist Rule,” 21–4. Truly systematic repression including deportation, 
forced labor, and execution was applied only to Orthodox priests, and only prior to WWII: Priestland, 
Weltgeschichte des Kommunismus,185, 195, 228 
45 
 
I.3.3 On the Ground in Turkestan 
 
Turkestan was Imperial Russia’s Central Asian territory east of the Caspian Sea and south of 
the Kazakh steppe. Yet apart from the identity of the overlords, conquest didn’t change 
much—Czarist rule “did not affect the patriarchal order […] and traditional forms of 
religious education were kept intact.” Unsurprisingly, the indigenous political outfits 
springing up after February 1917 had a clearly Muslim agenda and were often influenced by 
fundamentalist religious or pan-Turkic ideas. A number of them eventually revolted against 
Soviet rule.130 Nevertheless, the Bolshevik Soviet at Tashkent, in power since September 
1917, enjoyed a measure of support from such ‘nationalist’ forces, and on critical occasions 
actively sought cooperation themselves.131 
To achieve this, the Bolsheviks on the spot successfully aroused a sense of 
victimization and cultural endangerment. A Central Asian journal wrote in August 1919 that 
the British were out to Christianize all other religions, especially Islam.132 At a Bolshevik 
rally in Merv, a speaker averred that the Soviet government would liberate Muslim workers. 
Yet in the spirit of Sultangaliev’s slogan “Muslim peoples are proletarian peoples” he 
characterized not the native exploiting class, but the British as the main enemies—not of 
material proletarian interests, but of Islam. The rally closed with the slogan: “Long live 
Islam and the true followers of Islam!”133 A Bolshevik flyer, probably from Ashkhabad, 
similarly denounced the British as “enemies of our lives and our religion […] Long live 
defenders of the Moslem faith in Turkestan. Long live the all-powerful Khalifate. Death to 
the British and their anti-Moslem might.”134  
Far from revealing the need to improvise for the retention of Bolshevik power, 
postulations of this kind were exemplary implementations of Eastern revolution. In 
September 1920, the CPR(B)’s Central Committee transmitted detailed instructions on how 
to conduct propaganda work in Asia. Every revolutionary cell had to win over a member of 
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the local clergy in order to have the “centres of spiritual life […] become the centre of 
revolutionary propaganda.” Naturally, this predetermined the latter’s character: “The 
strictest injunctions are given to show the greatest consideration to the religious rites and 
ritual of the Mahomedans, Parsees, Sunnites, Brahmins, Lamaists,” and so on.135 Strikingly, 
the text explicitly referred to Brahmins, the ritual and social elite of Hindu society, 
highlighting the remoteness of Bolshevik policy in the East from commitment to social 
transformation.  
In the case of nomadic tribes, close relations had to be established with the chiefs, and 
generally the “greatest respect should be shown to the customs of every tribe, however great 
may be their divergences from the ideas of Communism.”136 At least there were tangible 
results: in 1921, the Somolvostok (Socialist Youth of the East), affiliated with the “League 
for Eastern Liberation,” called for a “Holy War” and successfully enlisted the cooperation of 
“warlike tribes,” some of whom joined the Red Army.137  
Mohammed Barakatullah, erstwhile head of the Indian Provisional Government in Kabul 
during the First World War, was an eminent propagandist of the Eastern paradigm in 
Central Asia. His anti-imperialist credentials as envoy of King Amanullah of Afghanistan 
(who sought an alliance with the Soviets during his 1919 war with the British) earned him 
the opportunity to chalk out his position in the Izvestiya:138  
I am neither a communist nor a socialist, but my political programme entails the expulsion of the 
British from Asia. I am an implacable foe of the capitalization of Asia by Europe, the principal 
representatives of which are the British. […] In this […] respect we are natural allies.139  
However, his views went beyond simple anti-imperialism. A couple of months before, he 
had drawn parallels between socialist and Islamic visions in his pamphlet Bolshevism and 
the Islamic Body-Politic, a piece widely distributed in Central Asia with Bolshevik 
assistance: Just as the workers of the west had identified “personal ownership” as the source 
of all worldly evils, Islam had instituted the commandment of charity. His romanticizing 
references to the early days of Islam bore obvious parallels to Salafism: The first caliphs’ 
treasury vaults had inexhaustibly mitigated the misery of the poor. Just as the theistic 
religions, socialism had been “revealed” in order to end “destitution, indigence, toil, 
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misfortune and oppression.” Barakatullah exhorted Muslims to heed the “divine cry” of 
“brother Lenin.” He also actively rallied Muslims along the Volga river and in Central Asia 
to the Soviet cause.140  
The approach seemed to resonate. British intelligence agencies worried that Soviet 
support for Amanullah had “given some color to this new pose of the Bolsheviks that they 
are the friends of the Muhammadans”141 (emphasis added). Yet they missed the fact that in 
addition to possible political gains, Soviet championing of Afghan independence and 
Muslim self-determination was a direct result of the commitment to secure “independent 
and free development” for all peoples and cultures. Even after the conclusion of the 1921 
Anglo-Soviet trade agreement, Bolshevik policy remained committed to the implementation 
of its vision for the East. Islam continued to play a vital part in it, and to receive 
concessions. Article 10 of the 1921 treaty between Soviet Russia and Turkey subjected 
citizens to the laws of their country of residence, with exceptions made only in military 
service and concerning “family rights [and] the right of inheritance.”142 Radical Islam’s anti-
imperialist proponents, such as the colony of the Wahhabi “Hindustan fanatics” near 
Chamarkand in the NWFP (North Western Frontier Province), continued to receive 
Bolshevik assistance.143 
A practical example of a working arrangement between communist activists and the 
traditional life-world of Central Asia’s non-Russian inhabitants is provided by M. N. Roy 
himself. His Memoirs recount his participation in the Bolshevik conquest of Bokhara in 
September 1920. Roy had reasoned beforehand that without Bolshevik intervention “the 
Muslims [sic] masses would be the victims [of counter-revolution] […] The purpose of the 
revolution would be […] to protect the Islamic masses throughout Central Asia against the 
[…] feudal ruling class.” In view of the repeated emphasis on the population’s dominant 
religion, it seems that even the Muslim-ness of the “Muslim masses” had to be protected 
from corrosive influence. Indeed, the prevailing outlook infused a considerable dose of 
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religion into the Bokharan Revolutionary Committee’s deliberations: Communists “were 
advised not to do anything which might offend the religious sentiments of the masses.” In 
order to win over the Muslim clergy, Roy even studied the Koran to a point where he could 
“justify the Revolution on scriptural authority.”144  
Indeed, given the general lack of education among the population, it was the mullahs 
who grew into crucial factors for the revolution’s implementation. Upon marching into 
Bokhara, the emir’s estate was nationalized and “administered by the Chief Imam as a 
trust.” To Roy, incorporation of religious elements did not in the least detract from 
Bolshevik determination “to protect and promote the interests of the downtrodden 
masses.”145 An anecdote confirmed this congruence: During a conference of people’s 
representatives, the call for prayer sounded; yet most delegates, overwhelmingly in favor of 
joining the prayer, were not sure whether this would conform with the new state’s character. 
Roy claims to have saved the day by proclaiming that revolution was not about having 
“quarrel with any religion,” and suggested that the meeting be suspended for prayer.146 His 
appreciation of Bolshevik policy towards religious communities belies pragmatist 
interpretations of his intervention:  
The Russian Bolsheviks not only stood for the liberation of the colonial peoples […] they had 
actually set free millions of Muslims subjugated for centuries by Czarist absolutism. Now it was 
the turn of the liberated Muslims to extend a helping hand to their brethren across the frontier.147  
Obviously, to Roy, as to Stalin before, ‘Muslim’ superseded nationality as the main feature 
of Central Asia’s non-Russian inhabitants, and was a quality that distinguished them from 
‘colonial peoples.’ Under communist tutelage, it was not that the minds of Central Asian 
nationalities were to be ‘liberated’ from Islam, but that Muslims were to be ‘liberated’ from 
foreign influence. Having outgrown a primarily religious frame of reference, Islam had 
come to acquire a national and ethnic dimension imbued with a strong component of 
essentialized resistance. Hence, Roy deemed it perfectly natural for Soviet Muslims to set 
out, as Muslims, to help other Muslims “liberate” themselves, also as Muslims. This is the 
Eastern revolution in a nutshell, substituting ‘Muslims’ for ‘workers.’ Since Roy would be 
the pivotal figure in the CPI’s early years, it is difficult to see why fanatical religiosity 
should have been problematic for the first subcontinental communists, who are just about to 
enter the stage. 
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Synopsis of Chapter I 
 
The basic Marxist mode of analysis, distinguishing between essence and appearance, 
defined the terrain on which communist responses to religion and religiosity would grow. 
Marx himself thought it important not to neglect appearance. However, his famous 
aphorisms on religion characterized it as an ideological reflection of the misery caused by 
relations of production. Mainstream Marxism appropriated his heritage in a polarized and 
substantialized manner. Lenin conceived of social constellations fostering the development 
of religious ideology mainly as conscious and active meddling by the ruling classes. As a 
consequence, religiosity among the revolutionary subject seemed artificial, ephemeral, and 
therefore largely unproblematic.  
Marx and Engels identified the proletariat as the class standing to gain most from 
radical social change. This was ontologized by later Marxists as an inherently progressive 
and revolutionary quality to which the proletariat and, later, the ‘masses’ had to be awoken. 
Both figured as population sections coerced into a society initiated, run, and directed by the 
ruling classes. Resisting it almost automatically became progressive. 
Lenin expanded this set-up with a key element. He supplemented the international of 
workers with the international of “suppressed nations.” Although Lenin refused to 
acknowledge “national culture,” the conceptual neglect of appearance (that is, ideological 
phenomena outside economics) led to the incorporation of culture into the Bolsheviks’ 
agenda. The categorical distinction between “suppressing” and “suppressed” nations yielded 
an equally categorical distinction between the respective content of revolution. While 
“suppressing” nations in the West were deemed needful of cultural and social self-criticism, 
“independent and free development” (necessarily including culture and religion) assumed 
primacy in the case of “suppressed” nations in the East.  
This fundamental division constituted the meaning of Stalin’s passing distinction 
between an Eastern revolution and a Western one. Indeed, it pointed to two diverging 
paradigms with far-reaching implications for the consideration of religion. In the West, it 
remained an insubstantial anomaly either ignored or fought. In the East, it could itself 
function as a vehicle of progress as part of a resistant “nationality.” The elevation of 
Muslims to a quasi-national collective of resistance in early Soviet policy would provide a 
momentous example for subcontinental communists. 
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II Communist Roots: Spiritual Politics and the ‘Masses’ 
 
II.1 Tapping Religious Resistance 
 
II.1.1 Swadeshi and Hindu Revivalism 
 
The early Indian National Congress (INC) was virtually the antithesis of Bolshevik notions 
of progressive politics. It represented upper-class interests, it didn’t oppose British rule, and 
it had no mass base. However, the obvious divergence of British liberal ideas and the 
political realities in colonial governance, together with the colonial state’s persistent refusal 
to acknowledge the INC’s memoranda soon eroded exclusivist—and, together with it, 
liberal—notions of politics. The spark that eventually lit a widespread fire of unrest 
originated in tangible political developments and ignited a long-brewing ferment of 
discontent with British rule. Nationalist quarters, then overwhelmingly Hindu, widely 
perceived the government’s decision to partition Bengal in 1905 as a blow aimed at Bengali 
(and, on a larger scale, national and inter-communal) unity. The outrage triggered a mass 
movement extending far beyond the province. According to Satyabrata Rai Chowduri, it 
swelled into a “mighty torrent of nationalism” and laid the groundwork for the “Indian 
revolution.”148  
This “mighty torrent” was inundated with the ‘spirit’ of Bande Mataram, of religious 
devotion to the deified motherland. Deeply couched in Hindu idioms, the surge in 
nationalist sentiment was not so much theistic as religiously political. Dietrich Reetz 
succinctly puts it: “It was the system of intellectual and social norms within a particular 
religion rather than the belief in God that became the bedrock of infant nationalism.”149 The 
protagonists were mostly Hindus motivated by a mixture of (Bengali) nationalist feelings 
and apprehensions about losing part of ‘their’ Bengal to Muslims, who formed the majority 
in the eastern part. Aurobindo Ghosh (1872–1950) in Bengal and Bal Ganghadar Tilak 
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(1856–1920) in Maharashtra were the movement’s most vociferous proponents. It was 
particularly the latter who would attain a place of honor in communist historiography.150  
Along with other nationalists such as Lala Lajpat Rai and Bipin Chandra Pal, Tilak 
initiated a vigorous anti-British campaign manifesting itself in rallies and propaganda for a 
boycott of British in favor of native products (swadeshi). The movement’s bedrock 
consisted of “social reaction and superstition, symbolised in [Tilak’s] defence of child 
marriage and the protection of the cow.”151 Tilak also championed the revival of Hindu 
festivities such as the Shivaji and Ganapati festivals. The former in particular had distinctly 
anti-Muslim overtones. Bankim Chandra Chattopadyaha taught that working for the public 
good was an essential part of true faith and thus sacralized political and social action; 
Swami Vivekananda, a Bengali religious reformer, preached a spirit of sacrifice based on 
the Bhagavad Gita and the Vedanta. All this struck a chord with the ‘masses.’ Tilak’s 
conviction for sedition in 1908 initiated a renewed upsurge of protest. It included a political 
strike by Bombay workers venerating the convict as “Tilak Maharaj,” in the course of which 
around 200 of them were killed—a manifestation acknowledged by Lenin as “conscious 
political mass struggle.” Although the bulk of the population—the peasantry—remained 
largely unaffected, the movement’s influence on the later nationalist movement was 
tremendous.152 
The first reason why a clearly non-socialist movement predating the activity of the CPI by 
one-and-a-half decades is featured here is that it forms the communist link to nationalist 
politics. Notably, comrades from Maharashtra stand out. To Ganghadar Moreshwar 
Adhikari (1898–1981), an eminent party theoretician, Tilak’s “valuable ideas” had drawn 
the “ordinary class” into a mass movement whose outlook seemed of little interest to him. 
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Accordingly, he revered Tilak “as a fighter and a savior.”153 Adhikari’s cousin and CPI 
grandee, Bhalchandra Trimbak Ranadive (1904–90), was similarly enthusiastic, and Dange 
took a directly apologetic stance: “Naturally in those days […] there was no question of 
being an atheist or anything.” Much in the manner of a counter-overflow, religion’s ubiquity 
effected its neutralization. Even Namboodiripad’s far-sighted criticism of Hinduism as a 
factor detrimental to political consciousness came to a positive verdict on the movement.154  
The other reason is that the political socialization of a number of CPI pioneers had 
taken place in this environment. Among them were Tirumal Acharya, Abani Mukherjee, and 
particularly Narendra Nath Bhattacharya alias Manabendra Nath (M. N.) Roy.155 Born into a 
Brahmin family in the Bengal district of 24 Parganas, Roy graduated from the Bengal 
Technical Institute in 1907 and plunged into political action right away.156 As mass politics 
was less attractive to his revolutionary impatience than underground terrorism, he joined the 
milieu of the Anushila Samiti revolutionary terrorist groups.  
Here, “revolutionary” refers to commitment to a radically Hindu national awakening. 
To a far greater degree than in the swadeshi campaign, this political vision was steeped in 
Hindu mythology. It sacralized violent action and sacrifice, and was characterized by 
casteist elitism and pronounced disdain for Muslims. Roy’s biographer Sibnarayan Ray 
describes him as “a brahmachari whose devotion as a sakta to the mother goddess had been 
reinforced and politicized by his […] devotion to the motherland.”157 Having proven his 
revolutionary mettle, Roy was chosen to procure arms and money from imperial Germany in 
Southeast Asia in 1915. With plans failing and the British secret service on his heels, he 
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escaped to the USA and later to Mexico, where he immersed himself in socialist politics and 
took part in the formation of the Mexican Communist Party.158  
To be sure, his political and personal views underwent considerable change. Roy 
himself spoke of a transition “from puritanism to liberation,”159 and professed having “lived 
through a couple of centuries of cultural history” during his stay in America.160 His first 
wife Evelyn Trent testified to the non-linear trajectory of the process of outgrowing 
traditional modes of thought by commenting diplomatically that “he had to pass through 
many evolutionary phases in his own development.”161 Political journalist Carleton Beals 
indicated as much in a retrospective appraisal of Roy: “Except for desiring Indian 
independence, he was in no sense a radical, for he believed firmly in child marriage, the 
caste system, and most of the traditional evils.”162  
Roy’s outlook still embraced the supremacy of Hindu culture. In the vein of 
Vivekananda, he counted the concepts of cosmic unity and of identity of the individual with 
the universe’s existence among “India’s contribution to the progress of humanity” in his 
1918 pamphlet India: Her Past, Present and Future.163 This included distaste for the 
political self-assertion of India’s Muslims, allegedly the culprits of the increasing inter-
communal rift: since the partition of Bengal, “many thoughtless Moslems, inspired by the 
government, have committed crimes against the peace-loving Hindus.”164 Suspecting the 
government’s evil machinations behind unpalatable developments was a pattern of 
interpretation popular not only with the Hindu right but also with leftists ever after—an 
overlap facilitating the transition from one to the other. 
After his arrival in Mexico, Roy studied Hegel and Marx and turned towards socialism. 
His radical contributions to the Mexican Socialist Party’s paper attracted the attention of the 
Bolsheviks. The discussions with Mikhail Borodin, a Comintern emissary, accelerated 
Roy’s drift towards the left. Both had a part in the conversion of the Mexican Socialist Party 
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into the Mexican Communist Party, which eventually nominated Roy as a delegate to the II 
Comintern congress in Moscow in 1920.165  
Roy’s case is a paradigmatic example of the emergence of subcontinental communism from 
a mixture of socialist and religious-nationalist thought. Although he gradually discarded the 
religious components of his outlook, they remained acceptable ‘entry points’ into 
communism—they had been part of his own experience and had constituted the ideological 
terrain on which Roy’s communist consciousness eventually grew. This immensely 
facilitated the integration of other actors into the fold of communism, whose case was 
structurally similar: radical Muslims leaving the subcontinent to fight for the Ottoman 
caliphate on the one hand, and nationalist Sikh revolutionaries from the North America-
based Ghadr party on the other.  
 
 
II.1.2 Minority Responses: Ghadrites and the Muhajirin 
 
Radical nationalism extended far beyond the Indian subcontinent and found one of its 
incarnations in an association of revolutionaries on the North American Pacific coast. 
Originally a more modest party, the involvement of Lala Har Dayal (1884–1939) led to its 
radicalization and rebranding under an unequivocal label, ghadr (“revolt”). Through its 
eponymous paper, the party declared itself to be an implacable “enemy of the British Raj” 
and exhorted “Indian young men” to “take up arms soon.” Accordingly, Ghadr published 
poems glorifying the subcontinent’s martial past. The Ghadrites made quick organizational 
advances and by 1914 had established branches in a number of countries outside North 
America.166 
The Ghadr Party is generally credited with commitment to secularism unattained by 
other contemporary outfits. Clause 10 of the party constitution declared religion the 
“individual concern of each member.” Caste distinctions were to be abolished, and inter-
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dining was customary in the party ashram.167 However, the party was quite homogenous and 
consisted overwhelmingly of Sikhs, among whom caste distinctions traditionally mattered 
less. Furthermore, conflicts and power struggles within the party could well develop into 
religious polarization. Also, Ghadr propaganda often picked up religious themes, such as 
accusing the British of destroying not only the subcontinent’s temples, but also its religions 
proper.168 
Similar oddities abound in the short but turbulent history of the Ghadrites. One reason 
for their appeal was that notwithstanding the (sometimes utopian) calls for revolution, the 
Ghadrites largely conformed to subcontinental colonial modernity, where the communities 
were central instances for the articulation of political and social aspirations. Moving within 
these precincts, Ghadrite appeals often addressed the subcontinent’s population in terms of 
their communal affiliation. Thus, Ghadr would woo the “Warrior Sikhs, Mussalmans and 
lion-hearted Rajputs,”169 while Lala Har Dayal called on the “Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs 
[to] be brave sons of Mother India,” and tried to rouse them into action on the grounds that 
your temples and mosques are being pulled down. Your religion is not safe. You are forbidden 
to eat beef and pork by your religion, but the white people eat both daily. […] From the mosques 
and temples they have driven out good people. There remain […] titled gentry [who] are traitors 
to the country.170 
Obviously, the “titled gentry” were “traitors” in a much greater measure than “good” 
religious “people” could ever be. The real meaning of the Ghadrite pledges to secularism 
became apparent in Har Dayal’s lament that the influence and status of religious institutions 
were currently unavailable to his revolutionary project.  
The proximity of religious and revolutionary outlooks also appears in a 1914 letter from 
a Ghadrite to a correspondent in the Jullundur district. Written to convince the recipient, 
apparently an individual with a religious audience, to take up propaganda work in the 
British army, the letter exhibits the seamless transition of religious into revolutionary 
ideologemes: “Formerly you preached religion among the Sikhs. Now you must set aside 
thoughts of religion and give lectures about the country.”171 Ghadr’s praise of the ruler of a 
princely state for donating to a religious school, taking exception only to its being run by 
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Europeans, offered similar encouragement. Unsurprisingly, the Ghadrites also undertook to 
rouse Muslim sentiments on the khilafat issue.172 
Although religious revivalism was ultimately extrinsic to their vision, the Ghadrites 
exhibited few reservations to basing not only their propaganda, but also their activity on 
religious themes. Accordingly, when many returned to the subcontinent after the outbreak of 
war with a view to orchestrating a national upheaval, religious festivals were their first and 
foremost venues of mobilization.173 
A plot for a coordinated rebellion of army regiments on the subcontinent was foiled by 
the British, but this did not dispel their revolutionary grit. Many acknowledged that 
clandestine methods were unfit to tackle the complex constellations on the subcontinent, or 
reasoned that a revolution required expert support. The result was a gradual approximation 
to the Comintern and the involvement of Ghadrites in the CPI. A number of activists, among 
them Santokh Singh, proceeded to set up a communist organization in rural Punjab—the 
Kirti-Kisan Party (KKP)—and would maintain their own, to an extent ‘Sikh-ized,’ variety of 
peasant communism in an uneasy partnership with the provincial CPI unit (see also chapter 
V.1.3).174  
For all its impact on Muslim thought, the movement for inner-Islamic reform and strong 
attachment to British rule led by Syed Ahmad Khan in the second half of the 19th century 
had never been the uncontested representative of Muslim opinion. An anti-colonial strand 
had lingered on, represented by the inheritors of 19th century Wahhabism such as the 
Deoband school and the proponents of pan-Islamic sentiment. The latter had gained ground 
significantly after Jamal-ud-Din al-Afghani’s visit to the subcontinent in the 1880s.175 Also, 
resentment against the colonial rulers increased in inverse proportion with the Ottoman 
Empire’s stature as the sole surviving Muslim power of note. The cession of Egypt, and 
notably the 1912 Balkan wars, increasingly painted the British as its main enemy.  
On the subcontinent, the revocation of the Bengal partition in 1911, the denial of 
university status to the Muslim college in Aligarh in 1912, and the demolition of a mosque 
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in Kanpur for road construction in 1913 took a heavy toll on the British reputation among 
Muslims. These events confirmed a sense of marginalization and deprivation among a 
community not only behind in most social indicators, but also wary of Hindu revivalism. In 
response, religious identitarism gained ground to such a degree that the community’s 
relative outward calm was highly deceptive.176 
The simmering discontent erupted when the prospect of the Ottoman Empire’s 
dismemberment became tangible after the end of the war. With the cession of all non-Turkic 
territories, the holy sites of Islam were in danger of coming under infidel control. Against 
this, a broad movement led by the Ali brothers emerged in 1919 and swelled into the largest 
popular Muslim upheaval against British rule since 1857. While this khilafat (caliphate) 
movement resulted from a plethora of different factors and motivations, it cast the 
multifarious discontent in an unambiguously religious mold.177  
Mohamed Ali had declared the Ottoman state’s existence a “vital matter of faith” 
essential to any Muslim’s “eternal salvation.”178 Other demands made by him and his 
brother Shaukat involved opposition to any restriction of the Ottoman Empire’s power 
status; called for the restoration of Muslim holy sites, as well as territory lost in the past 
(namely Egypt, Tripoli, and possessions in the Balkans), to its tutelage; and claimed to 
respect the allegiance of Muslims to the caliph.179 The movement’s anti-imperialist scope 
was restricted to Muslim countries or communities. It demanded self-determination only for 
“the inhabitants of all territories that have been under Ottoman and other Moslem 
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Government,” supervised by a predominantly Muslim board consisting of “Rulers of 
Muslim Indian States, divines and political leaders.”180  
If the demands were not met, the question arose whether “we and other Indian 
Mussulmans can any longer remain under British subjection.”181 The demand for 
conservation of the caliphate pointed to the feasibility of infidel rule in India. This 
connection yielded two possibilities. First, allying with the emerging Congress-led non-
cooperation movement against British rule, an opportunity eagerly seized upon by 
Mohandas Gandhi. Second, to escape illegitimate British rule through a large-scale 
emigration movement, the hijrat.182 
This movement of emigration began in earnest in summer 1920, “when batch after 
batch of Muslims [...] left India for Afghanistan on the pretext that they would not stay in a 
country and under a Government which was oppressing their co-religionists in Turkey and 
elsewhere.”183 Amir Amanullah of Afghanistan fueled the drive to leave by promising plots 
of land and loans to the muhajirin (emigrants), fanning their “millenarian hopes” for a 
religiously and materially better life.184 By mid-August, more than 40,000 people had 
departed for Afghanistan. At that point, probably dissatisfied with the predominantly low 
social profile of most of the arrivals, Amanullah closed the borders again, leading to the 
hijrat’s “sudden […] collapse.”185  
Smaller, more radical groups among the emigrants had left with the aim of fighting 
actively—either for the preservation of the caliphate or, from outside, against infidel British 
rule. Already in 1915, a party of Muslim students had left Lahore in order to foment a 
revolution among the tribes in Afghanistan and the NWFP. Several of them joined 
Obeidullah Sindhi’s “army of god.” It was to fight for the subcontinent’s liberation under 
pan-Islamist auspices.186 These first muhajirin built a network of contacts throughout 
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Central Asia with other revolutionaries such as Mahendra Pratap, Mohammed Barakatullah, 
and Abdur Rab Barq, as well as, last but not least, the Bolsheviks. In fact, a vigorous 
revolutionary traffic took place between Kabul and Soviet Turkestan. Although actual 
cooperation was limited, the connections upon which the next generation of muhajirin 
would draw had been established.187 
In July 1920, the first caravan of determined young men set out towards Soviet 
Turkestan, arriving in Tashkent in October.188 Despite endeavors to win the emigrants over, 
the Bolsheviks did not “put any pressure upon these pro-Khilafat people” and readily 
brought the most fervent ones to the Turkish border.189 In Tashkent, the muhajirin hoped to 
receive military training and assistance for their cause. However, this was to happen only 
indirectly. Instead, Roy, the new Comintern in charge of revolution on the subcontinent, 
went about organizing them according to the approach he had developed at the 2nd World 
Congress of the Comintern just a few months before. The Communist Party of India (CPI) 
would be the ultimate result of his efforts. 
 
 
II.1.3 “Closest Contact with the Broadest Sections”: The Comintern 
 
The Communist International (Comintern) had been founded in March 1919 as the 
instrument to spread revolution around the globe. Although the Bolsheviks’ primary hopes 
hinged on Europe, the attention paid to colonial countries—especially in Asia—increased at 
the same time as revolutionary hopes in the old world crumbled. Convened in July and 
August 1920, the Comintern’s 2nd World Congress was the stage for a first surge of interest 
in the extra-European world. 
 Although technically a delegate of the Mexican communist party, Roy spoke for India 
during the proceedings, and instantly shot to prominence by challenging Lenin’s approach 
to revolution in the colonial countries. The issue revolved around the role of the colonial 
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bourgeoisie: Lenin held it to be a progressive force destined to vanquish imperialism, which 
artificially kept feudalism alive, and to bring about a democratic revolution. In contrast, Roy 
insisted that the bourgeoisie was not sufficiently differentiated economically from the feudal 
order and hence would not overcome it. Their differences were clear when it came to the 
issue of Gandhi. Lenin deemed him a revolutionary in his capacity as an inspirer and leader 
of a nationalist mass movement; to Roy, he was a toothless religious revivalist and social 
reactionary. In the end, a compromise was reached. It provided for the limitation of 
communist support to “revolutionary” nationalist movements as opposed to “bourgeois 
democratic” ones, and emphasized the primacy of working-class agitation.190 
Roy’s rejection of cooperation with the subcontinent’s bourgeoisie does not mean that 
he didn’t subscribe to anti-imperialism. In fact, he attributed an even more pivotal role to 
anti-imperialism than Lenin.191 Nor was he an anti-nationalist. Rather, his ardent nationalism 
could not coexist with rival bourgeois nationalism, and one exhibiting casteist social 
conservatism coupled with moderate means of struggle at that. In Roy’s eyes, this was far 
from fulfilling the modernizing tasks communists associated with the bourgeoisie, which 
consisted of de-feudalization and radical homogenization of the population’s mainstay into 
expropriated proletarians. Gandhi’s principled opposition to modern industry showcased this 
lack of commitment to historical progress as understood by the communists. Against this, 
‘proper’ nationalism was to achieve liberation from the “absolutism of reaction, embodied 
in landlordism and all the economic backwardness, social prejudice, intellectual stagnation, 
religious bigotry etc. that go with it.”192 
Yet the laws of history as identified by historical materialism were not easily muted. If 
it didn’t feature in bourgeois nationalism, progressive transformation—inevitably taking 
place—materialized ‘behind’ the revivalist non-cooperation movement. In order to identify 
a concrete agent, and hence present an alternative point of intervention, Roy had to 
substantialize this notion where it was at least not vocally contradicted—in the movement’s 
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mass following. If the leaders so blatantly refused to tread their supposed historical path, the 
‘masses’ had to take their place.193 Roy was not isolated in his views. Many delegates 
agreed on the necessity and feasibility of reaching out to the quasi-automatically 
revolutionary ‘masses’—a term that had come to be used more or less interchangeably with 
‘working class.’ Lenin himself emphasized the transferability of revolutionary organization: 
With a little cultural adaptation, peasant and worker Soviets were equally suited to 
‘backward’ countries as to capitalist ones and should be set up immediately. Therefore, 
Zinoviev viewed the most important task of a communist party as maintaining “closest 
contact with the broadest sections of proletarians.”194  
Engineering a sufficiently ‘correct’ mindset among the population was to be attained by 
a three-pronged approach. First was Amadeo Bordiga’s call for a “simple and clear way of 
expression” in propaganda work.195 Second, according to Roy the revolt of the ‘masses’ 
proceeded “in many cases unconsciously,” which lowered the requirements for suitable 
manifestations.196 And third, in view of the resentment bred by foreign occupation and 
exploitation, the Resolution on the National and Colonial Question reasoned that 
this requires the class-conscious proletariat of all countries to exercise special care and special 
attention towards the—in itself outdated—national sentiments in the countries and peoples 
enslaved for a long time, and obliges it to make concessions to help eliminate distrust and 
prejudices.197 
Yet these “concessions” allowed for subtle differences in the best tradition of an Eastern 
revolution: While communists were to struggle against the “reactionary and medieval” 
influence of Christian missionaries, pan-Islamism was considered problematic only insofar 
as it strengthened rival imperialisms and the position of the upper strata in Muslim 
societies.198 In contrast to Christianity, which was ideologically dangerous because of its 
cultural link to imperialist countries, ‘grass-roots’ Islamism evaded the communist ban. 
Quite the opposite: Delegate Kohn emphasized connective “primitive communist” elements 
in Muslim law proper.199 And Dutch-Indonesian delegate Henk Sneevliet, referring to those 
Muslim delegates who had made it to Moscow as “our communist hajis,” called for 
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alignment with a broad Javanese movement of civil unrest under the auspices of the Sarekat 
Islam, which fought against “sinful capitalism.”200  
The revolutionary gear of the early 1920s included rather than sidelined pan-Islamism. 
Although the colonial question was largely sidelined at the 1921 third congress, the 
Comintern emblematized its approach to revolution in the East by allotting scarce speaking 
time to the “Committee of Revolutionary Muslimhood” campaigning against the 
“subjugation of the Muslims.” Committee leader Machul Bey called on the Soviet state to 
guarantee the “rights and liberties” of the Soviet Muslims, who had suffered an unspeakable 
plight under the Czarist—that is, infidel—government. On his part, Zinoviev was certain he 
was dealing with a “truly revolutionary movement of oppressed peoples” worthy of the 
support of the world’s proletariat.201 
At the fourth congress in 1922, delegate van Ravesteyn worked himself into an outright 
pan-Islamic mania:  
The revolution that has gripped the entire orient and will lead it to utter political independence is 
irresistible [….] This is the pan-Islamic movement. […] Islam is the bond uniting all Islamites 
against the capitalist world. Islam is more than a creed; it is a complete social system, it is a 
civilization with a philosophy, culture, art of its own, and […] it has become an organic whole 
conscious of itself. […] In this momentous fight, it is the duty of the revolutionary proletariat 
[…] to grant moral and political support.202  
Indonesian delegate Tan Malaka similarly promoted the inclusion of pan-Islamism. A united 
anti-imperialist front had to entail support for the war of liberation waged by hundreds of 
millions of aggressive, active Muslims. Neither Radek nor Zinoviev indicated dissent. 
Despite occasional cautions, the Comintern proved faithful to the slogan given by Karl 
Radek back at the third congress: “To the Masses. Each day that this does not happen is a 
lost day for communism.”203  
Evidently, these statements have to be viewed in the context of contemporary revolutionary 
enthusiasm. World revolution still seemed both imminent and inevitable. There was little 
need felt for careful differentiation between revolutionary currents, as all of them (including 
religious ones) would eventually converge in the great socialist transformation. Direct mass 
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action rather than accurate criticism was the order of the day. Therefore, simplified 
propaganda was to achieve what little politicization was regarded necessary to initiate a 
revolutionary process. In a typically Marxist disdain of appearance, communists regarded 
this process as developing largely ‘unconsciously’—or even chose, in an Eastern vein, to 
embrace movements precisely because of their religious militancy, as Roy would himself do 
with regard to the Akalis. Conversely, Lenin’s consistent exhortations to adapt the 
revolutionary instruments to conditions on the ground acknowledged the limits of 
revolutionary universalism, and prepared the stage for the creative and culturally situated 
intervention of communists on the spot. 
In this spirit, Roy proceeded with the setting up of a provisional Central Indian 
Revolutionary Committee headed by himself. Upon receiving news of the arrival of militant 
emigrants from the subcontinent, he journeyed to Tashkent with two trainloads of military 
supplies intended for the training of the muhajirin.204  
 
 
II.1.4 The Tashkent Party Forge  
 
After arriving on 1 October 1920, Roy entered into a fierce competition with the Indian 
Revolutionary Association around Abdur Rab and Tirumal Acharya for the allegiance of the 
emigrants.205 After all, the muhajirin presented potentially valuable material and hence 
credibility to any revolutionary. Roy, the ‘new man’ replete with arms and the Comintern’s 
back-up, was the best-placed contender, determined to channel the emigrants’ anti-British 
passions into communist corridors. A special school—the “Induskii Kurs”—providing 
extensive military training was set up, yet it soon became clear that this would not suffice.206 
As Roy wondered retrospectively, “what would most of them do with their guns, and whom 
would they fight, and for what ideal?” Most of the emigrants were “not even nationalists.” 
                                                 
204 CPI(M): History of the Communist Movement in India, vol. 1, The Formative Years, 1920–1933 (Delhi: 
CPI[M] Publications 2005), 33–4; Kaye, Communism in India, 4. 
205 Usmani, Historic Trips, 47. On the inter-factional recriminations, see Roy, Memoirs, 465; for a refutation of 
Roy see Ahmad, Myself and the Communist Party, 54; and for a detailed account of the episode see Dmitriev, 
Indian Revolutionaries, 116–20. 
206 Judgement of the Sessions Judge, Peshawar Division, Home/Poll/1923 Nr. 62, 2–3. See also Roy: Memoirs, 
419–20; Overstreet and Windmiller, Communism in India, 34; Ansari, Pan-Islam and the Making, 528; 
Harkishan Singh Surjeet, March of the Communist Movement in India: An Introduction to the Documents of 
the Communist Movement in India (Calcutta: National Book Agency 1998), 23. 
64 
 
Upon seeing his new wards for the first time, the school’s drillmaster remarked: “We are 
going to train not an army of revolution, but an army of God.”207 
It didn’t take much to arrive at this conclusion. For once, the emigrants had soon 
established a habit of complaining about the ritual purity of the food. Also, a paper, 
Zamindar, was edited “on the Islamic grounds” with the involvement of the future first 
secretary of the CPI, Mohammed Shafiq.208 Further illustration is provided by the case of 
one of the emigrants, Maula Baksh (1901–1978), alias Shaukat Usmani, from Bikaner. He 
would be a leading light in subcontinental communism’s first years while never changing 
his nom de guerre, which translates into “glory of Osmania.”209 In much the same vein as 
Barakatullah, he emphasized the congeniality of communism and religion. Even long after 
joining the CPI, Usmani wrote to Roy that “Islam preaches equality, so does Communism. 
That is why I am a Communist.”210 To be more precise, he was both—moving in the murky 
overlap of the two currents constitutive for revolution in the East.  
These circumstances didn’t deter Roy from carrying on with the education of his 
wards—after all, they were all he had, and the contemporary mood in the young Soviet state 
was all for the inclusive mobilization of Muslims. What happened then is a matter of 
contention. According to Roy’s self-apologetic version, which unfortunately is the only 
available ‘thick’ first-hand description, the lessons at the school had not been geared 
towards changing the emigrants’ established modes of thought. Rather, they had aimed at 
incorporating the émigrés’ revolutionary fervor in its contemporary state: courses were 
“delivered by several of their own fellow-religionists, did not mention the word 
‘Communism’ nor made any disrespectful reference to religion, which pacified the 
recalcitrant lot.” Instead, the classes aimed at providing the muhajirin with the minimum 
consciousness for a “national democratic revolution.”211  
Moisej Persits, on the other hand, alleges that this was the very objective that Roy failed 
to accomplish. A disappointed Roy had found that the muhajirin were “lacking in even the 
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most elementary political consciousness […] they came to fight for Islam, not for India.”212 
Roy’s propaganda work accordingly “affronted [the] ideals” of the ‘national 
revolutionaries,’ “which was quite inadmissible [!].”213 Consequently, Persits labels the 
nascent party as notoriously unpopular among the émigrés. However, irrespective of who is 
right, both Roy and Persits agree that a ‘correct’ Leninist indoctrination consisted of 
“political education compatible with [the émigrés’] mode of thinking, with their mentality, 
[…] traditions and religion.”214 At a time when Stalin declared his tolerance of the 
Dagestani sharia, this was a compelling testimony of revolutionary aspirations. 
Roy later justified his decision to work with the muhajirin by a more ‘rational’ 
commitment to Islam on their part. Despite a deep emotional attachment to Islam, they 
seemed to respond better to his injunctions than he had “expected and wanted. Most of them 
transferred their fanatical allegiance from Islam to Communism.” Having experienced a 
similar “sudden jump” himself just recently, he was far from problematizing such 
“instinctive idealism” among his flock. Nor did he care to scrutinize the particular mixture 
of communist and religious elements that had enabled them to suddenly agree on the 
necessity of a “Communist revolution. I was surprised when some of them approached me 
with the proposal that they wanted to join the Communist Party,” or set it up right away.215 
Being a reluctant “father of Indian communism” propelled by the urges of his fanatical 
students, the Bolsheviks’ revolutionary expansionism, and the competition of Acharya’s and 
Rab’s Indian Revolutionary Association alike, little choice apparently remained to Roy but 
to proceed with the foundation of the CPI. 216  
In contrast, Persits reproaches Roy for having decided on founding the party even 
before having reached Tashkent. This seems plausible: Having passed through Berlin on his 
way to Moscow in 1920, Roy was aware of the group of veteran Indian revolutionaries 
around Virendranath Chattopadhyaya and Bhupendranath Datta. These renowned and well-
connected revolutionary nationalists were just about to try and gain Bolshevik support. 
Hence it seems likely that Roy was eager to create hard facts, however embarrassing the 
muhajirin episode might appear to the post-Marxist stance permeating his Memoirs.217 
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Other factors also favor an active role for Roy. The only biographical account of the 
episode apart from Roy’s—a short passage in Usmani’s recollections—emphasizes his 
decisive role.218 Equally critically, Roy was eager to substantiate the vision he had 
expounded at the 2nd Comintern congress: the vision of instant mass revolution as a united 
front with the nationalist bourgeoisie. In these circumstances, the muhajirin at Tashkent 
were a godsend. On the ideological side of things, Roy himself had only recently worked 
actively for ‘Muslim liberation’ after the conquest of Bokhara. There is little reason to 
suggest that the radicalism of fanatical, anti-British Muslims should have discouraged him 
now when he had unhesitatingly undertaken to harmonize Islamic culture and Bolshevik 
revolution just weeks before. 
The new party was a manageable organization. M. N. and Evelyn Roy, Mukherjee and his 
wife Rosa Fitingov, Acharya, Shafiq (the first party secretary), and Khushi Mohammad 
(aliases Mohamed Ali and Sepassi) were the founding members. The latter two had 
unquestionable credentials as ‘revolutionaries’—Shafiq had edited Zamindar and worked 
closely with Barakatullah, Mohammad had occupied a senior rank in Sindhi’s “army of 
god” back in Kabul. Along with the rest of the ‘second-generation’ muhajirin, Usmani 
remained outside the party for lack of “knowledge of Marxism” and for being at odds with 
communist imperatives of liberation.219 
However, both were soon to be imparted to him. When the Comintern realized in spring 
1921 that the would-be communists in Tashkent spent undue amounts of time on factional 
rivalries, while political indoctrination made only lackluster progress, it was determined to 
shift the operation to more professional surroundings. This introduced the final chapter of 
the muhajirin episode: The completion of their ideological training at the Communist 
University of the Toilers of the East.220 
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II.1.5 Imparting Revolution 
 
Reflecting the eastward shift of Soviet attention, the KUTV (Communist University of the 
Toilers of the East) had been established in 1921. Its curriculum was tailored to Bolshevik 
notions of revolution “adapted to Eastern conditions.” Students hailed from all parts of Asia 
and the traditional dresses they wore made for a colorful mixture. A year after its 
inauguration, the university had over 700 students from 57 nationalities, who had come to 
learn the “rudiments of communism.”221  
The institution’s main goal was to “train the future […] leaders of the more primitive 
sections of the [Soviet] Republic.” Ongoing Basmachi resistance in Central Asia had 
awoken the Bolsheviks to the adverse effects of excessive religious encouragement outside 
of Soviet tutelage, and hence pan-Islamism was not endorsed. A leading official stated that 
the “fight [against imperialism] must be carried on in the name of international communism 
and the right of every people to self-determination, not through appeals to racial and 
religious prejudice and fanaticism.” Professedly unaware of the close conceptual proximity 
of the two, the university aimed at endowing its students with the necessary skills to become 
“leaders in their communities.”222  
However, this did not mean that metaphysics were categorically rejected within the 
KUTV’s framework. Ernestine Evans, a journalist who wrote down her experiences in the 
young Soviet state in the travelogue Looking East from Moscow, described the KUTV as an 
undertaking to reconcile the nationalism of the (former) colonies with the internationalist 
outlook of the ‘Workers’ Country.’223 In Soviet practice, this entailed bestowing the 
blessing of revolutionary universalism upon national and cultural particularisms. For 
example, Zinoviev castigated the double oppression national communities had suffered at 
the hands of the nobility and the bourgeoisie in Czarist Russia. Yet there was hope, as he 
claimed that the victorious Bolsheviks had in a couple of months restored what both groups 
had been destroying for centuries.224  
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The long-term merits of this avowal may be doubted, especially in view of later, more 
gruffly nationalist policies. However, Zinoviev’s revivalist thrust also has a claim to 
communist legitimacy, and informed the three basic principles guiding university life: 
because of the collective-cultural notions connected to the first two—equality and 
companionship—they were necessarily complemented by the third: religious tolerance.225 
In this light, Kaye’s supposition that most muhajirin “seem to have accepted Roy’s 
proposals [to join courses at the KUTV] as the only means” to obtain food rations seems 
misplaced.226 Similarly, Ansari’s claim that the “experiments” with the muhajirin had ended 
in failure may be doubted. Even allowing for the fact that many among them “clung to Islam 
and stubbornly resisted socialist ideas,” his finding assumes a fundamental irreconcilability 
of the two.227 However, their juxtaposition finds little substance in the contemporary 
circumstances. Soviet self-determination, that is, emancipation of collectives and their 
cultures from the foreign-dominated past and present had superseded the emancipation of 
classes and individuals from these very collectives and cultures. 
Therefore, Ansari’s verdict misses the contemporary horizons of revolution. If 
anything, the remarkable fact is not that one portion of the muhajirin refused to be drawn 
into the socialist orbit, but that another did not. Given the émigrés’ background, it is indeed 
highly probable that not all of them were intrigued by socialist tenets and Soviet advances. 
However, this is at least as likely to have been a question of class (most were from the 
middle class) as of religion: As long as it was part of a diffuse conglomerate of national and 
cultural sentiments of the ‘masses,’ religion tended to be accommodated by the 
Bolsheviks—in contrast to explicit bourgeois-ness, which entailed social aloofness. It was 
perfectly feasible for the muhajirin to cling to the Islam of the ‘masses’ and embrace the 
brand of anti-imperialist revolution the Bolsheviks had designed for the East.  
This is also the best approximation to an answer to the question of the kind of 
‘communism’ that had led the khilafat radicals to transfer “their fanatical allegiance from 
Islam to Communism,” as Roy had observed. As he was involved in the running of the 
KUTV and held classes, he took an active part in the transition process. It was further aided 
and influenced by a prominent faction among the institution’s staff: Sultangaliev’s Muslim 
national communists. They left their imprint on the South Asian students, not least among 
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them Roy who, by virtue of his connections to South and East Asia, became the “main 
channel through which Soviet Muslim national communist ideas were spread to the Third 
World.”228 
A number of the muhajirin joined the CPI after having received instruction at the KUTV. 
Shaukat Usmani would become a key figure in the first decade of South Asia’s communism. 
Abdul Majid, besides doing lackluster party work, was later one of the co-founders of the 
Naujawan Bharat Sabha (Indian Youth League), which he set up together with Bhagat 
Singh.229 Fazl Elahi Malik, aliases Krishnamurti and Qurban, worked closely with Roy and 
became an “important communist agent.”230 Along with Feroz al-din Mansur, another future 
member of the Naujawan Bharat Sabha, he was active in the Communist Party of Pakistan 
in the 1950s, even becoming its general secretary.231 Rahmat Ali, alias Zakaria, like Khushi 
Mohammad an erstwhile member of the Indian Provisional Government and the “army of 
god,” obtained a PhD from the Sorbonne with a study on the subcontinent’s ‘communal 
problem’ (see chapter IV.2.2). Khushi Muhammad worked as a communist organizer in 
Europe, became managing director of the Masses of India, the CPI’s organ in the mid-
1920s, and was convicted in the Meerut conspiracy case following his return to India. Both 
hailed from the “radically-inclined circles of Indo-Muslims intelligentsia” and sported a 
remarkable track record of Muslim extremism.232  
The KUTV remained popular. A 1937 British report estimated that a total of sixty 
students from the subcontinent had been educated at the institution; the actual number is 
probably considerably higher. Disappointed radical nationalists, members of the erstwhile 
Indian Provisional Government, and Ghadr militants from North America enrolled at the 
KUTV in search of a new revolutionary path. In this manner, Santokh Singh and Ratan 
Singh, two Ghadrites and future originators of the Punjab communist movement, found their 
way from the USA to Moscow.233 
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Apart from a crew to man the ranks, the Soviet episode had assisted in the establishment of 
a modus operandi under subcontinental conditions. Clearly committed to adapting to 
“conditions in the East,” the new party moved in the muddy waters of elements of 
communism and anti-imperialist religious ideologemes, which converged into the 
commitment to work for revolution on the subcontinent under anti-British, but not 
necessarily secular—let alone atheist—axioms.  
From spring 1921, the ex-muhajirin returned to India in groups. Most were intercepted 
at Peshawar and jailed as Bolshevik agents, effectively preventing them from participating 
in the fledgling communist movement.234 Together with the lukewarm commitment to party 
work many exhibited afterwards, this prompted Philip Spratt, a British communist and 
emissary of the CPGB to the subcontinent, to comment that the muhajirin “were, altogether, 
a disappointment.”235 This does not hold on two counts. First, some of them did indeed 
become important actors in the development of South Asian communism. Second, despite 
the unsatisfying ratio between hopes and investments on the one hand and concrete political 
returns on the other, the muhajirin episode was seminal as a testing ground for the 
integration of radical left-wing and religious outlooks.236 
 
 
II. 2 Indigenous Communism? 
 
II.2.1 Subcontinental Socialisms 
 
For quite some time before the appearance of communism, the subcontinent’s political 
scene had been embroiled in a state of political turmoil. This had come about as the result of 
(a) the tense economic situation, (b) widespread discontent over inadequate political gains 
as a reward for the subcontinent’s loyalty during and contribution to the war (the Montagu-
Chelmsford reforms of 1919), (c) anti-liberal British post-war laws (notably the Rowlatt 
Act), (d) Muslim khilafat woes, and (e) the excesses of British repression, culminating in the 
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1919 Jalianwalla Bagh massacre. When Gandhi assumed leadership of the protest 
movement in 1920, it underwent a pronounced change towards mass action and religious 
revivalism. Two non-domestic influences compounded the situation: The mass return of 
demobilized, and to an extent politicized, soldiers and a spirit of revolutionary hope fostered 
by the October Revolution.237 
Given this turbulent background, it is little wonder that the revolutionaries-turned-
communists were not the only ones to respond to the sudden acuteness of socialism. Even 
though there had been no prior socialist movement, let alone a Marxist one, developments in 
Russia had been carefully registered. Revolutionary socialism, and notably Lenin himself, 
enjoyed a broad and often benevolent reception in nationalist and national revolutionary 
circles, where both were connected to (and resonated in) religious idioms and notions. 
Already before the war, Lala Har Dayal’s 1912 biography of Karl Marx had portrayed him 
as a modern-day rishi, a religious scholar or wise man. Fittingly, the book opened with a 
citation from the gospel of Matthew.238 
More prominent, however, were references to reformist Hinduism’s egalitarian and 
utopian socialist strand from the mid-19th century, which had been actualized by the 
swadeshi movement: In 1907, Aurobindo Ghosh had declared that the future belonged to 
socialism—a socialism rooted in the rejection of materialism and an embrace of ‘Eastern’ 
spiritualism. Of all things, he envisioned the Hindu concept of caste as the means to purify 
socialism of its obnoxious fixation on economic categories. Vivekananda similarly deemed 
‘caste’ the original abode of socialism.239 
The later reception of Bolshevism went down a similar path. Tilak considered its 
principles to be rooted in the Gitas and Shastras. In a 1920 speech, he opined that in 
Bolshevism labor ruled over capital, just as in Hinduism and Islam, and advocated for 
Bolshevism on this basis. Bipin Chandra Pal, addressing a Vaishnavite rally in Sylhet in 
September 1920, emphasized that universal brotherhood and self-sacrifice were the unifying 
traits of Vaishnavism and Bolshevism. Annie Besant, whose anthroposophically inclined 
Home Rule League had been an important nationalist nucleus in the 1910s, similarly held 
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that a socialist spirit had been ingrained in the subcontinent’s culture since ancient times. It 
had to be resuscitated by harking back to traditional values and returning to the system of 
quasi-independent village republics.240  
This thrust could connect to leftists. British left-wing activist Sylvia Pankhurst 
envisioned the resurrection of the village system and the transfer of comprehensive 
responsibilities to the traditional system of panchayats (village councils). More generally, 
the contemporary “official and ‘correct’” position on the communist cultural front was to 
emphasize “independent origination”—which chimed well with subcontinental radicals: 
Atmashakti, a paper closely connected to the Jugantar terrorists and given to publishing 
contributions from Roy, opined in its 22 November 1922 issue that communism was rooted 
in the subcontinent’s “essence.”241  
 
Egalitarian Non-Egalitarianism 
The restoration of a simple and just society of bygone days was also on the agenda of the 
most prominent contemporary exponent of ‘socialist’ thought in South Asia. Due to his 
immense influence on the national movement, his moral and spiritual articulation of 
socialism deserves a closer look. Having risen to fame through his satyagrahas in South 
Africa, the Gujarati lawyer Mohandas Karamchand “Mahatma” Gandhi (1869–1948) 
became an iconic figure in the INC, which he transformed into a mass movement. 
It is not self-evident that Gandhi should be viewed through a socialist lens. In his 
History of the International, Julius Braunthal introduced his chapter on South Asian 
socialism with the assessment that “the concepts of Socialism are obviously in sharp 
contrast to the fundamentals of Hindu philosophy.” Yet he did not maintain this initial 
juxtaposition, but ended up referring at length to Gandhi as the most prominent figure in the 
approximation of Hinduism to socialism.242 
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Gandhi based his political demands, notably earlier ones, on the ideal vision of a 
restoration of ancient subcontinental society. In order to attain this goal, the foreign masters 
and the evils of modernity concomitant with their rule—foremost machinery, modern 
industry, and the railways—had to disappear. Gandhi envisioned a society of village 
republics autonomously governed by the panchayats. A prominent feature of these entities 
was to be religion (not in the sense of a specific religion, but of religiosity), a supposed core 
principle of human existence. This conviction also governed his stance on the less 
sympathetic aspects of empirical religiosity, such as caste issues, whose solution he 
envisaged in a kind of egalitarian non-egalitarianism: While retaining the fourfold varna as 
the “natural order” of society, Gandhi opposed the strata’s hierarchical ranking. Also, he 
held that social distance arose only as a consequence of jati, the innumerable stratified sub-
castes.243 
The same egalitarian non-egalitarianism characterized his economic concepts. Inspired 
by John Ruskin’s Unto This Last, Gandhi’s economic approach was “essentially moral” and 
phrased in terms of religion and spirituality.244 To him, economic equality meant that 
everybody was to receive according to his or her need. “This is socialism. In it the prince 
and the peasant, the wealthy and the poor, the employer and the employee are all on the 
same level.”245 However, they were to remain princes and peasants, wealthy and poor. 
Gandhi was reluctant to uproot the social order, and instead delivered sermons on the 
“dignity of poverty,” preaching that dearth of material goods was compensated for by 
largesse of spirit.246 
Gandhi’s vision profoundly affected the national movement’s trajectory, character, and 
appearance. Fusing moral-economic and religious ideologemes of the swadeshi campaign 
with a specific brand of spiritual, non-violent mass militancy, Gandhi’s revolutionary 
techniques—satyagraha and ahimsa—turned the national movement into “a strange mixture 
of nationalism and religion and ethics and mysticism and fanaticism.”247 Therein lay the key 
to his immense success: “His method […] was one which the peasant could readily 
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understand. He lived the simple life of the Indian peasant, dressed like him, and talked in the 
language and through the idioms [of] the peasant.”248  
Gandhian socialism thus had affected communist hunting grounds. As a consequence 
the conceptual abyss separating it from communism narrowed considerably in practical 
politics. The political landscape that resonated so well with the idioms and notions of 
Gandhi’s campaigns necessarily determined the imprint the communists were trying to 
make. When their mission began in earnest, notions of social progress had already been 
connected to—and, to an extent, proved viable in the context of—spiritualist politics, not 
materialist ones. All the CPI could, and would, do was to adorn the preconfigured peasant 
mindset with a communist gloss. 
 
 
II.2.2 The Quest for the ‘Masses’ 
 
It was only after Gandhi’s suspension of non-cooperation following the killing of a number 
of policemen at Chauri Chaura in 1922 that Roy’s criticism of the movement really came 
into its own. The abrogation nourished Roy’s disdain towards the INC in general and 
Gandhi (the last of a “long line of ghostly ancestors”249) in particular. To him, the factions 
emerging in the aftermath of non-cooperation—the Swaraj Party headed by Motilal Nehru 
advocating entry into the representative organs created by the 1919 Montagu-Chelmsford 
reforms in order to blockade them from inside, the “responsivists” or Independents around 
Mohammed Ali Jinnah who took a more constructive stance towards council entry, and 
those who altogether rejected participation in British institutions and opted for the 
implementation of Gandhi’s “constructive programme” of spinning in the villages—were 
more or less interchangeable: None represented the interests of the ‘masses,’ and Dominion 
Status, as demanded by the Swarajists, would only perpetuate the subcontinent’s slavery.250  
Accordingly, Roy’s turn towards the broad population as the only remaining agent and 
addressee of his progressive ambitions was all the more determined. This was borne out by 
the CPI’s first theoretical intervention, the Manifesto to the 36th Indian National Congress. 
Giving shape to Roy’s endeavor to set up counterweights against colonial, bourgeois, or 
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colonial bourgeois ‘reactionaries,’ it undertook to identify resistance among the ‘masses’ 
apart from nationalism in general and the Gandhian leadership’s spiritualized brand of 
mobilization in particular. The manifesto counselled “fellow countrymen” that the “mass 
revolt is directed against the propertied class, irrespective of nationality.”251 Only if the 
“immediate grievances” of the people were addressed would they continue to lend their 
support. Despite contradicting evidence, Roy deemed it impossible for the striking workers 
and protesting peasants to be moved by the “redemption of the Khilafat” instead of the 
“petty, but imperative necessities of everyday life” in their “sober moments.”252 
Notwithstanding the conservatism of its guiding ideals, to him the movement highlighted 
that “the masses are showing unmistakably their desire for material betterment.”253  
Indeed, the non-cooperation movement’s appeal seemed to have convinced Roy that 
conditions on the subcontinent were ripe for revolution. His India in Transition (1922), the 
first major Marxist work on South Asia, abounded with revolutionary optimism. It was to 
expose the mobilization’s “deep-rooted social character” and unveil the “revolutionary trend 
of the growing mass movement.”254 This diagnosis was holistic in scope: India was not 
merely liberating itself from foreign domination, but was treading the path of 
comprehensive human emancipation, on which religious tradition barred the way. In 
consequent disregard of the slogans so effectively mobilizing the “growing mass 
movement,” Roy declared the country’s “entire store of popular energy” to be revolting 
against all “which has so far kept it backward and still conspires to do so,” even deeming the 
upheaval the “essence of the present transition.”255 To Roy, it was clear that “like all other 
political movements in history,” Gandhi’s popular campaign for the restoration of ram rajya 
was an “expression of the urge of social progress.”256 
In his zeal, he dug ever deeper into the mass protest’s layers of meaning, eventually 
concluding that its core was secular. His own mechanisms of selective perception developed 
during the muhajirin episode at Tashkent greatly assisted him during the process: to him, for 
example, Muslims’ susceptibility to the khilafat propaganda merely indicated the degree of 
economic discontent.257 Consequently, he opined that “politically speaking there is no 
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question of sects in India’s liberation struggle,” and reasoned that there remained little 
justification for not establishing links with religious revolutionaries.258 In a direct inversion 
of the various protest movements’ distinct metaphysical tinges, and in vivid contrast to the 
slogans that brought people into the streets, Roy fashioned them into “a reaction against the 
age-long resignation, created by religious teachings and the tenets of spiritual culture.”259 
This stance granted no role to the religio-cultural complex other than that of an 
ephemeral nuisance. Subsequent publications would treat it as such: Roy’s first Program for 
the Indian National Congress, written for the 1922 Gaya session, contained only a single 
reference to religion. It curtly demanded freedom of conscience and the separation of 
religion and state. A contemporary phrase of his captured the unshakable conviction 
underneath his approach by congratulating himself to have found, at last, a philosophy that 
“enables us to untangle so easily every complicated social and historical phenomenon.”260 
However, by untangling the “complicated social and historical” phenomena in this manner, 
Roy set about entangling the nascent communist party in what he would himself much later 
assess more lucidly as unfavorable terrain. His autobiography conceded that the “religious 
appeal certainly moved the masses, and it was indeed the motive force of the non-co-
operation and Khilafat movements. […] The socio-cultural atmosphere, therefore, inhibited 
the growth of a democratic revolutionary spirit.”261  
And yet, Roy’s zeal to conjure up a situation amenable to his revolutionary tastes did 
not solely derive from wishful thinking. His reports on the “powerful mass revolutionary 
movement” widely read in communist papers all over the world had been manufactured on 
the basis of unreliable evidence. For example, Usmani wrote in spring 1923 that the 
‘masses’ were ready for immediate revolution, with the army standing by for a sign from the 
INC. Only much later he admitted that even from a contemporary perspective armed 
rebellion would not have been possible without foreign intervention.262 The upheaval on the 
subcontinent and its representation in the communist mind drifted ever further apart. 
However, there was a more realist string, too. Activists on the spot soon demonstrated that 
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theoretical shenanigans were not even required to appropriate a revolutionary movement for 
communism. 
 
 
II.2.3 Transmission Belts 
 
The failure of most muhajirin to return to British India undetected didn’t deter Roy. He also 
relied on agents undertaking undercover trips to the subcontinent. The first of these 
emissaries was Nalini Gupta. He had come to Moscow early in 1921 with the Berlin group 
of revolutionaries in their attempt to dislodge Roy from the Bolsheviks’ favor, but soon 
changed sides. During his stay on the subcontinent from November 1921 to March 1922, he 
managed to contact Roy’s former associates among the Hindu revolutionary terrorists in 
Bengal and enlisted a promising activist in Calcutta—Muzaffar Ahmad.263 Encouraged by 
the success of his envoy, Roy proceeded to mobilize substantial resources from the 
Comintern for the task of building a communist movement. Thanks to his extended network 
of contacts, he went about posting huge quantities of communist literature to the 
subcontinent, complemented by considerable amounts of funds.264 
Having joined the CPI in the meantime, Usmani returned to British India in September 
1922 and set up communist groups in Benares and Kanpur. By late autumn, there existed a 
handful of cells aligning themselves with communism through a mixture of outside 
encouragement and domestic initiative. These were the Calcutta activists around Ahmad, 
Madras-based leftist trade unionists led by Singaravelu, and Sripad Amrit Dange and the 
Socialist in Bombay. Besides these, there were the group in Lahore around Ghulam Hussein 
(whose paper Inquilab was run almost entirely on subsidies from Roy), and the cells in the 
UP formed by Usmani.265 The following sections discuss the handling of religion in an early 
communist context using the examples of the groups in Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay. 
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Calcutta 
Ubiquitous religious motives in society and politics alike left a lasting imprint on the 
nascent movement. Muzaffar Ahmad (1889–1973), the “pivot around which the communist 
group in Bengal was built,”266 who in time would become the young movement’s “best 
organizer […] in Northern India”, had had his fill of Muslim identity politics.267 Frustrated 
by both mainstream nationalism’s bourgeois Hindu attitude and the exclusivist communal 
politics pursued by Muslim leaders, he and his associates sought to articulate an independent 
position. However, as the basic categories of contemporary politics—specifically the 
distinct communal tinge to the articulation of all sorts political demands—continued to 
operate even among those seeking to escape them, their Muslim background remained 
heavily influential in the formulation of their premises. 
In Ahmad’s case, his political socialization in a cultural association for the promotion of 
Muslim literature, the Bangiya Musulman Sahitya Samiti (Bengali Muslim Literary Society) 
from 1913 onwards expressed and simultaneously preconfigured his sympathy for Muslim 
concerns. Even though the association, a forum for the minuscule liberal Muslim 
intelligentsia, was of a non-sectarian character, it concerned itself mainly with the spreading 
of Muslim culture—notably among Hindus. As it was through the Samiti that Ahmad 
recruited many of the early members of the Calcutta communist cell (among them Abdur 
Rezzak Khan and Abdul Halim), the latter unsurprisingly developed an affinity with radical, 
in the sense of anti-imperialist, Muslim politics.268  
Ahmad’s involvement in the Bengali poet Nazrul Islam’s paper Dhumketu (Comet) 
from 1922 onwards was similarly literary-political. The journal exhibited the same distinct 
tinge of radicalism that had already marked Ahmad’s 1920–1 stint in Fazlul Haq’s daily 
Navayug. Besides deriding the INC for its lack of resolve and calling for mass action against 
domestic and British oppression, the paper also denigrated organized religion. However, in 
the case of Muslims this referred only to the conservative establishment. More popular and 
radical forms of communal political mobilization such as the khilafat movement were 
afforded considerably more benevolent treatment. Although Ahmad had “no clear-cut 
position at the time, except for anti-imperialism and an interest in mass struggles,” the type 
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of anti-imperialist mass struggles he turned to had a clear religious leaning.269 In January 
1921, Ahmad and Islam participated in deliberations on how Muslims could be mobilized 
for the preservation of the Ottoman caliphate. At around the same time, he wrote a series of 
short essays in which he praised “Islamic glory and culture.”270 Fittingly, Chattopadhyay 
identifies Ahmad’s drift towards communism as taking place in this period, when he was 
about to set up another newspaper together with Qutb-ud-din Ahmad, a “pan-Islamist and 
nationalist labour leader.”271 
In the following year, the Calcutta group was joined by one Hafiz Masood Ahmad, who 
had been educated in a renowned Deoband madrasa. Founded in 1867 during the communal 
“education rush,” the religious school located in Deoband, UP, represented an influential 
strand in subcontinental Islam that was as fiercely anti-imperialist as strictly conservative. It 
regarded British India as dar-ul-harb, enemy soil ruled by infidels, and was an exponent of a 
pronouncedly rigid interpretation of Islam and Islamic law. This pronounced Islamic 
component in his biography did not discredit Hafiz Masood Ahmad. On the contrary, 
Muzaffar Ahmad averred that his background “was one of the reasons why we had admitted 
Hafiz Masood Ahmad to our company.”272 
Ahmad was similarly inclined towards Khwaja Abdul Hai, a professor at the Aligarh 
Muslim College, whom he had met in 1923. “Mr Hai had been a student of Deoband 
Madrasa [...] He was also a revolutionary,” for he had been a driving force behind the 
exodus of the first batch of muhajirin in 1915.273 In addition, Hai had distinguished himself 
by leading the boycott of the Aligarh College’s staff and students during the khilafat 
movement’s heyday in favor of an independent “Muslim National University.” This short-
lived institution, founded upon indignation over the British “sacrilege committed against the 
Khilafat,” had sworn in its students on the Quran and emphasized the sacrifices its staff had 
made for the cause of Islam.274 So when Ahmad met Usmani in 1923, he sent him to 
Aligarh, which he considered “a very good place for Usmani to make acquaintances.” On 
his part, Usmani harmonized with the environment at the Muslim college. By the time he 
                                                 
269 Chattopadhyay, An Early Communist, 69. 
270 Ibid., 29–30, 33–4 (quote); see also Ansari, The Emergence of Socialist Thought, 56, 63–4. 
271 Chattopadhyay, An Early Communist, 74, 105. 
272 Ahmad, Myself and the Communist Party, 299 (quote); Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, The Deoband School and the 
Demand for Pakistan (Bombay: Asia Publishing House 1963), 28, 33, 46, 79–80. On the Deoband school’s 
lasting positive image among Muslims, see David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of 
Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press 1988), 54–5. 
273 Ahmad, Myself and the Communist Party, 300. 
274 See the report on the inauguration ceremony in H. N. Mitra, ed., The Indian Annual Register: Being an 
Annual Chronicle, a Digest of Public Affairs of India in Matters Political Educational, Economic, etc., vol. 3, 
1921 (Sibpur: Annual Register Office 1921), 131–4. 
80 
 
was arrested for the Kanpur Conspiracy Case late in 1923, he had risen to the post of deputy 
head of the anti-British Muslim National University.275 
The maintenance of extensive connections to the current of Muslim anti-colonialism 
was not limited to Ahmad. Abdur Rezzak Khan (1900–1984), son-in-law and follower of 
the “notorious Wahabi + Pan-Islamist” Akram Khan, was an “intimate associate” of his and 
other core members of the Calcutta communist group. Together with khilafat firebrand and 
future INC president Abul Kalam Azad, Akram Khan was a member of the fundamentalist 
Mohamedan Secret Society. In a later interview, Abdur Rezzak Khan recounted having 
heard numerous stories of the glory of the Wahhabi movement during his childhood, and 
that therefore “anti-imperialism came naturally to me.” Moreover, Khan and Ahmad had 
already met before 1921, when Ahmad had asked him to do a Bengali translation of the 
Quran.276 
All this points to the continuation of political traditions that had impressed themselves 
upon the future communists in the course of their socialization in a sub-unit of the Calcutta 
microcosm, where “anti-colonial political Islam dominated the world of the urban Muslim 
intelligentsia.” The early communists were hardly differentiated from this environment, and 
there was little reason to be, as it had many links to contemporary left-wing politics. 
Fittingly, the only ascertained recipient of the British left-wing communist Sylvia 
Pankhurst’s Workers’ Dreadnought on the subcontinent was the Wahhabite and khilafat 
organizer Mohamed Yusha Khan of Calcutta. Of the other two suspected recipients, one was 
a member of the Bengal Muslim League.277 Even though Ahmad, Halim, Khan, and others 
never made the transition towards identity politics, partaking in the life of this milieu had 
made the existence of a consciously Muslim element in the phalanx of communist progress 
appear quite natural. 
Tellingly, Ahmad reserved his skepticism for Roy’s plans to involve his former 
associates from the Anushila Samiti and Jugantar underground terrorist movements in the 
building of a communist movement in Bengal. In several letters to Roy, Ahmad expressed 
his aversion to and later his dismay concerning this move, as the elitist and revivalist high-
caste Hinduism at the heart of these groups alarmed him and others of Muslim background. 
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Ahmad assiduously (and justifiably) portrayed them as proponents of traditional middle-
class radicalism who shunned mass work and as religious extremists harmful to the cause of 
an integrative movement—an assessment unthinkable with respect to Ahmad’s own, 
similarly radically-minded co-religionists. Roy expressed agreement with his aversion to the 
political culture of the extremists, but having himself been socialized in their milieu he saw 
no need for their principled exclusion. Hence he encouraged Ahmad to try and keep up 
contact with them, and maintained that their organs, notably Atmashakti, occasionally 
published “good articles.”278 
 
Madras 
Another communist nucleus emerged in the South around the Madras-based lawyer and 
trade union activist Malayapuram Singaravelu (1860–1946). Already untypical for an early 
communist because of his age and his socialization in a 19th century environment, he was 
also the scion of a wealthy family of traders and temple guardians. He himself held the 
position of “Trustee of Sri Payandi Amman Temple” in Madras.279 Contact with the CPI 
had been established when Singaravelu wrote to Roy after reading India in Transition. He 
was attracted to Roy’s take on emancipation because he saw it as a synthesis of radical 
transformation inspired by the October Revolution and the necessity to retain a connection 
to what he considered “Indian.” This included countering the British portrayal of 
Bolshevism as a foreign ideology and rooting it in subcontinental history and culture. 
Influenced as much by his own traditional milieu and contemporary Gandhism as by trade 
union work, to Singaravelu domestic heritage consisted primarily of spiritualism. The 
Manifesto of his Labour and Kishan Party of Hindustan hence stipulated that the approaches 
of the Bolsheviks and Western Marxists did not cover the “real interests” of the 
subcontinental workforce.280  
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On his part, he had quite definite notions of them. Even though the general goal was 
common—improvement of the living conditions of the ‘masses’—the subcontinental 
environment had to be accommodated: Besides the promotion of the rights of untouchables, 
who were to receive both equal political and religious rights, he demanded special care for 
the maintenance of the “freedom of religion and worship.”281 An early exponent of the 
peculiar brand of secularism that came to dominate post-independence Indian politics, 
Singaravelu regarded each community’s religious festivities, customs, and institutions as 
part of national culture. To him, they were important enough to be entitled to public support 
and funding. In this, he exhibited the utmost impartiality. In September 1922, he demanded 
the urgent resumption of civil disobedience in telegrams to the Congress Working 
Committee and the Central Khilafat Committee, as British intervention in Turkey 
endangered a “successful solution” of the khilafat question. A “non-violent offensive” had 
to be initiated by the INC “if the British attacks [sic] Islam.”282 
Although aware of Singaravelu’s views, Roy persisted with his integration into the 
communist movement. After all, due to his relative popularity and indefatigable endeavors 
to set up socialist trade unions in Madras, Singaravelu was one of the most promising 
recruits on the subcontinent. Against this, his “shortcomings in the way of theoretical 
understanding” and “ideological weaknesses” were of minor importance—qualifications 
that, unspecified as they were, did not necessarily pertain to Singaravelu’s religious 
leaning.283 Even when Roy’s criticism intensified after the Kanpur conference, it targeted 
Singaravelu’s lack of commitment to radical forms of political action while remaining 
largely silent on his cultural and religious outlook. At any rate, Roy would defend him 
publicly not just as a capable lawyer and internationally acknowledged representative of the 
working class, but also as a versed Marxist.284 
 
Bombay 
The Bombay communist movement originated in a group of activists around S. A. Dange 
(1899–1991). With the help of a moneyed donor, Ranchoddas Bhavan Lotvala, they were 
able to edit a paper—the Socialist—from 1922, to educate themselves in Marxism in his 
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well-equipped library, and to have a (short-lived) go at establishing a Socialist Labour Party 
within the INC in 1923. However, the Socialist’s circulation never exceeded 500 copies, and 
Lotvala withdrew his support upon Dange’s arrest in the Kanpur Conspiracy Case.285 
What the milieu of Muslim anti-colonialism was to Ahmad, Hindu extremist 
nationalism was to Dange. While steering clear of identity politics in the proper sense, he 
had derived most of his political inspiration from Tilak, notably from the latter’s 1915 book 
Gita Rahasva, and was an adherent of Vedic philosophy. The influences of both were amply 
present in his first, as yet mildly Marxist, book, Gandhi vs. Lenin. While it exhibited a clear 
preference for Lenin, it was Tilak who figured as a “saviour,” whose “fighting Genius” had 
been raised “to the high pedestal of divinity itself.”286 To Dange, communism disposed over 
similarly metaphysical connections. “Karl Marx’s Book the ‘Capital’ is to the Bolshevik 
what the Geeta is to the Hindoo, or the Bible to the Christian.”287 The “prophesy [sic] of the 
Guru, Karl Marx” had acquired “a force of religions, and all that inspired unflinching belief, 
that a religion demands.”288  
Sachchidanand Vishnu (S. V.) Ghate’s (1896–1970) way to communism took a 
comparably mystical route, as he described in a later interview. Born to a “very orthodox 
Brahmin family,” Ghate read “Indian philosophy, Ramakrishna Paramahansa and 
Vivekananda, etc.” All had an affinity with socialism: “The main thing in all the topics in 
philosophy is service of people.” The difference lay merely in the degree of—remarkably 
abstract—“activity.”289 His responses showcased the typical contradictory pulls of 
subcontinental communists: On the one hand, they intended to assert an independent 
communist identity; on the other, they emphasized a sense of rootedness in their own 
biography—and, indirectly, of communism in the native religio-cultural environment. 
When asked later whether he had been religious, Dange replied nebulously that 
“religiousness was there in me in the sense that you believe in worship.”290 In his case, 
however, an ostensibly abstract sense of “worship” did allow for certain distinctions in 
religious matters, such as during the 1917 “anti-Bible agitation” at Wilson College, which 
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Dange had been attending. The object of resentment was the forced common prayer before 
class, when “the Professor used to come, stand up, close his eyes and do prayer, and we had 
to stand also.” Dange’s refusal to join in (“It is not my prayer. Why should I?”) led to his 
voluntary disassociation from the college. Retrospectively, Dange fashioned the “boycott” 
of the institution into a “political strike”: “There was nothing of Christian or the Bible or 
Hindu or anything about it, it was just against imperialism.” Nevertheless, “there could not 
[have been] any other issue.”291 
Even granted that the young Dange had been driven by pristine anti-imperialist motives, 
it seems likely that his aversion to mandatory Hindu prayer before class would have been 
less pronounced. Just as Lenin had laid down the future Marxist practice of judging religion 
by its social location, Dange struggled against the Bible’s perceived imperialist connotation, 
not its religious quality. The subordination of religious considerations to political ones 
fostered a readiness to embrace indigenous creeds under the auspices of culturally conscious 
anti-imperialism. Native religion thus acquired a hue of resistance via the possibility of its 
inclusion in ‘revolutionary,’ or only anti-imperialist, mobilization. Conversely, it was the 
religious ‘other’ that made Dange discover his secular streak. Other than Christian prayer at 
Wilson College, Dange also opposed the khilafat movement on the grounds of its religious 
outlook. While his Socialist had remained conspicuously silent on the matter, he later 
deemed it “so strongly tinged with religion that in many cases its anti-imperialist aspects 
were entirely obscured by religious frenzy.” Moreover, he asserted that “the moment our 
generation brought in religion, etc. in this movement, we said: It is gone.”292  
On a general plane, however, Dange’s stance towards an empathic understanding of 
religion was not in the least dismissive. In the context of the Ottoman caliphate’s eventual 
abolition by the Turkish national assembly in 1924, he commented that religion was “a 
bundle of superstitions” when “not understood or misunderstood”—implying that in his 
view, there was something in religion beyond such wrong understanding. The Turkish 
leaders, stripping religion of “excrescences and overgrowths,” exhibited a pragmatic stance 
towards religious traditions; still, there was no need to “condemn them as irreligious or 
infidels”293—two qualities that apparently resonated negatively for Dange.  
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Linking Segments 
From the outset, Roy had encouraged the communist cells to overcome their organizational 
isolation in order to set up a unified underground revolutionary party. It was to operate 
through a legal front organization, a party with a more moderate nationalist and socialist 
agenda. A 1923 memorandum suggested “Workers’ and Peasants’ Party of India” as its 
name. It was to function as the “conscious vanguard of the working class in its struggle first 
for national, then for social liberation.”294  
As a matter of fact, steps in this direction had already been taken on the subcontinent, 
mainly in the shape of endeavors to hold an all-India communist conference of the different 
groups. However, due to the difficulties of communication over long distances, British 
surveillance, and a lack of resources, they had proved abortive. Attempts by Dange (the 
Socialist Labour Party), Ghulam Hussein (the so-called Manifesto Party), and Singaravelu 
(the Labour and Swaraj Party) to form parties similarly failed. The foundation of the last of 
these on 1 May 1923 at least introduced May Day celebrations to the subcontinent. Yet 
Singaravelu’s proposition that the other groups become provincial units of his Madras-based 
party met with little enthusiasm, indicating the early segmentalization of the party.295 
Rivalling ambitions played into this, too. Roy had to push Dange repeatedly to establish 
contact with Singaravelu. The regional units acknowledged Roy’s and the Comintern’s 
distant overlordship and by and large adhered to their injunctions, while each was wary of 
the others and anxious to preserve organizational independence, leading to the wielding of 
effective power by ‘little secretaries.’ Accordingly, the segments could fashion communism 
according to their own localized cultural preferences—with a Muslim, a Hindu, or a pan-
religious tinge.296  
Roy’s efforts to build a centralized movement from the outside were similarly curtailed 
by British surveillance agencies ever vigilant to intercept his communications and shipments 
of money. British pressure on his European host countries repeatedly forced Roy to relocate 
his headquarters. Simultaneously, colonial authorities moved against his comrades on the 
subcontinent: In 1924 many of the early communists were rounded up and put on trial in the 
Kanpur Conspiracy Case. Accused of conspiring “to bring about a violent revolution of the 
labouring classes in India in order to deprive the King Emperor of his sovereignty of India,” 
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Roy (in absentiam), Ahmad, Dange, Usmani, and the former emissary Gupta were sentenced 
to various terms of rigorous imprisonment.297 
The impact on some of the convicts’ future careers was tangible. Roy had to serve his 
six-year term after returning to the subcontinent in 1930. Dange and Usmani each spent four 
years behind bars. Singaravelu was exempted from the trial, either due to his poor health or 
because the security agencies didn’t consider him dangerous enough. Gupta and Ahmad 
were released early due to illness. The former cooperated with the prosecution, made a 
comprehensive deposition, and abandoned communism. Similarly, Ghulam Hussein turned 
informer upon his arrest in 1923 and was let off the hook. After his release, he demonstrated 
the fluid interplay of communism and religion by immediately joining the Lahore-based 
Muslim Outlook, “a purely communal newspaper.”298  
 
 
II.2.4 The Kanpur Communion 
 
As if mocking British efforts to root out communism, a journalist from the Central 
Provinces called Satyabhakta announced the foundation of the ICP (Indian Communist 
Party) in Kanpur just a few months after the judgments in the conspiracy case had been 
delivered. However, bearing testimony to the lessons of British repression, the impact of 
Gandhism, and the necessity of a situated subcontinental approach, he envisaged the party 
as a domestic affair without affiliation with the Comintern, and dismissed violent revolution. 
In September 1924, Satyabhakta issued a call for a conference of all subcontinental 
communists. Attended by most contemporary activists at large (who successively 
transformed the new organization into the subcontinental CPI), it convened in Kanpur in 
December 1925.299 
A paradigmatic example of the political and ideological scope of early subcontinental 
communism, Fazl-ul Hasan (1877–1951), alias Hasrat Mohani, had been a prominent 
member of the party since its inception and was chairman of the conference’s reception 
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committee. Mohani was a celebrated Urdu poet from the UP and an “extremist nationalist 
leader.”300 He earned lasting fame by being the first within the INC’s fold to publicly call 
for complete independence at the 1921 Ahmedabad session. The Documents of the History 
of the Communist Movement describe him as a “left Congressman who was undoubtedly 
influenced by the October Revolution.”301 
Mohani’s other influences were discreetly glossed over: He had been an eminent 
khilafat activist and, at the time of his Ahmedabad speech, was president of the All-India 
Muslim League. At a khilafat conference in May 1920, he had exhorted Muslims to take 
direct action for the preservation of the caliphate’s territorial integrity. If this were not 
secured, it would be the religious duty of Muslims to rid the subcontinent of British rule. In 
1921, he had endorsed the fundamentalist Moplah rebellion because of the insurgents’ 
sincere commitment to their faith, notwithstanding outrages against the Hindu population 
(see chapter III.1.1).302 Right before his appearance at the communist conference, Mohani 
had presided over the All-India Khilafat Committee’s 1925 session, in which he had 
reiterated that the (already abolished) caliphate was essential to Islam.303 
Opening the communist conference, Mohani called for the attainment of independence 
“by all fair means” and the establishment of a system of Soviets. In his view, communism 
had unjustly been described as an anti-religious movement. Mohani’s vision allowed for 
“the largest possible latitude and toleration” in matters of religion. Not only was the party 
open to adherents of all creeds; atheism itself was to be regarded as a religion. However, his 
ostensibly rigorous ‘secularism’ was thwarted by his emphatic invocation of Islam, whose 
alleged inherent resistance to capitalism surpassed even “the Communistic conception.” For 
example, Zakat, the duty of charity in Islam, was opposed to capitalist economics, and 
already the first caliph had called for jihad against the uncharitable. Also, he likened the ban 
on interest in Islam to communism: “The usurer profits by his capital alone without doing 
any actual labour and this is against the principles of Islam just as it is against 
Communism.”304 This was no opportunist assessment tailored to the occasion. Already in 
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1920, Mohani had likened Islam and Bolshevism to each other on the grounds of their 
common “great principles” of freedom and equality.305 
Communism appealed to Mohani most as a variety of Islam, which was the true anti-
capitalist force. Striving for a “firm foundation […] and a new synthesis of political 
culture,” as S. M. Habibuddin put it, national independence and the application of Islam’s 
economic tenets were the two pillars of Mohani’s communism.306 Commenting on the lack 
of dissent among the delegates at the conference, Ansari noted that the “close identity of 
views between the communists and radical Pan-Islamists […] was very much in 
evidence.”307 Yet it would be just as unfair to reduce contemporary communism and pan-
Islamism to a common denominator as it would to pigeon-hole Mohani as a sectarian 
Muslim. After all, he invoked Tilak’s swadeshi campaign as the most important influence 
on his political socialization. His grounding of communism in Islam was not exclusive or 
fundamentalist, but reflected the religious complexity of politics extending to the communist 
sphere.  
Singaravelu, the conference president, integrated communism into religious eschatology 
in an overarching sense. His speech opened with a reference to Tilak as a “beacon of light 
for all true lovers of freedom,” but soon transcended the framework of religious nationalism. 
The communists were told to persevere: Just as kalachakra, the wheel of time, kept on 
turning eternally, the suffering undergone by the “world reformers” would inspire others to 
take the burden upon themselves until they became objects of the world’s admiration. Such 
had been the history of mankind since its inception. In this spiritualist rephrasing of 
historical materialist determinism, communism would inevitably heal mankind “of almost 
all the ills of life.”308  
According to Singaravelu, Marx had been the first to systematize communist thought 
and to cast it in a scientific, practically applicable form. Yet Plato, Buddha, and Christ were 
its true ancestors and originators. At the same time, he was skeptical of the implications of 
Bolshevism. Although he was convinced that “in the course of ages, there can be no doubt 
that the work begun by this man in Russia [Lenin], will ultimately […] shower happiness 
and contentment upon the human race,” he questioned the suitability of Bolshevism for the 
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subcontinent. This was because it constituted the “doctrine of the majority.”309 Evidently, 
Singaravelu was aware of the charged ground on which questions of majority and minority 
in the subcontinent’s tense communal set-up trod, and preferred to define communism 
separate from their implications. While doubtful in terms of communist doctrine, 
Singaravelu’s speech was also an impassioned response to the deterioration of communal 
relations. It consisted of an attempt to liken communism directly to its environment by 
framing it in religious, but non-sectarian, idioms, just as Gandhi had undertaken earlier on a 
nationalist plane. 
In line with this, he also displayed a sense of the problematic dimensions of empirical 
religiosity for an enlightened conception of society. Castes and creeds in their current 
statures had become “nightmares”: 
The communal and religious differences which seem to destroy the harmony which once 
obtained among all political parties in the country during the hay day [sic] of [the non-
cooperation movement] may overtake us also, for […] we Indians are so religiously minded and 
caste ridden [.…] Religion and caste have been the demons which have been swallowing our 
political unity from historic times. […] The leaders who flaunt these fripperies before us are 
traitors to our country and to our cause. The Hindu Sabhas, Sangathams Shuddees are mere 
bourgeois tactics of the leisured class. Let us therefore leave religion, caste, and creed to each 
individual tastes and fancies, and let us pursue our peaceful course towards Swaraj, free from 
these nightmares.310  
Turning away from the Eastern accommodation of religious anti-imperialism, this passage 
exhibits the central features of the Western communist understanding of communalism as 
expounded by Roy (see chapter III.2). They aimed at limiting and ultimately isolating the 
problematic dimensions of religious ideology, the virulence of which among the ‘masses’ 
could not be ignored. This, along with the religious fabric of Singaravelu’s own communist 
vision, necessitated a peculiar conditioning of religion to retain it in the revolutionary fold. 
The most important step was to outsource its divisiveness: Those who spread vile disruption 
on religious grounds formed a clearly identifiable stratum. Consequently, only the “leaders” 
who propagated communalism or advocated ‘hostile proselytization’ were dubbed “traitors,” 
not their mass following.311  
Communist echoes on the conference were mixed. Today’s CPI acknowledges the 
conference as its founding point; to the CPI(M), it was an important organizational step and 
the first assertion of an independent domestic brand of communism. In contrast, most 
contemporaries were less sympathetic. Roy soon chastised the ICP both for its “national 
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communism” and its commitment to non-violence. He considered affiliation with the 
Comintern essential to any serious communist undertaking. Also, Mohani’s speech had been 
of “a rather dubious nature” because the way to achieve a Soviet republic remained unclear. 
Both he and Singaravelu had distinguished themselves by “well-meaning but utopian 
phrases.”312 Two months later, when Roy’s attitude towards Satyabhakta had deteriorated 
sharply, he attacked both Mohani (“Islamic communism”) and Singaravelu (“the Biblical 
variety”) for their “extremely confused [and] childish” notions of communism.313 
Yet this remained the only instance of criticism of religious motives from communist 
quarters. Ahmad attacked the envisioned struggle and affiliation to the Comintern in his 
castigation of the “farce staged by Satyabhakta.” However, this didn’t deter him from taking 
over the new party’s Bengal section.314 Significantly, the passages in Mohani’s and 
Singaravelu’s addresses on the relationship of the party’s agenda to Islamic welfare 
concepts and universal religiosity respectively, figure neither in Ahmad’s nor in other 
retrospectives. More benevolent references at best emphasize the party’s anti-communalism. 
In this, the party application form rather than Singaravelu’s criticism of communalism 
serves as the most important exhibit. It states—twice—the basic incompatibility of party 
membership and membership of any “communal organisation.” This provision is enough to 
convince Irfan Habib of the communists’ uncompromising anti-communalism. Mohani’s 
expulsion in 1927 on the grounds of his membership in the Muslim League underscores this 
interpretation.315 
Indeed, the provision’s vanguard status is aptly illustrated by the fact that the anti-
communalist standard set by it was attained by the INC only in 1938. Nevertheless, a closer 
look qualifies its seemingly principled stance. The passage on the form read “I belong to no 
such communal organisation which can debar me from joining this party”316 (emphasis 
added). This was a clearly political phrasing. It indicated that the pariah status of communal 
bodies was neither guaranteed nor irrevocable. If certain factors sufficiently contradicted 
apparent communalism in communist eyes, the assessment could well be otherwise.  
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Mohani’s case, however, appears to follow a different logic. When asked about 
Mohani’s presence at Kanpur despite him being a member of the Muslim League, Ghate 
later portrayed the issue as an accident: “At that time not much distinction was made as to 
who was coming and who was not coming […] it was just making a beginning and anybody 
could come.”317 Still, it is hard to believe that just “anybody” could have attained the degree 
of eminence in the new party that Mohani did. It seems more likely that in the murky 
contemporary cultural-communist context, it simply hadn’t yet dawned on anyone that his 
roots in Muslim politics could actually be deserving of communal stigma, and concomitant 
communist criticism. Similarly, his expulsion two years later responded to a heightened 
sense of communist identity on the one hand and an increased awareness of the communal 
problem on the other. Nevertheless, cooperation between Mohani and the communists was 
resumed in the late 1930s. 
Disagreements at the founding conference, mainly over international affiliation, soon 
led to the demise of the ICP. Outvoted on the question, Satyabhakta, Singaravelu, and most 
of the members from the UP soon left the ICP. In addition, a majority vote had renamed it as 
the CPI and set it on a course of international affiliation. Despite continuing in politics, 
more specifically in his follow-up National Communist Party, Satyabhakta henceforth 
remained outside the spotlight. Incidentally, judging by a 1926 letter to Radha Mohan Gokul 
of the Widow Marriage Association, his own stance on religious matters was characterized 
by a remarkable lack of aversion to communal identity formation. Announcing his 
resignation from the ICP, he expressed his hope to meet Gokul soon at a conference of the 
Hindu Mahasabha, participation in which he recommended.318  
Together with Satyabhakta, Singaravelu disappeared from the stage of South Asian 
communism. Despite continuing in trade union work, he never again rose to an eminent role 
in left national politics, which is probably the reason why his presidential address at the 
conference has more or less sunk into oblivion. At any rate, his own metaphysical frame of 
mind remained unshaken: An indignant Singaravelu countered Roy’s post-Kanpur doubts 
about the sincerity of his communist commitment by referring to Buddhism, which counts 
doubt (vichikitsa) among the most heinous crimes. Later in the 1920s, a police report 
mentioned that he had “as usual” referred to revolutionary Russia as the “land of the 
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blessed.”319 Shortly before his death, he regretted that neither democracy nor “even 
religion” had proven capable of ameliorating the living conditions of the broad 
population.320 
 
 
Synopsis of Chapter II 
 
This chapter traces the spirit of the émigré formation of the CPI and the party’s first steps in 
a subcontinental environment. A conflation of religious and political ideologies 
characterized the main strands converging in the early CPI—extremist nationalists in the 
process of overcoming their deeply Hindu notions of India, Muslim militants having left 
British India to fight infidel rule and preserve the Ottoman caliphate, and Ghadrites ready to 
countenance a fusion of religion and revolutionary nationalism in their mobilization efforts.  
This constellation by and large also characterized the programmatic stances and 
political links forged by the early communists ‘on the spot.’ As yet, they were largely 
ignorant of Marxist analysis and its rationalizing view on religious phenomena. Their first 
steps illustrate early subcontinental communism’s situatedness in the conditions on the 
ground, but also, albeit unconsciously, in the Eastern revolutionary paradigm.  
Early communists were critical of the prevalent modes of agitation—bourgeois 
nationalism and identity politics. Nevertheless, they orientated themselves instinctively 
within the limits of their political socialization. It was as logical for Muzaffar Ahmad to 
work with anti-British Muslim extremists as it was for Dange to revere Tilak’s Hindu-
revivalist nationalism. This entailed the reproduction of prejudices implicit in religious 
partiality, contributing to an early segmentalization of subcontinental party communism. 
The 1925 communist conference in Kanpur epitomized the Eastern practice of 
understanding and articulating communism in cultural terms. Two leading figures, M. 
Singaravelu Chettiar and Hasrat Mohani, even invoked an outright religious framework. 
Therefore, early communism was not an alien system removed from subcontinental 
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“Lebenswelten” (Alfred Schütz). Its marginality was not a consequence of cultural aloofness 
or of a pronounced anti-religious agenda. Rather, it was the numerical and organizational 
weakness of the nascent movement, its suppression by the colonial state, and the 
incomparably greater pull of Gandhi’s full-blooded saintly vision of a simple and just 
society that rendered the aspiring party a largely invisible factor.  
Yet unmediated susceptibilities to local context soon receded into the background. Roy 
and the CPGB, which assisted in building the subcontinental movement from the mid-1920s 
onwards, spearheaded the CPI’s theoretical turn. As will be shown, this didn’t preclude the 
adaptation of culture and religion. It did, however, fundamentally alter the modalities of 
their articulation in a communist framework when the CPI again turned to them in the 
1930s. 
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III Revolutionary Subjectivity 
 
III.1 From Religiousness to Resistancy 
 
Much to their chagrin, the communists faced substantial difficulties in the articulation of a 
consistent criticism of communalism and in the sustainable identification of revolutionary 
subjectivity. In order to understand these difficulties, it is expedient to assess the first 
pinnacles of communist revolutionary hopes on the subcontinent. Both the early Akali 
movement in the Punjab and the great 1921 Moplah uprising in Malabar constituted 
manifestations of grass-roots militancy imbued with, and resting on notions of, perceived 
religious grievances. The paradigms of (Western) externalization and (Eastern) 
accommodation rival in their assessment of the religious component notably in case of the 
Moplah rebellion.  
 
III.1.1 The Moplah Rebellion 
 
Origins 
Religiously inspired unrest among the south Malabar coastal region’s Muslim population, to 
whom the terms “Mappillas” or “Moplahs” refer, sports a long tradition. According to 
Stephen Dale, “suicidal jihads,” as he calls them, date back hundreds of years, when they 
had been an often called-to way to combat foreign, that is, European usurpers of the spice 
trade monopoly.321 However, right from the beginning the grievances of Muslim traders and 
clerics included real and perceived religious degradation: The obstruction of the haj, the 
destruction of mosques, and notably the forced conversions of Muslims to Christianity. 
Together, these factors seemed to indicate a comprehensive danger to Islam.322 
After the reinstitution of the upper-caste Hindu landlord elite (driven away under Tipu 
Sultan) by the British, the Moplahs, divested of their stakes in the spice trade, underwent a 
sustained social decline. Concomitantly, the commercial dimension of unrest came to be 
eclipsed by religious glorification of the shahid (martyr) and corresponding means of 
struggle. In the course of the ongoing low-intensity war, the “closely related ideals of 
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mujahid [warrior of god] and shahid became enshrined as heroic ideals among the 
Mappillas.”323 Hence, the possibility of such militancy turning ‘inward,’ that is, against 
infidel (and more prosperous) members of domestic society increased—even more so in the 
context of the rapid ascendancy of communal idioms and the strengthening of intra-
communal solidarity under the conditions of 19th-century colonial modernity: “Revolt 
became practically endemic” in the Moplah hotspots of the Ernad and Walluvanad districts. 
Initially, most victims were Hindu landlords from the Namboodiri and Nair castes. Although 
the overwhelming majority of Hindus, tenant farmers living as miserably as the Moplahs, 
were left alone, the frequent desecrations of temples illustrate the virulence of a certain 
religious fanaticism. They fused religious and agrarian issues into a volatile cauldron of 
highly militant millenarianism.324 M. Menon, author of the most comprehensive study on 
the rebellion to date, concurs that a combination of agrarian grievances of the rural poor and 
the tradition of religious militancy lay at the root of the recurring outbreaks in Malabar 
during the 19th and early 20th century. Accordingly, they testified to a markedly 
fundamentalist outlook:  
The ‘outbreaks’ had the character of religious rituals from the beginning. The intending 
participants donned white robes, divorced their wives, settled all their accounts, and received the 
blessings of a Tangal […] for the success of their mission; after death most of them come to be 
worshipped as shahids.325 
Two major and closely connected movements preceded the great rebellion of 1921, each 
representing a strand of unrest among the Moplahs. Together they defined the space for the 
looming uprising’s self-assertion: The peasant movement of 1920/21 agitating for a revision 
of the tenancy laws and the anti-colonial campaigns of the Congress and khilafat 
Committees. However, the latter two resonated very unevenly among the Moplahs, 
particularly after the tenant and non-cooperation movements lost momentum following the 
arrest of its leaders. In March 1921, District Magistrate E. F. Thomas reported that the 
predominant form of political mobilization had become “religious to the exclusion of 
everything else, non-co-operation was nothing, Khilafat was everything, the talk of Hindu-
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Muslim unity was nonsense and the main idea was the vision of swaraj and Malabar for the 
Mapilla and the Mapilla alone.”326 
In mid-August, a report identified “a situation which contains the possibility of an 
extremely serious Mapilla outbreak”:327 On 1 August, a crowd had rallied in Pukkottur to 
protect a laborer from arrest. When tensions ran high upon the arrival of government 
officials, the crowd set their minds on storming the local Kovilagam palace with the aim of 
converting it into a mosque, emphasizing Islam’s close proximity to Moplah notions of 
social justice.328 However, this was not just a reiteration of ‘classical’ fanaticism. On the 
contrary, fundamentalism among the Moplahs had exceeded many of its traditional local 
and customary boundaries. This tendency could be gleaned from innovations such as the 
participation of women in political rallies, but also from the fact the colonial order itself had 
become the target of attacks. Contact with the national movement and its advanced methods 
of organization and mobilization contributed significantly to modernizing the traditional 
way—Menon terms it the “‘outbreak’ method”—of venting grievances and expressing 
protest.329 British suppression of political dissent left few venues to channel the growing 
unrest: 
It was easy to stop all public political meetings, and difficult to combat religious propaganda 
from the Mosques. This situation led to a dangerous state of affairs in Malabar in which though 
the Mappilas remained extremely agitated over the Khilafat issue they were denied opportunities 
of resorting to modern methods of peaceful agitations and demonstrations, and were left with no 
alternative to falling back upon traditional religious organization and its methods for ventilating 
their fears and frustrations.330 
 
Land Reform and Khilafat State 
On 20 August, an army detachment sent out to arrest suspects met with overwhelming 
popular resistance in Tirurangadi and barely managed to withdraw. In the ensuing weeks, 
the rebellion spread over a vast swath of land in South Malabar, encompassing parts of the 
Ernad, Walluvanad, Ponnani, and Calicut districts. In mid-September, Thomas reported that 
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an area of more than 1.5 million inhabitants was up in arms. British control outside of 
garrisoned strongholds had ceased for months to come.331  
The rebels were quick to assert their sovereignty over what they declared khilafat 
kingdoms. On a meeting of leaders on 21 August, Malabar was partitioned into a number of 
areas. Each would be ruled by a king, and the “khilafat Code” (the local interpretation of 
Islamic law) would be the law, including draconian punishments. Weapons were to be 
handed over to the king; so were money and food, if he demanded so. Variankunnath 
Kunhamad Haji, a zealous khilafat worker and the most prominent leader of the rebellion, 
styled himself “Raja of the Hindus, Amir of the Mohammedans and Colonel of the Khilafat 
Army.”332 Likewise, soon after the withdrawal of the troops from Tirurangadi Ali Musaliar 
had proclaimed himself king under cheers on Islam and had taken up office in the local 
mosque. F. B. Evans wrote in late October that wherever the rebellion spread there were 
“the usual stories of the declaration of Islam Raj, etc.”333 
Statements of captured rebel leaders, almost invariably religious dignitaries fervently 
revered by their followers, vindicate the operation of politicized religiousness. According to 
Evans, Sithi Koya described that to him that a khilafat state meant “the proper observance of 
Islamic ritual.” Chembrasseri Tangal traced the rebellion’s surprising intensity to a false 
rumor spread by Ali Musaliar that the Tirurangadi mosque had been attacked by British 
troops during the operation on 20 August.334 Even while these statements are mere extracts 
from the respective enquiries and are mentioned by Evans mainly because they reinforce his 
own views on the matter, they point to the close proximity of spiritual and temporal 
motives. Thus, the rebels took care to destroy symbols of government from the very 
beginning. Public records, currency notes, stamps and public buildings themselves were 
targets of the insurgents’ wrath. Likewise, they destroyed documents pertaining to 
ownership of land wherever possible—which points to their determination to rid themselves 
of not just British supremacy, but also the social hierarchy by revising land tenures. Equally 
typical for contemporary protest movements and Islamic rigidity alike, the rebellious 
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Moplahs attacked and closed down liquor shops throughout the affected districts. Cognizant 
of his new subjects’ grievances, Haji exempted them from taxation for a full year.335 
However, besides striking out at representatives of government and the colonial order in 
general, the insurgents’ violence also targeted another major group. Already in the first days 
of the uprising, “a very large number of Hindu houses” in the affected districts had been 
attacked and looted. A week after the outbreak, the British authorities reported “widespread 
violence and robbery directed against Hindus.”336 Rebel bands looted and burned down 
temples, too. Armed Moplahs presented government servants, notably policemen, with the 
option to side with the rebels or die if they were Muslims, and mostly killed them instantly 
if they were Hindus. To be sure, British reports made no effort to distinguish between the 
social positions of the insurgents’ victims, many of whom were landlords. The insurgents’ 
fury, however, affected average Hindus, too: Evans wrote that “one of the greatest 
difficulties […] lies in the helplessness of the non-Moplah population who drift about from 
panic to panic, and whose chief care is avoidance of giving the slightest offence to the rebels 
who prey upon them.”337 
British sources abound of similar reports. They also mention a number of forced 
conversions. In November, Thomas had “good information” about 180 cases, excluding the 
worst-affected areas. He estimated their total between 500 and 1000, in addition to “many” 
murders for refusal of conversion.338 In January 1922, Sir William Vincent replied to a 
question in the Legislative Assembly that their number “probably runs to thousands,” 
although there would never be exact figures. Much in the same manner, he put the number 
of destroyed Hindu temples at over 100. Forced conversions seem to have been conducted 
mostly by rank-and-file Moplahs, not the leaders, who were not interested in converting the 
Hindu population.339 
By the end of 1921, the army had largely restored colonial order, albeit it would take 
until March 1922 to crush the rebellion and suspend martial law. Isolated murders of Hindus 
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continued into late spring. More than 2300 insurgents had been killed in encounters; another 
301 were sentenced to death during or after the rebellion.340 
 
Distilling a Social Movement 
Although communists had had no part in the rebellion—in fact, the CPI hadn’t established 
so much as a single cell on the subcontinent yet—, it soon figured prominently in the 
localization of communism. In view of Roy’s anti-bourgeois stance in the Comintern 
debates on the agents of revolution in colonial countries, the Moplah rebellion was a much-
needed point of reference on two counts. First, it figured as a prime example of the militant 
mass struggle that Roy posited as the core of the khilafat and non-cooperation movements. 
Second, the uprising served to showcase the relative lack of radicalism in Gandhi and the 
Congress. Gandhi had condemned the insurgents because of their ample use of force. The 
communists, however, soon fashioned it into the beginning of revolution. 
Neither the scarcity of reports nor the tenor of the few available pieces of information 
could detract from the communist determination to claim the rebellion. On the contrary, its 
initial perception through the lens of an Eastern revolutionary paradigm ensured that its 
pronounced fundamentalist component contributed to a positive assessment. A 1921 
Inprecorr (International Press Correspondence, the international organ of the Comintern) 
article located the rebellion’s origins in religious outrage: Soldiers had entered mosques in a 
bid to arrest Muslim leaders and thus had desecrated the sites. This had caused 
“understandable” indignation among the Muslim population.341 Abdur Rab, not yet fallen 
from Bolshevik revolutionary grace, felt vindicated in his view that Brahmins were no more 
than hesitant compromisers, whereas “the Muslims” had gone straight for “immediate 
revolution.”342 For him, the uprising was anti-colonial struggle par excellence. In a rare case 
of agreement between the two, Roy echoed this endorsement when he called for extending 
what had “burst out spontaneously at […] Malabar” to the entire subcontinent in the 
manifesto submitted to the 1922 Gaya Congress. Later, Roy even boasted to have had a 
hand in the uprising through his agents.343 While this seems presumptuous, his 
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straightforward embrace of the rebellion leaves little doubt that its religious fanaticism did 
at least not contradict Roy’s aspirations. 
Ironically, these first responses bore close resemblance to British assessments. The only 
difference was that they embraced the rebellion on the very grounds that led British officials 
to discount it as obstinate fundamentalism. Slogans such as the call for a khilafat republic 
had stirred the refractory Moplahs into action, and thanks to their inherent fanaticism they 
had taken the injunctions literally. The extent to which a social dimension of the conflict 
was gainsaid becomes apparent in a telegram to the Government of India, where Evans 
stipulated that there was no reason to suppose “that agrarian discontent was even a 
contributory cause of the rising”:344 Initially, the colonial and the communist point of view 
concurred in the cultural substance of the argument.  
Only when cues to non-religious motivations of the revolting Moplahs became 
available did subsequent communist contributions switch to the emphasis of the rebellion’s 
purported materialist underpinnings. Referring to the report of a Kerala Congress committee 
tasked with an enquiry, the Vanguard approvingly quoted from a speech by the committee’s 
head, V. S. Gayatri Iyer, characterizing the uprising as a consequence of “long standing and 
acute agrarian grievances.”345 The systematic destruction of public records demonstrated 
that forced evictions had been a core cause of the outbreak. Roy jumped to the conclusion 
that Iyer had “proved [!] that the rebellion was neither for the Khilafat nor directly against 
the British government […] [but] primarily against landlordism.”346  
Yet, in the mid-1920s the rapidly worsening inter-communal climate forced Roy to 
reconsider the religious factor. The surge in communalism after the end of non-cooperation 
made it difficult to uphold the conviction that religion was just a relic, an ephemeral 
phenomenon bound to be swept aside by the strides of history (that is, the class struggle). 
Since all it had been swept aside in were the terminological regulations Roy had applied, in 
the end he came round to admit an “ugly character of religious fanaticism.”347 Still, this had 
been possible only because the conflicting classes had belonged to different religions. As to 
the basics, he remained convinced that despite a “certain religious character” the Moplah 
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revolt had been “an agrarian revolt.”348 In the same measure that religious fanaticism had 
been emphasized earlier, communist commentary would henceforth belittle it to the extent 
that the rebellion acquired the halo of a revolutionary example for peasant communism. 
 
Towards a Domestic Revolutionary Heritage 
And yet, the CPI-led Kerala state government’s bid to introduce pensions for veteran 
insurgents on rebellion’s golden jubilee in 1971 met with unequivocal rejection from senior 
CPI(M) opposition leader Namboodiripad (1909–1998). His claim—understandable from 
his biographical experience as an indirect victim since his family of wealthy landlords had 
had to live as refugees for half a year, but very unusual for a communist—that the uprising 
had been a communal movement seemed to indicate a comprehensive reversal of the 
rebellion’s embrace in communist quarters.349 What had happened? 
Indeed, his assessment appeared diametrically opposed to earlier communist stances. 
Saumyendranath Tagore’s (1901–1974) pamphlet Peasants Revolt in Malabar, 1921, 
written after an extensive tour of the area during the early 1930s, constituted the first 
‘native’ communist commentary on the rebellion. Certainly it was the first to rely on first-
hand accounts. The text was a manifesto of radical dedication to a communist ‘history from 
below’ and of equally radical determination to preserve the materialist pristineness of 
popular self-assertion: Throughout the history of revolt among Moplahs, the “apparent 
causes” of outbreaks had been not religious, but “purely agrarian.”350  
Consequently, Tagore portrayed the uprising’s communal dimension as a malignant 
rumor. “The Moplah peasants were not anti-Hindu by any means […] Not a single Hindu 
was molested or plundered in those days just because he happened to be a Hindu.”351 
Victims among Hindus inevitably had been either class enemies or pro-British, and only 
those who had collaborated with colonial institutions had been harassed and robbed. 
Evidently, Tagore didn’t waste time with questions such as how exactly the rebels had told 
those aiding the British from those loyal to the insurgents. Instead, he extensively quoted 
allegations by Ahmad Hazi, a peasant leader during the rebellion, that it had been the 
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government which had engineered the destruction of temples and the looting of Hindu 
houses in order to defame the rebels.352 
Tagore’s reductive simplicity soon invited Namboodiripad’s criticism. As it was written 
during the pro-Muslim euphoria of the CPI’s ‘nationality period’ (see chapter V.3), it is all 
the more remarkable to see Namboodiripad’s 1943 classic A Short History of the Peasant 
Movement in Malabar spell out the rebellion’s motivations in no unclear terms: “The 
beginning of the riot was partly political and partly agrarian but very soon it developed into 
a communal movement.”353 Namboodiripad attacked Tagore and other “so-called Marxists” 
for neglecting a couple of “simple but relevant questions”—such as why the tenant 
movement and the subsequent rebellion had been restricted to Muslim-majority areas. 
Neither the bureaucracy nor the landlords had been partial towards Hindu tenants. 
Nevertheless, the latter had experienced the uprising as predominantly anti-Hindu. Also, 
Tagore had ignored the forced conversions, which “cannot by any stretch of imagination be 
explained away as part of a purely agrarian movement.”354  
Still, it was Namboodiripad’s very theoretical sophistication that eventually enabled 
him to arrive at a comprehensive absolution of the rebellious Moplahs, and in the end more 
or less confirm Tagore’s position. To begin with, despite admitting that “a certain 
percentage of the crimes are of a purely fanatical type” he was quick to identify culprits 
outside of the ‘masses’: What the corruptive khilafatist influence had been to Tagore, the 
mullahs were to Namboodiripad. Allegedly, it had been in their interest to turn “the anti-
jenmi [landlord] sentiments of the peasants into the anti-Hindu sentiments of the Moplahs.” 
It had come as no surprise, then, that the uneducated peasants had fallen for this. Rather, the 
remarkable fact was that there had been relatively few “fanatical outbursts”: “It clearly 
shows that with all his traditional illiteracy, backwardness and priest-riddenness, the Moplah 
peasant is much more a class-conscious peasant than a community-conscious Moplah.”355 
As to why the “class-conscious peasant” had taken a “partially communal turn,” then, 
Namboodiripad pointed to the withdrawal of Hindus from the movement when it turned 
violent. “The Moplah found that his Hindu compatriots […] deserted him; the military 
arrived to hunt him out of his abode; his Hindu neighbours helped the military against him. 
                                                 
352 Ibid., 24. 
353 E. M. S. Namboodiripad (interviewee), 3, 5 (quote). 
354 Namboodiripad, “A Short History,” 179, 182. 
355 All quotes ibid., 174–5. 
103 
 
He naturally got enraged at them [!].”356 Having thus become victims both of the British 
military and the treacherous infidels, Namboodiripad considered it understandable that the 
Moplahs turned against Hindus, even common ones.  
This rationalizing drive was topped off with a baffling appropriation of the movement’s 
leadership as suitable revolutionary material. Quite possibly this was a reflection of the 
CPI’s contemporary holistic embrace of resistive Muslim self-assertions, an embrace that 
tended to downplay rifts and differences in the exaltation of the greater Muslim cause. 
Consisting of “saintly Moplahs” strangely unconnected to the maligned ulema, the 
ideological (that is, religious) lapses of the uprising’s leadership were merely a matter of 
correct instruction and at any rate eclipsed by their merits as anti-British agitators and 
peasant leaders: 
Sincere anti-imperialists, they, however, think and speak in the terms of religion which had 
tremendous effect in rallying the Moplahs […] most of them were good material as peasant 
cadres if only there had been a good and efficient central leadership […] they showed their 
mettle as good organizers both before and during the rebellion.357 (emphasis added) 
Namboodiripad’s reasoning was all the more remarkable because it concluded a text starting 
out with an attack on “so-called Marxists” for their ignorance of disagreeable communal 
facts. As an apparently much better Marxist, Namboodiripad could even imagine the very 
same leaders doing the very same thing under a properly, that is, communist-organized 
revolution.  
His later positions display a similar, if somewhat more sophisticated rationalizing 
impulse. Emphatically sympathizing with the hunted and deserted Moplahs in a 1970 
interview, his justification of their suspicions and aversions towards Hindus became more 
dogged in the same measure that the latters’ fears and apprehensions were devalued. 
Namboodiripad averred that the crucial, communally divisive factor had not been actual 
forced conversions, but rather the fear of them on the part of Hindus. Similarly, he estimated 
the number of killed Hindus to be quite low, as “it was not so much the number that 
mattered but the athmosphere [sic!] of tension.”358 Hence, he attributed the spike in the 
Malabar Arya Samaj’s popularity after the rebellion, which furthered the intercommunal 
divide, solely to Hindu phantasmagorias, outsourcing the irrational factor to the non-
rebelling population segment that had developed essentially unjustified fear. The betrayed 
and beleaguered Moplahs, on the other hand, had had a rational foundation for their 
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communal outrages as the few Hindus remaining in the area had actively cooperated with 
the British.359 
In view of this background, it can be safely said that Namboodiripad’s seemingly 
contrary stance on the matter during the above-mentioned 1971 pension controversy 
originated in motivations of political distinction. Considering his other efforts to acquit the 
common Moplah peasant (if not the rebellion as a whole) from the charge of communalism, 
this was clearly an anti-CPI move designed to expose the rival party’s reactionary trends for 
political reasons rather than because of an evolution in his own positions. Mutual 
recriminations of the same pattern abounded in the years after the 1964 party split. Hence, 
the principal merit of Namboodiripad’s “most sophisticated analysis” (Robert Hardgrave) 
lies in the attainment of an impressive level of rationalization and exculpation, and in the 
inadvertent exposition of the mechanisms at work there.360 
By temperament not prone to complicated theoretical analysis, popular Kerala 
communist leader Ayillyath Kuttiari Gopalan (1904–1977) confirmed the Moplah 
rebellion’s importance as a reference point for communist identification of resistive 
subjectivity. His 1973 autobiography confessed that the “Moplah rebellion excited [his] 
imagination.” Even while the rebellion had been “bereft of intelligent political leadership 
[and] well-conceived policy or programme, the brave deeds of my Muslim brethren who 
fought against imperialist oppression enthused me.”361 Notwithstanding their shortcomings, 
the rebelling Moplahs, braving the constraints of time and place, had managed to come out 
progressive in a political and a social sense:  
The class sense of Muslim peasants [of Malabar] has sprung from a century-long struggle 
against feudalism [!] [.…] The last of these struggles against feudalism took place in 1921 [….] 
There is no memorial yet to the countless martyrs who laid down their lives in the fight for land 
for the peasants.362 
Strikingly, Gopalan didn’t bother to explain away (or even mention) religious militancy. To 
him, one of the most renowned popular leaders of the South Asian communist movement to 
date and a native of Kerala to boot, the defining criterion seemed to be ‘activity from below’ 
plain and simple: The political self-assertion of a socially declassed population segment 
through a rebellion that counted landlords and foreign rulers among its enemies 
compensated for possible uglier aspects. Ideological motivations apart from those 
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acknowledged by coarse Marxism seemed either irrelevant or non-existent to Gopalan’s 
perspective, mirroring the entire party’s blind proximity to fundamentalist currents. 
A contemporary of the Moplah rebellion, the Akali movement in the Punjab formed the 
second pillar of early communist revolutionary optimism. While not as extensive, violent, or 
radical as its Moplah counterpart by far, it nevertheless displayed considerable tenacity in 
confronting the colonial government on the issue of communal self-government and was 
highly popular notably among the Sikh peasantry. In the following, the incorporation of a 
very Sikh grass-roots movement into the communist revolutionary fold will be illustrated. 
 
 
III.1.2 The Akali Movement 
 
Akalization of the Panth 
From before its integration into British India in 1848, the Punjab had been a heavily 
agricultural province with a somewhat unique social set-up. The Jats formed the numerically 
dominant group, land-owning farmers who incarnated the ideal type of Punjab social life 
until the end of the British Raj. In contrast, extensive landholdings were limited to the 
(Muslim) western Punjab. In the central and eastern parts of the province, the 1900 Punjab 
Land Alienation Act had largely prevented the concentration of land by limiting the 
possession of land to “peasant castes” and thereby banning the entry of commercial capital 
into the land market. This provision contributed to the sharp divide between urban and rural 
life in the Punjab, which in due time would make itself felt in provincial politics (including 
the communist movement) and also affect the province’s fragile communal balance.363  
Similar to processes among Hindus and Muslims, political activity among Sikhs grew 
out of movements of religious reform with a strong educational component. As a result of 
the combination of numerous factors, among them increasingly virulent anti-colonialism, 
the grant of separate electorates to Muslims in the 1909 Morley-Minto reforms, and the 
ascendancy of several institutions committed to the promotion of Sikh political, cultural, and 
religious ‘rights,’ “the first decade of the twentieth century brought about a great religious 
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and political awakening among the Sikhs.”364 The movement against the 1907 Land 
Colonization Bill had first borne this out. In its course, current communal idioms were 
connected to social questions, leading to the agitation among Sikhs assuming a distinctly 
communal character. Popular songs like Pagri Sambhal Jatta (“O, Jat, see that your turban, 
the embodiment of your honor, is not dislodged”) attested to an identitary sense of protest in 
the community.365 
The assertion of a collective Sikh identity also fostered a critical attitude towards a 
government viewed as hemming in the community’s aspirations. Events such as the 
demolition of a Delhi gurdwara (Sikh temple) in 1914 had caused considerable resentment, 
even though the British generally saw to it to maintain quiet in the strategically, militarily, 
and economically important Punjab—enough for the Sikhs to remain mostly loyal. After the 
World War, however, the nascent movement for the reform of the gurdwara management 
was abetted by the anti-government wave sweeping the subcontinent. In the Punjab, the 
repercussions of the 1919 Jallianwala Bagh massacre, where British troops had fired into a 
peaceful protest rally and killed hundreds of civilians—an event that “turned the tables of 
political fortunes across India”—were doubly felt.366 The increasingly radicalized and 
militant wing of the movement named itself “Akali” after a term coined by Guru Gobind 
Singh for “immortal.” It denoted those who would risk their lives to defend the Sikh 
religious sites.367  
The Akalis lost no time to show their religious colors. Jathas (religious protest rallies) 
were organized in rural Punjab demanding that Sikh religious institutions be administered 
by the panth (the Sikh community); that the office of the mahant (Hindu temple 
administrator) be abolished in favor of a responsible management elected by the Sikhs from 
their ranks; that the property and income of the temples be utilized “for the purpose for 
which they were founded”; and that Sikhism be practiced “according to the teachings of the 
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Sikh Gurus as preserved in the Adi Granth,” the holy book of the Sikhs.368 The campaign 
resounded most among the Sikh intelligentsia and the middle and lower Jat peasants. 
With the need for a separate organization increasing, the Central Sikh League was 
formed in December 1919. It declared allegiance to the Congress and joined the non-
cooperation movement as the government neglected the “‘rights of the Sikh 
community.’”369 Politically, though, it was soon eclipsed by the rise of the Shiromani Akali 
Dal (SAD). Originally, the SAD had been the militant wing of the central Shiromani 
Gurdwara Prabhandak Committee (SGPC), established in November 1920 as the self-
governing body to manage the temples in the spirit of the panth. Soon, however, the political 
and religious radicals from the Akali Dal became the dominant group within the latter’s 
fold. Their agenda consisted in restoring what they believed to be original tenets of Sikhism, 
with the first goal being the ouster of the mahants.  
The institution of Hindu temple priests or mahants dated back to the times of 
independent Sikh rule in the Punjab. In the wake of the establishment of British rule, the 
quality of temple management deteriorated as heredity gradually displaced responsibility. At 
the same time, the income from the temples’ land holdings increased considerably due to the 
expansion of canal irrigation, rendering the mahants’ exclusive access to the wealth exposed 
to intensified challenge. Petitions to dislodge the mahants and reorganize gurdwara 
administration had surfaced already in the first decade of the 20th century, and had emanated 
not from a popular movement, but from the Sikh aristocracy. However, resentment against 
their practices seldom surfaced in the shape of purely managerial criticism. According to 
Kailash Chander Gulati, it was the “vices of the mahants” that “created religious discontent 
among the Sikh laity.” Not only “unauthorised expenditure,” but particularly also 
“sacrilegious misuse of the sacred precincts” counted among the sins of the temple 
priests.370  
The government, seeing no need to disturb the hitherto prevailing amicable relations 
with the established Sikh leadership, and fearing that the gurdwaras be taken over by 
nationalists, responded with repression. The resulting casualties further popularized the 
largely non-violent movement. After a prolonged struggle and numerous clashes, which 
claimed the lives of hundreds of activists and had thousands injured and jailed, the efforts 
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eventually bore fruit. In November 1925, the Sikh Gurdwara Bill was passed, providing for 
the management of Sikh temples by an elected body, the SGPC.371 
The latter’s agenda, largely determined by the SAD, had germinated from religious 
considerations. The SAD, in turn, was “the product […] of the church embodied by the 
historic Sikh shrines.”372 Accordingly, the Akalis were determined to “see that the sanctity 
of the shrines was restored and its affairs were conducted by the […] congregation in time 
[sic!] with the original teachings of Guru Gobind Singh.” These motivations became closely 
linked to broader anti-British politics among the Punjab Sikhs: The “growing national 
consciousness among the Sikhs found its immediate expression in their […] struggle for the 
democratisation of the management of the gurdwaras.”373 Such a link also was to Gandhi’s 
taste, who extended the INC’s support to the Akalis, signifying their suitability for the pan-
religious project that was his vision of Indian nationalism. In this, he would not be disturbed 
by reports of his local informer Pannikar, who repeatedly pointed to the “religious 
fanaticism and narrow-mindedness of the general [Akali] body” and had first-hand 
experience of religious friction between Akalis and Hindus.374 Indeed, the connection 
between nationalism and religion also worked the other way round: According to Gopal 
Singh, the movement had “politicized the Sikh identity” and thus brought about a permanent 
division between Hindus and Sikhs, a division that would become deeply manifest in the 
demand for a separate Sikh state in the 1940s.375 
 
Socialization of the Akalis 
Just as in the case of the Moplah rebellion, South Asian communism was eager to 
appropriate the Akalis for social emancipation and national revolution. Unlike the Moplah 
uprising, however, the movement’s religious dimension never came to be treated as the 
‘other’ of the more progressive aspects of the mobilization—not least because the 
communal excesses of Malabar were not reproduced in the Punjab. Instead, religious 
assertions figured as core ingredients of a mixture of nationalist, ‘cultural,’ and social 
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factors rendering the movement worthy of support. From the outset, it was fashioned into an 
integrated whole in the proper Eastern revolutionary sense.  
Additionally, the Akali agenda was unduly glorified for envisioning a revolution in land 
relations. Thus, Inprecorr wrote in mid-1922 that the movement aimed for redistribution of 
the estates of large temples among the peasant cultivators. Although this was clearly beyond 
the scope of the movement, the Comintern’s organ was certain that “nothing less than 
expropriation” was on its agenda.376 Roy similarly maintained that the movement was “of a 
seriously revolutionary nature.”377 Moreover, he asserted that the Akalis were “heroic 
Sikhs,” whose “determined fight” had been betrayed by the Congress:  
Unfortunately the Congress has a very wrong conception of the Akali Movement which is 
looked upon by it as a religious affair; whereas it is a revolt of the expropriated peasantry […] 
Essentially what the Akali Sikhs are struggling for is not a religious reform, but to regain 
possession of these communal estates. In other words, it is a class struggle between the landlords 
and the peasantry.378 
Two factors facilitated the short-circuiting of Sikh revivalism with a full-fledged peasant 
revolution. One, the SAD’s composition: Among the Akalis were many “remnants or 
survivors of the Ghadr Party who had [….] escaped the gallows [after having unsuccessfully 
staged an armed uprising in 1915].” The prominent role of revolutionaries who might well 
have ended up in the CPI, had it existed earlier, spurred communist sympathies.379  
Two, the hopes and aspirations Roy put into the movement were pinned on a 
particularly militant factor: The Babbar Akalis (“immortal lions”), armed brigands harassing 
loyalists and those they intended to rob, went a long way to rouse communist sympathy for 
the movement. They were a splinter group of the Akali Dal calling for non-payment of land 
revenue and striving to “liberate” the temples, apparently with a temporary measure of 
success: According to British sources, they had managed to establish an “absolute reign of 
terror” in parts of several central Punjab districts during the latter half of 1922.380 Many 
Sikh sympathies were with the Babbars, who seldom targeted fellow religionists during their 
robberies—after all, they were staunch flesh from the Akali bone, frequently shouting 
slogans such as “Sat Sri Akal” and singing shabads (holy Sikh hymns).381 Inprecorr raved 
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that the Babbars were “terrorizing the landholders and agitating for a revolt which will 
overthrow the British government and establish a government of the Sikhs.”382 
British fears of disquietingly successful Akali endeavors to spread propaganda among 
Sikh regiments, as well as the colonial stance expressed by the Pioneer that the SGPC “are 
now a formidable revolutionary organisation determined to bring the Government to their 
knees,” further contributed to communist sympathies for Akali militancy—from which the 
religious quality of its anti-colonialism could not detract one bit.383 Sufficiently informed to 
characterize their “aggressive campaign of agitation” among soldiers as one conducted by 
“special propagandists” by means of literature in the vernacular, it is telling that Roy made 
no mention of its content.384 Things seemed too obvious: In the course of the Akali 
campaign, Roy opined that even the “most simple Akali peasant” had grasped what his 
struggle was about.385 
Apparently, his Vanguard had grasped it, too. In an almost hagiographic sketch, Evelyn 
Roy praised Babbar leader Mota Singh for having initiated a campaign against “corrupt 
religious leaders and their government coadjutors, for the reclaiming of rich temple lands 
and their redistribution among the peasant masses.” Not stopping at this somewhat creative 
characterization of the Babbars, Roy went on to glorify its Sikh heritage: The “history of his 
conquered race [!], the Sikhs,” was burning in Singh’s heart, the “proud and martial blood of 
a soldierly people” was flowing through his veins. Hiding from the police, he had moved 
underground and spread “doctrines of simple communism.”386  
Others shared in this appraisal. Bolshevik support for the Akalis had from an early point 
exceeded mere solidarity addresses. Mohamed Ali, in charge of the Comintern’s Central 
Asian “Mali bureau” in the early 1920s, had sent considerable sums for revolutionary 
propaganda to Mota Singh and other Akalis in 1921 and 1922.387 Fittingly, both Ghadrites 
and the Comintern exhibited few reservations towards Sikh identitarism when they 
approached the SGPC with the suggestion to set up secret societies under its umbrella. 
Disguised (!) as communal associations, they were to work for the revolution.388 This was 
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more than a whim born from contemporary revolutionary enthusiasm. The Moscow-based 
International Peasant Council would consider the Akalis a full-blown peasant movement for 
years to come.389 
In contrast, communist responses from the subcontinent proper have ever been low in 
numbers, and even more so among contemporaries. More precisely, Dange was the only 
contemporary communist on the subcontinent to comment at all, and the metamorphosis in 
his assessment of the Akalis speaks of a rapid socialization as a communist: At first, he 
viewed the Akalis as a movement against British control over “the Sikhs,” who were 
“fighting for” what Dange deemed “their rights.” The Akalis’ ideological moorings seemed 
to resonate positively with Dange when he attacked the INC leadership for its 
contemplative attitude: “We cannot say that the Akalis are fighting for their religious 
question and sit silent. […] What we must urge is sympathetic and simultaneous action in 
other parts of India in support of the Akalis.”390 However, a couple of weeks later, while 
Roy was still in the process of reaching ever new heights in extolling the merits of a revolt 
under Sikh auspices, the Socialist carried an editorial marked by a radical turn in the 
assessment of the movement. Notwithstanding the repression unleashed by the government, 
he considered the Akalis victims not so much of the British as of  
an institution, that they themselves created […] Men in history have carved out kingdoms and 
amassed wealth by heroism and industry but the subtleties of the priestly craft have outflanked 
them all by carving kingdoms with the aid neither of a sword or a war-horse but by an invisible 
invention of the Great Fear and charity to Temples and Priests. If the individual mahants go, a 
committee will come, if a committee goes, a dominating class will come. It is the property of the 
Gods; that is the main evil. The vice of the mahant is a creation of that property and the property 
is a creation of that great invention of the priestly craft.391  
The mahants, Dange went on, were not the real problem. They merely administered the 
grants of land made to the temples. Not just the Punjab, the whole of India was affected by 
“the same curse.” There was just one way of ending the sorry state of things: “Cease to 
create property in the temples and everyone will cease to clamour for rights in them, 
religious or otherwise.”392  
Back then, Dange had been an independent socialist inspired by, and communicating 
with, Roy in Europe, but not yet a Bolshevik. Diverse strands of left-wing thought had not 
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yet been unified and cast into a streamlined ‘party line,’ but were freely competing within 
the future communists’ minds. In Dange’s case, this meant that the unqualified absolution of 
broadly resistive grass-roots movements was not the only option available to a radical left-
wing perspective. Straightforward criticism of religion, still a meaningful component in the 
assessment of social phenomena, could assume priority over the heady euphoria for hazily 
resistive ‘masses’—especially if the religion in question was outside one’s own, accustomed 
metaphysical turf.  
Dange’s next comments in October 1922, however, were marked by another turn that 
bore testimony to the exposure to the influence of contemporarily prestigious Bolshevism. 
Not incidentally, this novel turn occurred at a time when correspondence between Roy and 
Dange intensified.393 It exhibited Dange’s gradual drift towards a ‘mature,’ more 
systematized left-wing worldview: Remaining silent on the religious aspect, the Socialist 
now limited itself to commending the SGPC for its “highly efficient organisation and 
conduct of the campaign,” and emphasized that deteriorating economic conditions after the 
war had occasioned the movement against the mahants. Excessive taxation of land and 
speculation in food grains lay at the root of the problem.394 
Still, as against Roy’s explicit embrace of the movement’s religious grounding Dange 
could bring himself no further than supporting the Akalis on account of them being a 
political social movement. The overtly religious character of their campaign had raised his 
sense of alarm, reasonably acute outside the premises of Hindu-tinged extremist 
nationalism. However, in the same measure that Roy’s prestigious and influential position 
as the chief organizer of communism on the subcontinent recognized by the highest 
revolutionary authority, that is, the Comintern, gradually diffused into the scattered groups 
on the ground, original ambiguity succumbed before the uniform imperatives of party 
communism.  
As these imperatives discouraged criticism of ‘mass action,’ but on the other hand set 
no limits to identification with the latter, it is hardly surprising that affirmation of the 
movement including its religious features characterizes what little later South Asian 
communists have published on the matter since. A case in point was CPI leader Sohan 
Singh Josh (1896–1982), whose political career had begun in the Akali movement itself—
no exceptional feature among early Punjabi communists.395 For Josh, its crude anti-
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establishment impulse went a long way towards its justification. The political act of joining 
it had been an act of defiance of the then prevailing “feudal respectability” in the villages. 
Even so, those who endorsed Josh’s decision did not necessarily sport a more progressive 
mind-set: “The reaction of the more religious people […] was that [I] had done the right 
thing. The Sikh religion was under attack.”396 Indeed, while the “heavy burden of direct 
and indirect taxes” levied from the peasants had also contributed to a mood of unrest, Josh 
underlined that the mahants had succeeded in “polluting” the Sikh religion with Hindu 
rituals and thereby pulling the teeth of official Sikhism.397 
Josh admitted that the movement’s mainstay consisted of radicals “fanatically 
dogmatic in religious matters.”398 This, however, was no strong detergent: Although he 
claimed to have spoken out against many of the “principles” passed at Akali gatherings 
(like a ban on inter-communal marriage or degradation of the status of women), he stuck to 
the movement. Josh’s zeal and bravery in political struggles even seem to have sufficiently 
cemented his reputation to have him elected general secretary of the “august” SAD in 
1923.399 Before this background, Josh’s claim to have been forcibly ejected from a number 
of Akali meetings because of his stubborn opposition to their traditionalist agenda appears 
odd. Despite high numbers of arrests, it seems unlikely that the movement had no other 
leaders of stature to fall back onto. His awkward maneuvering between extolling his own 
revolutionary merits and disclaiming the context in which they were accrued allows the 
interpretation that, quite contrary to his retrospective account, he seems to have been quite 
at ease with the more radical Akalis. 
A process of cutting the cord followed this initial phase of embrace of a religious 
movement: In jail, the lecture of Charles Sprading’s Liberty and the Great Libertarians 
sowed the seed of Josh’s alienation from the Akalis, with the result that by the mid-1920s 
he had drifted away from the movement and openly criticized its religious outlook. Josh 
began publishing articles in ex-Ghadrite Santokh Singh’s paper Kirti (worker), of which 
one called to break the power of the priests because they were agents of the rich, free the 
minds from inherited dharma and fatalism, and exhorted the workers to liberate themselves. 
Upon becoming editor of the paper after Singh’s death in 1927, he removed the prominent 
quotation from the Adi Granth on the front page and replaced it with a Marxist phrase.400 
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And yet, in a reenactment of the communist reconciliation with ‘national culture,’ Josh 
eventually shed all reservations about Sikh religion in his autobiography. His retrospective 
portrayal of the ouster of the mahants as part of the class struggle ontologized Sikhism as 
an inherently resistive and even social revolutionary force: According to Josh, the Gurus of 
old had taught to fight tyranny, whereas the mahants’ “class interest had blinded them to 
the tenets of Sikhism.”401 The circle had come full.  
This section has traced the reception of two upheavals of the early 1920s in communist 
quarters and their fashioning into central points of reference for the localization of early 
revolutionary currents on the subcontinent. However, the appraisal of both phenomena did 
not follow a unitary pattern, despite a number of parallels. Much like the Moplah leaders, 
the upper echelons of the early Akali agitation have ever been exempted from criticism. In 
contrast to the usual practice of castigating the leadership for misdirecting an ‘essentially’ 
progressive struggle, as in the case of the non-cooperation movement, this pointed to a 
wholesome embrace of the respective movement. In the case of the Akalis, this was 
facilitated by the fact that communist opinion, unlike in the case of the Moplah rebellion, 
didn’t have to deal with obvious and disagreeable manifestations of exuberant fanaticism. 
In contrast, Akali religious assertiveness (and even Sikh religion proper), lacking a violent 
anti-Hindu edge, could figure as a positive point of reference. Thus, Roy short-circuited the 
community-centered grass-roots movement for reform in the administration of the 
gurdwaras with a full-scale peasant revolt. Militant Sikhism was not purged from the 
movement’s essence, as happened with Moplah radical Islam in much of later-day 
communist reception. On the contrary, its allegedly resistant traditions were invoked to 
back up positive appraisal. Consequently, the Akali movement’s religious rigidity seldom 
formed the target of criticism, directed largely ‘inwards’ as it was. Dange’s lone dissenting 
voice soon transformed into more ‘mature’ communist political commentary. Moreover, 
even his initial opposition suffered from a bias to problematize religiousness in all contexts 
except in his own Hindu one. In most assessments of the Akali movement, religion and 
social politics fused into an integrated whole worthy of communist support, whereas in case 
of the Moplahs, religion had to be dissected from the rebellion’s motives, and their 
fanaticism rationalized, to retain them as an instance in the self-localization of communism 
on the subcontinent. 
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This opalescent combination directly leads to the communist woes with one of the 
defining moments of political assertion on the subcontinent coming to the fore in the mid-
1920s. What has become known as ‘communalism’ in public and academia alike not only 
abstractly formed an integral part of formation of political will. It also immediately affected 
the very ‘masses’ the communists were eager to claim for their own project of social 
emancipation. Accordingly, this development formed a potent challenge to unqualified 
accommodation of mass struggles and their ideological fundaments. The following section 
explores the communist twin endeavor: To destroy communalism while keeping its agents 
in the ‘masses’ free from the odor of communal politics, and thus retain them as addressees 
for communism. 
 
 
 
III.2 Whose Communalism? Antinomies of Consciousness 
 
Most studies dealing with the emergence of communalism emphasize the crucial last third 
of the 19th century, and, hence, the divisive British influence. The time before is often 
characterized as largely free of religious conflict, or even as an inter-religious synthesis with 
only few exceptions such as Aurangzeb’s rule. This point of view is mostly represented by 
Indian nationalist and postcolonial historiography. On the other end of the spectrum, a 
communalized school of historiography traces two fundamentally diverse and inevitably 
hostile Hindu and Muslim “nations” back into history.402 Others note that predominantly 
peaceful coexistence did not preclude riots and mutual antagonism. Long before colonial 
rule, social and religious developments on the subcontinent had exposed community-related 
fault lines. Indeed, numerous cases of 18th-century inter-religious strife exhibit patterns 
reproduced in later colonial India’s increasingly communalized set-up.403 
Yet, during the later 19th century the traditional form of inter-communal tensions—that 
is, sporadic outbursts in violent clashes—gave way to systematic mutual delineation on a 
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political, educational, and social plane. This is because the conditions of colonial modernity 
contributed decisively to communal identity formation even while the British abstained 
from basing their rule on religious idioms: Like all colonial rulers, they had endeavored to 
control “the lives of individuals without necessarily sharing their values.”404 However, the 
tendency of British governance to recur, consciously or not, to pre-existing notions of 
community and weave them into the fabric of the colonial public sphere at all levels—from 
urban planning and employment to education and political representation—and thus 
accommodate and foster a broad social process of communalization went a long way 
towards a far-reaching modernization of traditional religious ties. 
Influential sections among the respective communities eagerly reciprocated this 
compartmentalizing trend. Phrasing a wide array of political and social aspirations—most 
notably, elite conflicts over public jobs and political appointments—in communal idioms 
became established practice during the heyday of the British Raj, and in turn endowed these 
idioms with an increased sense of legitimacy. In the 1916 “Lucknow Pact” between INC 
and ML, where the Congress accepted separate representation for Muslims as demanded by 
the League, the national movement itself confirmed the communities’ status as core 
categories of politics. This model exerted decisive influence on the articulations and 
aspirations of other sub-national communities.405  
In turn, religious communities became a quasi-natural focal point for the crystallization 
of nationalist sentiment. Eventually, “All-India” communities of Hindus and Muslims came 
to be defined and pitted against each other, not to mention the multitude of smaller regional 
communities. Pan-religious nationalism as preached by Gandhi undertook to unify the major 
communal entities under the roof of the national movement by accommodating their 
sentiments. Yet, this necessarily led to an affirmation of the respective collective identities, 
as evidenced by Gandhi’s acknowledgement and adaptation of the khilafatists’ religious 
demands. Thus, he paid for a temporal bridge over the inter-communal gap by deepening it. 
On the institutional side of things, the avenues for participation in politics and 
administration opened up by the 1919 Montagu-Chelmsford reforms were likewise 
constructed on the premises of separate electorates and thus had a “built-in temptation” to 
take the short-cut through the communal quarter.406  
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After a long-time low during Gandhian non-cooperation, communal tensions erupted 
with renewed vigor after the movement’s suspension. By the mid-1920s, mutual suspicion, 
aversion, and competition dominated an increasingly communalized political landscape. The 
latter became marked by the drive to “reclaim ‘victims’ and protect the ‘faithful’” in the 
hangover after the aborted common struggle for swaraj.407 The upsurge of the shuddhi and 
sanghatan, and tabligh and tanzim movements, respectively, as well as accelerating social 
separation bore testimony to the path community sentiments were going down. Violent 
outbursts were only the most evident hints to the state of things. More than a hundred 
communal riots occurred between 1922 and 1927, killing hundreds and injuring 
thousands.408 
 
 
III.2.1 Theoretic Conundrums, or That which Must not Be Cannot 
 
The upsurge in communal violence during the 1920s in one way or another influenced the 
agendas of all political actors. In contrast to the mutual recriminations of communal 
leaders—in politics, these originated notably from Hindu Mahasabhites and some Muslim 
Leaguers—, INC grandees Motilal Nehru and Abul Kalam Azad made plans for the 
formation of an All-India party in 1924. Its membership would exclude members of any 
communal organization (quite possibly the blueprint for the provision to the same effect in 
the CPI’s 1925 program). In Bengal, Chittaranjan Das negotiated a pact between both 
communities for the sharing of employment opportunities in the public sector, and Gandhi 
protested against the rise of inter-communal violence with a widely publicized three-week 
fast in autumn 1924. Yet, these endeavors proved largely ineffective: The Nehru-Azad party 
never materialized, Das died soon after the conclusion of his pact, which quickly became 
undone, and Gandhi’s sincere but only momentarily effectual efforts did little to dispel long-
term constellations for communal conflict. 
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The increase in violence was also noticed in communist quarters. Still caught in the 
whirl of the post-war upsurge, they were loath to acknowledge the reality of religious rifts 
among the erstwhile revolting ‘masses.’ At the same time, however, denouncing rising 
communalism as the ‘natural’ consequence of an ill-designed movement also provided grist 
to Roy’s anti-bourgeois mills, and ex post supported his refusal to forge ties with the non-
cooperators. The analysis took shape accordingly: While the absolute number of written 
contributions on the communal issue remained low, from the outset they undertook to 
externalize the religious divide from the spirit of protest, even religious, that had carried the 
movement until its termination. In a February 1923 comment Evelyn Roy identified 
religious extremism as “rank reaction,” but only “when exposed in its true colours,” hinting 
at a non-reactionary quality—little wonder given the lingering communist enthusiasm for 
anti-imperialism based on religious radicalism.409 In June 1923, the first text explicitly 
dedicated to the problem appeared in the Vanguard’s columns and considered the issue from 
a more materialist angle. M. N. Roy contrasted the “helpless” undertakings of South Asian 
leaders to contain the growing communal tensions by well-meaning appeals with his own 
analysis: “Communal rivalry is fomented by the upper classes of both the communities, and 
the Government always stands behind the scene.”410 The solution lay in exposing intra-
communal class conflicts for fostering unity in the struggle for freedom.  
Under bourgeois auspices, however, the fuss around injured communal sentiments 
would never cease. By following the injunctions of their spiritual leaders, Hindus and 
Muslims were “consciously or unconsciously playing into the hands of Imperialism.”411 
This was not a product of Roy’s imagination. (Pro-)British and conservative newspapers had 
been quick to question the viability and reasonability of subcontinental self-government 
upon the outbreak of communal riots.412 Nevertheless, notwithstanding his counterfactual 
claim—in the years before, it had been the very injunctions of spiritual leaders that had 
brought about a uniquely huge protest movement—Roy could obviously not imagine a 
worse incrimination than national betrayal. This is telling because it demonstrated two 
essentials of Roy’s view: First, that the problematic of communalism was not religious; and 
second, that neither the anti-libertine and socially conservative character of communal 
assertions, nor even their aggression against other communities, were overly disturbing to 
him. 
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The “Manifesto on the Hindu-Moslem Unity and Swaraj,” written by both Roys and 
published in the Vanguard in October 1923, constitutes one of the most often-cited 
communist texts on the issue to date.413 The pamphlet summarily blasted non-cooperation, 
the main error of which had been that an “unreliable ground,” that is, “religion was allowed 
to play the chief part in the movement.” Also, the khilafat movement finally began to appear 
as problematic—half a decade after its inception, during which time considerable 
revolutionary laurels had been bestowed upon its militantly anti-British pan-Islamism. With 
the khilafatists’ Islamic anti-imperialism fast transforming into political anti-infidelism Roy 
now identified it as a culprit for the current debacle, a “foregone conclusion of such an ill-
started movement.” Nevertheless, it was not all bad as the khilafat committees had at least 
succeeded in creating “some sort of political consciousness among the Mussulman masses 
of India.”414 Interestingly, Roy didn’t bother to scrutinize quality of this consciousness, 
probably for the same reasons that another article in the Vanguard had vaguely deemed 
khilafat leader Mohamed Ali the “better revolutionary” than Gandhi.415 Under the prevailing 
circumstances, a thorough investigation into the categories constituting contemporary 
revolutionarity might have turned out overly disappointing. In this light, the allegation that 
the upsurge in religious conflicts testified to the “essentially reactionary character” of 
bourgeois politicians only rang even hollower.  
Accordingly, the Hindu and Muslim ‘masses’ had been distracted from their actual 
unity on class grounds. They had fallen victim to those who cunningly operationalized 
religion: “The consciousness of this union is interfered with by large doses of conflicting 
religious dogma administered by interested parties. Religious propaganda is an indigenous 
method of exploitation of the ignorant masses by the able doctors of Divinity.” The latter 
depended on the support of the feudal upper classes for their existence, and apparently 
shaped mass consciousness at will. Reversely, nationalist middle-class intellectuals just had 
to shed their religious prejudices and “replace the religious propaganda and metaphysical 
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abstractions by economic slogans to make the masses conscious.” Yet, in the absence of 
national liberation, “India must continue to be a helpless victim of religious civil war.”416  
This underscores the commitment of contemporary communism to national liberation 
and highlights the redeeming qualities associated with its mere advent. Its embrace was 
precipitated on the deep sense of the Leninist demand for national self-determination of an 
essential intactness of indigenous culture, however religious its assertions. The latter had to 
be salvaged from the communally polluting colonial encumbrance in order to develop 
healthily: Roy opined in the Constructive Programme that men could not be educated in 
modern political principles “unless they extricate themselves from the bondage of religious 
superstitions and social prejudices,” which was impossible without a “free and normal 
national life.”417 The latter followed its own messianic teleology, as the “inevitable and 
inexorable” development of nationalism on “purely secular” lines would by itself put an end 
to communalism.418 Such ‘historical-materialistic’ eschatology is obviously closely related 
to its religious counterpart; hence, it is not surprising that Singaravelu reveled in similar 
prophecies at Kanpur with respect to the end of untouchability (“with the advent of Swaraj, 
these social and religious disabilities will fall of themselves”419). Roy even deemed 
revolutionary nationalism “the deadly enemy of communalism”—a daring claim in view of 
the religious leanings of many revolutionary nationalists. Undaunted, he maintained in 1927 
that national liberation was revolutionary in itself.420 
Firmly rooted in the antinomy of national liberation, which envisaged the emancipation 
of the ‘backward’ masses through a “free and normal national life” resting on, and achieved 
by, these very same masses, his views made Roy the prompter for left-wing nationalism. 
From the early 1930s onwards, leftist Congress leaders increasingly insisted on British 
departure as the only solution to the communal problem. In his 1936 autobiography Nehru 
commented on the post-1922 riots that “divide and rule has always been the way of 
empires,” and was similarly convinced that “communal leaders represent a small upper class 
reactionary group” and “exploit and take advantage of the religious passions of the 
masses.”421 The parallels to the communist pattern of analysis are obvious. Roy’s line of 
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argument contributed to the constitution of nationalist progressivism that regarded 
nationalism as  
all that was forward-looking, progressive, ‘modern’ in Indian politics. Communalism was all 
that was backward-looking, reactionary. Nationalism reflected the spontaneous urge of the 
Indian people for economic advancement and freedom from exploitation. Communalism 
reflected the machinations of the colonial regime and reactionary upper-class elements.422 
The communist approach was the first to systematize these tenets. Hence, rather than being 
indistinguishable from left-wing nationalism until the late 1930s it was the communist 
analysis of subcontinental religiousness and communalism that provided later left-wing 
nationalists with the essentials of their own stance. This testifies to the dynamic and 
modernizing impetus of communism in colonial South Asia, where its ambiguous 
relationship with nationalism entailed not only fierce political rivalry and competition but 
also the potential for cross-fertilization. The mutual quality of this process was ensured by 
the nationalist socialization of most subcontinental communists, who, after all, started out as 
chips off the nationalist block, and never severed their ties with mainstream nationalism.— 
Even within the purview of his own theoretical perspective, however, Roy’s critique of 
interreligious strife reveals itself to be principled to the same extent that communalism was 
recognized as a thing-in-itself. Which it was not: While Roy’s interventions formed the most 
vocal and most analytic criticism of communalism of its time, the efforts to confine 
communalism to the influence of imperialism and the upper social strata clearly exhibited 
blind spots towards religious mass militancy. Roy’s determination to appropriate the social 
content of the openly religious Moplah rebellion (and, although in a different manner, also 
the Akali movement) suggests that revolutionary communalism could be a legitimate point 
of reference as long as it was distinguished by a sufficiently radical and popular anti-
establishment thrust. Non-revolutionary, that is, neither anti-colonial nor (however mildly) 
anti-landlord communalism, on the other hand, was exactly the kind of communalism that 
couldn’t be accepted as part of mass. 
Therefore, Roy clung to the conspiratorial character of such ‘non-revolutionary’ 
communalism: “Anonymous persons” hired “goondas […] to start trouble,” which could be 
done “by such simple means as playing Hindu music before a Mussulman mosque; by 
Mussulmans slaughtering a cow before the enraged eyes of Hindu worshippers; by 
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sensational reports of kidnapping of children of one community by the other.”423 While the 
subcontinent was the best example that religion was indeed the opium of the people, “the 
virulence of this kind of opium-poisoning in the body-politic of India […] shows” not the 
critical state of ideologized popular consciousness, but merely “to what extent the dealers of 
this dope have been active.”424 This approach deflected the challenge to progressive notions 
of mass consciousness into a separate mercenary sub-cosmos by asserting that those who 
actually participated in riots were “the scum of society, which cannot be said to possess any 
sincere religious fanaticism.”425  
Since in this reasoning not even the most vociferous and violent proponents of 
communal antagonism were considered true fanatics it was only consequential to downplay 
basic communal differences themselves as “artificially fomented” and, hence, “less serious” 
compared to “other defects in the programme, ideology and organization of the nationalist 
movement.”426 This was the core of Roy’s analysis: Writing away the urgency of a 
widespread reactionary social phenomenon and thus uphold the proper communist hierarchy 
of (anti-imperialist and socialist) emancipation. Yet, even this approach did not remove 
uncertainties: Just as Roy had criticized the inclusion of communal unity among the 
prerequisites for swaraj by the Congress in 1924 (as this paid undue homage to an artificial 
conflict), he advocated the opposite only a year later when he attacked the veteran 
nationalist and Hindu Mahasabhite Lala Lajpat Rai for denying the necessity of communal 
unity for the attainment of independence.427 
To be sure, Roy was not the only architect of this theoretical edifice. Contemporary 
communist opinion concurred with the thrust of his analyses. For example, Rajani Palme 
Dutt (1896–1974), a leading CPGB theoretician, confirmed Roy’s positions in his influential 
1926 oeuvre Modern India. If anything, he was even less convinced of communalism’s 
ideological significance, and more optimistic than Roy that the laws of historical 
materialism would ensure the proper course of history. Even though Dutt castigated the 
bourgeoisie for fishing for “all kinds of cults and superstitions of barbarism, ignorance, 
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submission to God, etc., in order to spread these among the masses,” the attempts to 
influence the latter were ultimately in vain: It was “idle to believe that this fashionable 
make-believe can have the slightest effect on the real processes at work.”428 However, 
subsequent events on the subcontinent would cast an eerie light on these “real processes.” 
 
 
III.2.2 The Domestic Response: Calcutta 1926 
 
While the seminal theoretical texts on communalism had developed under conditions of the 
considerable spatial and temporal distance of European abodes to the actual manifestations 
of communal consciousness, communists on the subcontinent were more directly confronted 
with this peculiar type of upheaval. This had led to differences in its assessment as early as 
1924: Evidently annoyed by Roy’s reticence to comment straightforwardly on the issue—
references to the religious problematic were even sparser in pamphlets and manifestos 
appearing outside the Vanguard’s pages—, the Socialist published an open letter to Roy 
from J. P. Begerhotta, a member of the INC Working Committee and a future CPI secretary, 
in September 1924. It emphasized that “all efforts should be made to abolish religious 
influence from the people. Hindu Muslims unity can not be successful until every body is 
well fed and religious bigotry is removed.”429 Apparently, Begerhotta had had his fair share 
of exposure to what Dutt had called “real processes.” At the Kanpur communist conference, 
Singaravelu had responded by attempting to reconcile communism with ‘reasonable’ 
religiousness. The 1926 Calcutta riots gave rise to another, considerably more influential 
way of addressing communalism. 
Simmering tensions in the city had erupted in early April in attacks by Muslims on 
Marwari traders before the background of a steady downward trend in inter-communal 
relations. Assertions of communal identity during the non-cooperation movement and 
notably the communally uneven participation in the political and administrative sphere had 
profoundly strained the traditionally quiet (if not amicable) coexistence of the two big 
communities. Not only the bhadralok, the Bengali Hindu middle-class faced with Muslim 
competition for jobs in the public services and feeling increasingly threatened in its elite 
position, had embarked on a sustained process of communalization. The influx of work 
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migrants from more communalized areas on the upper Ganges introduced another volatile 
element into the city. Both the early abrogation of Das’s Hindu-Muslim Pact for the sharing 
of seats in administration and public employment and the campaigns for the upcoming 
elections for the Legislative Council also fed into the atmosphere of tension.430 
 Not uncommonly for the time, the riots originated in an Arya Samaj procession playing 
music in front of a mosque during Ramadan. What happened in several episodes during the 
following month, however, constituted the worst colonial India had seen of communal 
violence in decades. Over a hundred people died, the biggest part within the first couple of 
days. Besides religious buildings, rioters also attacked and burned numerous houses and 
shops. Regular troops had to be called in to restore a tenuous order.431 
In the face of the frenzy, the Calcutta communists around Muzaffar Ahmad reedited the 
Manifesto on the Hindu-Muslim Unity and Swaraj and distributed it as one of the few voices 
of religious neutrality in the city’s highly charged atmosphere. Ahmad therefore had 
considerable trouble to have it printed. It probably helped that the Manifesto’s editors 
avoided open anti-religious criticism, just as its authors had done. Besides theoretical 
reasons (namely the desire to classify religious phenomena as ephemeral) and personal bias 
deriving from involvement in a religious life-world, more tangible considerations had also 
influenced this stance. After all, open pronouncements of anti-religiosity had meant inviting 
trouble already in the past: Earlier in the same year, the renowned lawyer and author Abul 
Hussain had publicly accused Abdul Kader, a student activist of the communist-led 
Workers’ and Peasants’ Party of Dhaka, of offending Muslim sentiments and had warned 
him not to do so henceforth.432  
Now faced with the choice to either attack “third-rate ideas” (Lenin) and risk influence 
in a society dominated by them, or tailor political ambitions to the conditions dictated by the 
environment, domestic communism clearly went with the latter option. This, however, did 
not happen discreetly. As had been the case with Muslim anti-colonialist radicals of the 
early 1920s, the Calcutta communists took the bull by the horns and appropriated the 
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ideological status quo for their project of emancipation. Other opportunities were found 
even more lacking: With Gandhi focusing on his “constructive work,” militant nationalism 
was on a long-time low. Jawarhalal Nehru’s efforts to revive non-cooperation and 
satyagraha began in earnest only in 1927. Even then they were limited to paper politics: The 
INC’s association to the League against Imperialism and the moving of a resolution for 
complete independence at the Madras Congress session were not suited to spawn a broad 
movement against British rule.433 Accordingly, the Manifesto did not emphasize peace and 
restraint, but closed with a blazing call to take the fight to the rich, who after all were 
responsible for the predominance of religious ideology: 
Fatalism, fanaticism, submission, superstition, obedience and faith, the offsprings of religion, are 
the offensive weapons in the hands of the oppressors; poverty, miseries, self-renunciation, 
sacrifices are the consoling factors ordained by religion for the poor and oppressed. Our rich 
people […] are committing daily highest treason in broad day and tormenting the poor by 
invoking the aid of God. The people are still very ignorant and they are kept so by our religious 
leaders as one of the essential conditions of their own power.434 
This conclusion carried a meaning significantly different from the original Manifesto’s. The 
1926 Calcutta outbreak had been incomparably larger in scope and magnitude than the riots 
of 1923. The latter had been more akin to isolated occurrences and could more plausibly be 
traced to small groups of instigators. In Calcutta, however, considerable population sections 
had joined in the fray. Hence, in its context the reprint signaled not a reaffirmation, but a 
departure from Roy’s understanding of communalism. Ahmad’s comments in Langal 
(“Plough”), the Bengal Workers’ and Peasants’ Party’s organ, spelled out the shift at the 
peak of the riots: 
The upper strata of society have all along been plundering the lower ones. The looting which has 
to-day taken place in Calcutta under the thin cover of Hindu-Moslem dissension, is but the 
reaction from that spoliation. The matter for regret is that, the affair has floated before our eyes 
tinges with [sic!] a religio-communal line.435 (emphasis added) 
Here, Ahmad harked back to Roy’s radical early positions. They had affirmed 
‘revolutionary communalism’ in the wider Moplah and Akali contexts and fashioned 
religious politics into expressions of underlying social concerns in India in Transition, 
written at the high tise of non-cooperation. In 1926, however, there was very little in terms 
of a mass movement to latch onto—except for increasingly widespread communal 
manifestations. Hence, Ahmad’s approach to communalism sought to establish linkages to 
progressive aspirations, and conferred a double meaning on it: ‘From above,’ communalism 
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cemented the position and increased the bargaining power of a section of upper classes 
while at the same time weakening the unity of the voices of the underprivileged. Yet, ‘from 
below,’ it was a precise indicator of being dispossessed and deprived, and hence reflected 
the drive to combat the conditions providing for dispossession. Ahmad even argued that the 
charge of communalism was the last straw of the possessing classes to portray themselves as 
victims of backward underdogs, while in reality the true victims were rising against the class 
regime. Even though this did not happen consciously, theirs were acts of social desperation 
indicative of an unfulfilled desire to be free.436 
This was a potent radicalization of the classical Marxist approach, where religion 
pointed to social relations necessitatiung its existence as the “heart of a heartless world.” 
Religion itself was ‘necessarily false consciousness,’ an ideology. The Calcutta communists, 
however, associated religion (in the shape of a communal outbreak) with the struggle 
against the very world producing it. Such radicalism had been prompted by first-hand 
experience of the riots, which had obsolesced the classical approach of treating 
communalism and its perpetrators as alien to society’s mainstay. The Calcutta group 
instinctively realized that a communist perspective had to evolve new responses to the fact 
that communal terror had an undeniable popular dimension—new responses, however, that 
conformed to the old imperatives of mass politics. Hence, in the absence of a broad political 
movement communalism appeared as the closest approximation to social or even 
revolutionary militancy.  
Terrified by the outbreak, Roy had initially prepared the ground by suggesting that 
religion proper could indeed function as the arena of class struggle, albeit only where the 
class divide corresponded to the religious divide.437 Notwithstanding the lack of such a 
constellation in Calcutta, declaring communalism a misguided class struggle as the local 
communists did was consequential and advantageous. Ahmad could achieve both: paying 
homage to the actual state of the mass psyche and claim its agents for the communist 
revolution. Unbeknownst to him, thereby he probably came closest of all subcontinental 
communists to translate German Social Democrat leader August Bebel’s view that anti-
Semitism was the “socialism of fools” into a subcontinental context. Similarly ignorant that 
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the ideology in question was not just a preliminary stage of progressive ambitions, and 
similarly unaware of the grave consequences such a sympathetic assessment could yield, 
Ahmad’s reputation in communist circles (and his positions) remains similarly unassailed. 
On the contrary, he counts as one who had always fought tooth and nail against “all forms of 
deviation from Marxism.”438  
All this is not to imply that the communists supported, or even were directly involved 
in, communal propaganda, let alone atrocities. Nor were they perceived to do so: Langal’s 
consistent attacks against communalized nationalist politics led to a perceptible drop in the 
paper’s sales. The insertion of Pyarimohan Das’s (Hindu) name as an editor alongside 
Ahmad, intended to counteract Langal’s reputation as an anti-Hindu paper, could not turn 
the tide.439 It did not help that criticism of Muslim identity politics continued to figure 
significantly less prominently in its pages. Even the re-edition of Roy’s Manifesto exhibited 
this general trend: An added excursus on the historical role of Islam called on the 
subcontinent’s Muslims to join “heart and soul” in the struggle for freedom and blamed 
reactionary elements in Islam on the institution of the caliphate (“a weapon for privilege and 
oppression”). At the same time, the creed’s historical roots resonated more positively (“the 
rise of Arabs under the banner of Islam was the rise of mass consciousness under the slogan 
of equality, fraternity and brotherhood”). In view of the less magnanimous reality on the 
subcontinent, such positions scared off many Hindu readers while failing to attract Muslims. 
Police reports gleefully noted the sharp downturn in the sales of Langal, and remarked 
equally satisfied that its successor Ganavani initially had to be distributed for free to 
maintain an audience.440 
In fact, there was not much the communists could do against the riots except writing 
against them, and their principled opposition had limits: A sympathetic understanding of the 
riots as a class phenomenon confirmed that religious, or communal, radicalism was not 
necessarily opposed to a communist agenda. Against this background, attributing the CPI’s 
failure to effectively combat communalism to organizational deficiencies alone merely 
reiterates traditional left clichés of a strict dichotomy of ‘progressive’ and ‘reactionary’ 
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forms of consciousness. Moreover, it ignores the active role of communist instances in the 
amalgamation of these categories.441 
Roy’s reaction went down another path. Later in 1926, he responded to the riots with an 
elaborate “class analysis” of the communal phalanx. According to him, it consisted of a 
“parasitic class of priests,” reactionary politicians, the unemployed intelligentsia and petty 
bourgeois traders (both of which faced increasing competition from Muslims), and “lumpen-
proletariat and goondas […] used by the police to start the affray.” Behind them was the 
“hidden hand of imperialism.” All of these groups had their political and material stakes in 
sustained communal campaigns, and hence inflamed the widespread “discontent in the name 
of religion.” However, even though designed to locate communal ideology at a safe distance 
from the “masses,” Roy’s efforts at containment could not dispel rising doubts about the 
integrity of mass action. Even non-cooperation, hitherto merely a bourgeois framework of a 
progressive mass movement, appeared in a skeptical light: “A political movement based on 
religion cannot but lead to religious aggressiveness.”442  
This shift somewhat belatedly reflected debates in the Comintern problematizing the 
lack of ‘cultural’ criticism in the mid-1920s. While the V congress had defined the main 
task of the communist parties as getting even “closer to the masses,” for the first time there 
were prominent voices questioning the ideological implications of such an approach. 
Leading theoretician Nicolai Bucharin referred to heated discussions on religion that 
required the Comintern to clarify its world-view. Clara Zetkin attacked the Comintern’s 
practice by proxy of railing against the (socialist) Second International: She accused it of 
avoiding the confrontation with “bourgeois religious ideology” by fashioning religion into a 
private affair, and had similarly “fatalistically assumed that with the […] establishment of 
communist production, a communist ideological superstructure and mature communist 
ideology would emerge.” Zetkin pointedly ostracized the Second International for having 
shirked the battle for “complete Weltanschauung,”443 a battle Roy committed to take up in 
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1926: Henceforth, the CPI was to expose communal plotters, fight radical Hinduism and 
extremist Islam alike, and liberate the population from religious fanaticism and “traditional 
social evils.”444 
Yet, Roy also had a more seminal approach in store that would unfold its appeal to the 
CPI’s policies only much later. In March 1926, he had outlined a minimum program 
demanding a “guarantee for national minorities” and envisaging a “solution of the 
communal question on the basis of democratic rights.”445 Two months later, the events in 
Calcutta had obviously initiated a process of theoretical churning: A guest column by a 
Soviet trade union leader in the Masses of India criticized the INC for conceding “inordinate 
importance” to issues of religion and opined that “essentially the question was a question of 
national minority.”446 
This plank of thought, even while of little resonance for the time being, seemed to 
present a workable solution of the communal problem on communist terrain and in 
communist terms (“national minority”). It allowed for an analysis of the communalist 
phenomenon paying due homage to the inclusion of the “masses” without raising the need 
for criticism of their religious predispositions. The thought appealed sufficiently to Roy to 
include it in the CPI’s manifesto to the 1926 Congress session at Guwahati, which 
demanded that the “communal question […] should be approached as the question of a 
national minority.” However, referring to the superficiality of communal boundaries did not 
forestall their acknowledgement and operationalization in national terms by Roy himself: 
With clear cultural overtones, he demanded that “one of the main planks in the nationalist 
platform must be the protection for national and communal minorities.”447  
Apart from these tentative considerations, the CPI’s analyses remained largely on par 
with left nationalists. In the wake of the Calcutta riots, Nehru recognized the need to 
secularize the intelligentsia in the sense of “toleration of all faiths and beliefs and 
permissible religious practices.” Programmatically, this materialized in the demand for 
freedom of worship and religious neutrality of the state, just as in the communist 
manifestos.448 The consequences were similarly alike. Since attempting a political 
settlement of the question was a “waste of time” (Nehru), both left-wing nationalists and 
communists envisaged a long-term solution through industrialization and national 
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independence. In the short run, however, the differences in their political orientation made 
themselves felt: While Nehru campaigned for a conciliatory stance on the part of the Hindu 
majority, the events of the mid-1920s prodded the communists on a path of reorientation. 
Edging away from the ‘masses,’ they turned emphatically to their ‘proper’ revolutionary 
constituency: the workforce. 
 
 
 
III.3 From “Mass” to “Working Class” Complex 
 
III.3.1 Towards a Proletariat 
 
By the mid-1920s, the working class as a social stratum still had gone virtually unnoticed by 
subcontinental communism. This had been due to the transfer of its revolutionary 
prerogative onto the ‘masses,’ and a concomitant obfuscation of the borders between both 
categories typical for an Eastern revolutionary paradigm. If Roy’s India in Transition had 
conceptually inflated the working class to encompass much of the subcontinent’s 
population, the Vanguard’s rechristening into the Masses of India in January 1925 bore out 
this shift emblematically. To be sure, such name changes frequently occurred because of 
police surveillance and censorship of communist publications; nevertheless, a new name 
could also be indicative of the editors’ programmatic approach. In Roy’s case, it certainly 
was. Taking up a quote from C. R. Das for the subtitle, the Masses demanded “Swaraj for 
the 98 per cent” (a reference to the 1920 Government of India Act, which had enfranchised 
only two per cent of the population), vowed to take the “point of view of the masses,” and 
went on to short-circuit the “98 per cent” with the proletariat: The ‘masses’ “constitute the 
working-class—the producing majority […] the exploited and expropriated working-
class.”449 In 1926, the Calcutta group staged a similar move by renaming their organ Langal 
into Ganavani (“Voice of the Masses”).450 
In view of the not exactly gargantuan proportions of the working class proper, that is, 
the factory workers, their numerical hyperinflation and conflation with the ‘masses’ had 
been a plausible move to multiply the communists’ potential revolutionary basis: While the 
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number of factories and workers had risen steeply during the second decade of the 20th 
century, it was still low even in absolute terms. In 1918, there had been 3,500 “organized 
factories” on the subcontinent, and mill workers numbered around 2.6 million in 1921.451 
Their concentration in large urban centers occasionally endowed organized workers with a 
punching power above their numerical weight. Still, they formed no more than a miniscule 
minority of the population. Roy’s conceptual inclusion of the “masses” of “potential 
proletarians” (Horst Krüger) in the working class responded to the same imperative to 
present favorable non-bourgeois revolutionary perspectives that had earlier led him to claim 
a staggering nine million factory workers by 1920.452 
At the time communist interest in the subcontinental proletariat cropped up, the former was 
numerically and idiomatically still very much a class ‘in the making.’ It was only in the 
1920s that the defining steps towards the constitution of a working class were undertaken in 
the shape of competing, and sometimes complementing, efforts ‘from above’ and ‘from 
below.’453  
Official interest in the life and working conditions of subcontinental factory workers 
surfaced only after the World War. It was sparked by the October revolution, intensified by 
the accelerated formation of trade unions, and materialized in a streak of comparably 
effectively implemented labor legislation. Obviously, the main thrust of the definition and 
uplift of the workforce was to prevent it from becoming a hotbed of unrest, and possibly 
also to curb the advantages subcontinental entrepreneurs derived from excessive 
exploitation vis-à-vis their more constricted British counterparts.454 Concurrently, processes 
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of organization ‘from below’ took shape. Properly organized trade unions appeared on the 
scene at the end of the 1910s, replete with an umbrella organization, the All-India Trade 
Union Congress (AITUC), which was founded in 1920. Initially dominated by moderate 
labor leaders and left nationalists, it came under communist influence in the second half of 
the 1920s.455  
Systematic communist efforts to organize the laboring classes began around 1926. This 
date is important for two reasons: First, as has been shown, the streak of communal riots 
peaking in the Calcutta bloodbath on the whole had cooled off the CPI’s zeal for mass 
politics and underscored its lack of capacity for effective intervention. Second, following the 
1924 V Comintern congress’s call to set up a broad-based left movement—notably in the 
trade unions—under communist participation, the CPGB involved itself actively on the 
subcontinent. Between 1926 and 1928, it dispatched “emissaries,” British communist 
agitators, to the subcontinent on long-term missions to organizationally assist the CPI 
comrades. Among others, George Allison, Philip Spratt, and Benjamin Bradley encouraged 
the formation of trade unions and regional Workers’ and Peasants’ Parties (WPP), 
communist-controlled mass organizations with a moderate agenda open to a wide array of 
social activists and left nationalists. Among these emissaries, notably Spratt proved to be an 
“industrious and capable ally,” and communist trade union activity took a sharp upturn in 
the decade’s second half. 456  
The emissaries complemented indigenous efforts to establish legal front organizations 
in the aftermath of the Kanpur Conspiracy Case, which had showcased the dangers of open 
communist activity. A month before the 1925 Kanpur communist conference, Nazrul Islam 
and Halim had been among the founders of the Labour Swaraj Party in Bengal. Two years 
later, it was converted into the Bengal branch of the WPP on the initiative of Spratt and 
Bradley. The latter had both also taken part in the formation of the Bombay WPP. The 
Punjab branch came into existence by the conversion of the Ghadrite KKP into a WPP unit a 
couple of months later. In the UP, a promising young activist called Puran Chandra (P. C.) 
Joshi (1907–1980) presided over the formation of a UP WPP unit in 1928, the same year in 
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which the regional bodies were unified into an official—if powerless and short-lived—all-
India organization.457 Agenda-wise, the WPPs limited themselves to advocating freedom 
from imperialist and bourgeois dominance in comparably modest terms. Their mobilization 
centered on labor demands such as the eight-hour day, a minimum wage, improvement of 
labor conditions, and the ban on child labor. The youth wing was to address “special 
grievances” of the young generation, notably unemployment.458 
 
Outlook 
But who were the workers the communists set about to mobilize? Since the onset of 
subaltern studies in the 1980s, a lot has been written on the development of consciousness 
‘on the ground’ under colonial modernity. With respect to the subcontinent’s working class, 
the contributors can roughly be divided into two, not diametrically opposed, strands: Those 
who emphatically deny the applicability of a universal understanding of the “modern” to a 
subcontinental working class context, and those who, informed by rational choice theory, 
link the process of development of the working class milieu to the universal by framing it in 
terms of an evolving rationality. 
For the first approach, Dipesh Chakravarty has argued in a study on Bengal’s jute mill 
workforce that the development of consciousness in the working class was an uneven 
process and quite different from the West. While class solidarity had become firmly 
entrenched, workers’ sectional ties and affiliations remained largely intact. The 
“community” of the workers defined itself in terms of residence, language, and (perhaps 
mainly) religion.459 Hence, the workers held potential for mobilization on both ‘progressive’ 
matters—such as wage increases—and ‘reactionary’ ones—such as inter-communal strife. 
Workers displayed initiative and determination to fight, as represented in their joining 
militant unions, and responded to political as well as economic slogans. Yet, traditional 
loyalties of caste and parochialism persisted side by side with “advanced” class 
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consciousness. Far from submerged and repressed, they asserted themselves in the workers’ 
understanding of their environment.460 
On the other hand, Rajnarayan Chandavarkar, probing into Bombay’s textile workers, 
has made a case for what he calls “rationality” in the city’s working-class society. His study 
frames social relations in proletarian Bombay neighborhoods in the inter-war years in terms 
of traditional social arrangements. A sophisticated network of informal mutual obligations 
occupies center stage in his narrative of the Bombay workforce, inferring that other 
constituents of traditional social mediation, such as hierarchies of caste and religious ritual, 
were similarly part of the social make-up. Potentially “modernizing” impulses from outside, 
such as strikes and labor unrest, for a long time did not pose a serious challenge to these 
loyalty ties and solidarity relations knit around the central middlemen figures of the jobbers 
and dadas, the informal instances of labor recruitment, allotment, and militancy.461 
While the influence of these middlemen—and, in part, the cultural microcosm they 
represented—declined over time, other pillars of “traditional” worker culture were slower to 
fade, or even reinforced. Chandavarkar’s main argument for the rationally understandable 
choice of the workers to remain in these conditions—the reciprocity of obligations—
ultimately confirms the dominance of traditional and, in their context, “rational” social 
arrangements. For example, although generally dis-emphasizing the role of religion in 
worker consciousness Chandavarkar concedes that religious festivities had been “focal 
points of community sentiment and rivalry.”462 Hence, despite the (spatial) difference in 
their objects of research, both his and Chakrabarty’s findings permit the identification of a 
traditional and religious outlook of the working class throughout and beyond the 1920s. 
Early approaches to labor organization from above had reflected this circumstance. 
Annie Besant had infused a theosophical tinge into the trade union movement, reinforced by 
pioneering trade unionists from Bombay such as Bahman Pestonji Wadia and the Tilakite 
Joseph Baptista. Both were convinced of the spiritual mission of the subcontinent’s 
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workforce, which was to harness the “humanising spiritualism of the East” in order to 
“chasten the brutalising materialism of the West.”463 Even though soon supplanted by 
nationalism and left-wing agitation, their approach left its traces notably in the Gandhian 
brand of labor organization. According to an undated issue of the Indian Labour Review, 
trade unions oftentimes had their own temples, and important decisions necessitated prior 
religious ceremony. Similarly, workers and officials alike offered thanksgiving prayers for 
improvements in living and working conditions.464 
Community consciousness could also manifest itself in labor unrest. Nitin Sinha 
provides an example of a strike conducted under the auspices of dharma. While the 
inclusion of religious idioms augmented the mobilizing potential, the appeals of trade union 
leaders to overcome caste distinctions mostly went unheard.465 In the mid-1920s, a strike 
rally of workers celebrated both the WPP and the mother goddess of the Ganges (“Ganga 
Mai ki Jai!”). To the dismay of their communist organizers, the participants later refused to 
join an inter-caste dinner, declaring that “we can give up our lives [for the workers’ 
struggle] but not our religious beliefs.”466 Veteran communist Gautam Chattopadhyay aptly 
commented retrospectively that “this reveals the particular stage of the consciousness of the 
workers and helps us not to oversimplify.”467 
 
 
III.3.2 The Reds’ Care 
 
Due to the CPI’s initial neglect, there are few communist references to the composition, 
outlook, or even the role of the proletariat proper before the later 1920s. Roy had contented 
himself with categorically declaring that the working class that had shed all remnants of 
caste mentality. Although their “ignorance” prevented the workers from assuming a more 
prominent role in national politics, workers would soon become the one “relentless and 
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uncompromising revolutionary force.”468 Reports from communists on the spot indicated 
that there was still some way to go: 
Ill-paid, ill-clad as they are they cannot but fall an easy prey to these missioneries [instigators of 
communal riots], who promise to adjust their economic apparatus. And quite ignorant of the 
historical role they have to play, they think that the key of their poverty’s solution lies within the 
reach of these emissaries of God.469  
It is mostly retrospectives detached from events on the ground that muster more enthusiasm, 
“knowing the working class to be the standard-bearer of socialism” and trusting in “its 
capacity to play the leading role in the national revolutionary struggle.”470 Gopalan 
seconded that in the face of miserable conditions, the worker “resists committing suicide 
only because, unknown even to himself, there are germs of a revolutionary sense in him.”471 
Dogmatic ontology superseded empirical experience in ‘mature’ Marxist analysis. 
Properly grooming these germs in a “revolutionary sense,” however, was problematic 
with regard to the communist vanguard no less than the workers themselves. While not 
entirely implausible, Chandavarkar’s assessment that the communists “satisfied themselves 
that caste and religious identities were simply manifestations of false consciousness shortly 
to be subsumed by the emergence of the real thing” oversimplified matters.472 It 
presupposed a binary distinction between a unitarily areligious communist avant-garde and 
a “backward” working class, which does not hold in the face of both inclusive communist 
practice and the individual activists’ own situatedness. For example, in a 1929 speech A. A. 
Alwe, President of the Bombay-based communist Girni Kamgar Union (“Red Flag,” GKU), 
attributed his success in laborious grass-roots mobilization efforts to god’s help, “for which 
I am thankful.”473 
Moreover, communists were involved in conducting trade union business along 
communal lines. If the January 1929 demand of the Transport Workers’ Union of Bengal, a 
WPP-affiliated radical union, for granting leave on “official religious holidays” seems 
innocuous, British reports record the case of the Kirti Dal, a Sikh-only trade union from 
Calcutta. It closely cooperated with the WPP in Bengal and counted Abdul Halim, a core 
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member of the Calcutta CPI unit, among its leaders.474 In other instances, communists were 
not so much agents as reproducers of communal separation. Founded in 1932 in 
Ahmedabad, where the Gandhian Ahmedabad Labor Union (ALU) dominated the labor 
scene, the CPI-supported Mill Mazdoor Union consisted almost exclusively of Muslims who 
had not been absorbed into the largely caste-Hindu ALU.475 The congruity of communist 
peasant and worker unions in South India with caste and religious groups has been diligently 
researched.476 
These practices derived equally from biographical preformation and conscious tactical 
‘deviations,’ both nourished by the quiet conviction of doing the right thing as expressed by 
Rajani Palme Dutt’s apodictic statement that trade unions contained the seed of 
communism. It is possibly for this reason that nuisances such as religion or caste were 
virtually absent from statements of communist labor unions of the time, including the 
WPPs. An example among many, the Red International of Labor Unions’s (RILU) Indian 
section’s 1927 outline of a constitution for an independent subcontinent covered labor, 
education, political rights, and social security, but had nothing to say on caste or community 
formation.477 The All-India WPP’s 1928 Manifesto reproduced Roy’s 1922 Program for the 
Gaya Congress verbatim on the religious question, demanding freedom of worship and the 
separation of religion and state. Next to doctrinal class ontology, there are also signs of 
pervading insecurity and helplessness: A draft AITUC statement on the Nehru Report and 
its contested handling of communal representation recommended that “probably the best 
solution of the communal problem is to ignore it.”478 The lone contemporary communist to 
explicitly demand a “guarantee of certain common rights of humanity, such as the abolition 
of caste […] discriminations” in his draft of an agenda for trade unions was a foreigner—
Spratt.479 
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Obviously, the proletariat’s spiritual affiliation continued to vex the communists, and 
challenge them to confront it, even by way of adapting their political and social vision to it. 
Kranti (“Revolution”), the organ of the Bombay WPP, in July 1927 recounted a speech of 
the Madras Trade Union Congress’s president, Narayan Rao Joshi. He underlined that the 
working class had “no religion, caste or nationality or anything.” Rather, increasing the 
power of worker organizations and improving economic conditions counted as the workers’ 
“religion.”480 In the same spirit, Narayan Malhar Joshi, leader of the AITUC’s reformist 
wing, averred that the proletarian class was the workers’ caste. Yet, such categorical 
declarations could not do away with unwelcome identity patterns demanding to be 
recognized and addressed, if only to prevent the worst. On the occasion of Muharram 1927, 
Kranti issued a call to the “Musalman and Hindu people” to preserve communal peace, and 
emphasized that the WPP welcomed “people of all religions.”481  
The WPP’s 1928 guidelines for trade union functionaries pointed to the outlook 
prevailing even among the ‘vanguard’ by demanding that “all leading Trade Unionists etc. 
must be freed from communalism [.…] In particular, all Party members must […] 
themselves do no religious propaganda of any kind.”482 Frontal attacks on religion and 
traditional culture, on the other hand, were delicate enough to be outsourced. Addressing the 
WPP’s 1928 Youth Conference, Bombay WPP President D. R. Thengdi boldly urged the 
next generation to take up the task which he and his ilk had apparently shirked: 
The youths’ movement should start a campaign, a veritable crusade against all injustices, 
barbarities and malpractices, such as Untouchability, Child Marriage, caste system purdah, sex 
inequality, prohibition of widow remarriage etc. It should challenge and attack whatever is 
reactionary and decadent in social conceptions and institutions [….] It should declare a war on 
all communal movements which split the Indian People on un-historic [!] communal lines.483 
In view of this deferral of a task that was as complex as it was essential, the eventual 
declaration of war between Hindu and Muslim workers should not have come as a surprise.  
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III.3.3 Proletarian Communalism: Bombay 1929 
 
Bombay had developed into a hub of communist activity by the late 1920s. The local CPI 
around Shantaram Savlaram Mirajkar, R. S. Nimbkar, K. N. Joglekar, and—once released 
from prison in 1927—Dange successfully organized workers and conducted strikes. 
Occasional government repression such as a raid on Kranti in July 1927 rather served to 
increase its reputation and circulation.484 However, it was during and after the resounding 
victory in the general strike of the city’s textile workers from April to October 1928 that 
communist labor activity shot to real prominence and fame. The strike prevented major 
wage cuts and exhibited considerable tenacity and discipline on the part of the strikers. They 
organized themselves in mill committees, resisted all attempts to break the strike, and joined 
the GKU in scores.485 
To the Bombay communists, the strike confirmed the expectations reposed in the 
working class. The rejection across communities of the offer of Shaukat Ali, head of the 
local khilafat committee, to provide strike funds only for Muslim workers strengthened 
communist trust. Kranti’s message that the distinction between “Hindu or Musalman […] 
does not exist in the law of loot of capitalism” seemed to stick.486 At the beginning of 1929, 
the GKU was the strongest, most prestigious, and best-organized trade union in Bombay. 
The communal riot of February 1929 burst into this communist success story. 
Its prelude had taken place in mid-January: Striking oil workers had attacked Muslim 
Pathan blacklegs. The Pathans had not only repelled the assailants, but pursued them to their 
quarters, where they had rioted and looted.487 In the aftermath, rumors that the Pathans were 
kidnapping children quickly spread among Hindu workers, leading to a “man hunt for 
Pathans” on 3 February that left two dead.488 On 4 February, the unrest spread to the mill 
area, where over 30,000 workers had struck work, armed themselves, and commenced 
another “man hunt for Pathans.”489 
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On the following day, the municipal government called in the army to restore order. 
Shaukat Ali announced the organization of Muslim self-defense, and on 7 February, it was 
now Hindus who were “battered to death.” The latter, however, did their best to even the 
balance: A large crowd, originally having resumed work, responded to anti-Pathan rumors 
by striking work anew and rushing out to seek revenge.490 During the next days, the riots 
spread over the city in defiance of a curfew and patrolling armored cars. In total, over a 
hundred deaths were reported.491 
The communist response was unequivocally apologetic. From the outset, Dange was 
convinced that the “imperialists and their agents […] decided to involve […] the whole city 
in a furious communal rioting.” The imposition of a curfew and the efforts to nail down the 
culprits were only a “smoke-screen” to obscure the true originators—the “agent-
provocateurs who had directed the huge crime of a communal strife.” Among them counted 
Shaukat Ali, “who, once an anti-imperialist, is now the active paid agent of imperialism, 
planted in the bourgeois national movement to disrupt it by communal dissensions.”492 
Similarly, Mirajkar ever asserted that the riots had been “deliberately staged by the British 
Government,” and Ranadive traced the disturbances to the British administration’s desire to 
attack the “powerful arm of the working class” by engineering a “serious Hindu-Muslim riot 
to smash the class solidarity.”493  
Upon closer scrutiny, the adamant determination to externalize the source of the riots 
queerly coexists with the endeavor to deny outbreaks among workers altogether—an 
endeavor that falls flat even on the plane of textual immanence. Dange’s appraisal that the 
workers were “exceptionally free from the Hindu-Muslim feeling” and that they had become 
“class-conscious and not caste-conscious”494 is tempered by his own admission that only 
communist intervention had prevented them “from being excited into a suicidal fury.”495 
And while the committed efforts of communist labor leaders on the spot to stop the riots are 
beyond doubt, this was a shaky claim. Other passages allow for glimpses on the reality on 
the ground, such as when Dange conceded that the “rioting was never serious in the 
workers’ locality,” or more clearly, that the GKU had undertaken everything in its power “to 
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stop the mad fury [….] We issued every day one or two handbills, telling them of the great 
harm they were doing to their class by such action.”496 (emphasis added) Even the 
confirmation of the endeavor’s successful completion (“the temporary communal deviation 
was checked and corrected by the G.K.U.”) renders his claim of an “inherent superior 
proletariat morality of the workers” doubtful.497 
More adequately—if probably unintendedly—, British communist Clemens Dutt 
ambiguously summarized in late 1929 that the events of 1928–9 had left “no ground for 
uncertainty as to the advance of the revolutionary tide there.”498 And in Ghate’s recollection, 
a lone example of admitting uncertainty and first-hand experience into the picture, the 
“superior proletarian morality” takes more concrete shape: 
One day such a situation was created that we did not know what to do: [the workers] became 
very militant. […] They said that they wanted to kill some Muslims […] The workers would not 
go back [to work] because all sorts of rumours were being spread [such as their wives being 
abducted during their absence].499  
At least retrospectively, Ghate’s perception was acute enough to admit not only the fact of 
disturbances between Hindu and Muslim workers, but also that they had been “provoked by 
the workers themselves, not by the management,” which had sought to maintain peace and 
keep production going.500 
Apparently, the “great harm” mentioned by Dange had been done to communist notions of 
the working class no less than anything else. The outbreak dismayed the Bombay activists, 
who felt the need to support the best inside ‘their’ workers against empirical evidence. This 
incredulity explains the contradictory fashion of coupling the outsourcing of the riot to 
social adversaries with its outright denial, a procedure typical for an exonerating Western 
paradigm of externalization. That which must not be could not, and as communists they had 
chosen to chain themselves to their—supposedly pristine—revolutionary subject. Mirajkar 
later explicated this fateful bond: “Whatever Tata may say, he is always wrong, whatever 
worker says, he is always right.”501 This kind of allegiance undercut the realization of the 
Bombay workforce’s communal undercurrent.  
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In fact, the workers were no choristers. There had been serious religious friction already 
in 1927, and it was common to accuse blacklegs of soiling the heritage and the prestige of 
the Marathas and Shivaji himself. Both references had a distinctly Hindu coloring, with 
Shivaji being a directly anti-Muslim symbol.502 Even within the Hindu block, things were 
far from settled, and the communists did not necessarily contribute to the resolution of 
tensions. Once the GKU had reached a critical mass and consolidated itself in the wake of 
the general strike, debates on caste reared their head, sparked by the simultaneous non-
Brahmin movement. The Bengal WPP had booked the matter under counter-revolutionary 
“encouragement of differences among Indians” roused against their “chief political and 
intellectual leaders, who are Brahmins.”503 The response among Bombay communists was 
similarly unfavorable. Dange, a Brahmin himself, intensely distasted the non-Brahmin 
movement, which he had accused of “unpatriotic and narrow-visioned” petty-bourgeois 
outlook and “Fascist terror” against Brahmins as early as 1922.504 A corresponding 
inclination to regard the movement as divisive marked Kranti’s position, which knee-
jerkingly dubbed those attacking caste hierarchies in the GKU as “spies.”505  
It was only a government assault on the movement that fostered détente and restored 
unity: the arrest of the leaders for the Meerut Conspiracy Case in March 1929. Dange would 
digest the experience by reducing the conflict to the petty bourgeoisie’s proneness to 
communal agitation. “Brahmin and non-Brahmin, Muslim and Hindu […] are the various 
brigades of the economic struggle of the petty-bourgeois clerkdom.”506 Even if this was 
correct to an extent: Dange’s critical faculty for pernicious identity formation interacted 
closely with his refusal to reflect on the substance of caste oppression—and, not least, his 
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own privileged position in the caste hierarchy. His ready dubbing of those pointing to 
religious oppression in the movement as “reactionaries” smacks of a certain sense of 
comfort, resulting from his own situatedness, with the traditional social order. In this, he 
fused considerations of a bigger picture of united struggle with reluctance to question 
personal entanglement in and benefit from caste hierarchies into a stance beyond neat 
categories such as ‘progressive’ or ‘reactionary.’ 
A similar diffusion characterized much of the communist ingredient in the ferment of 
radicalism leavening in the 1920s. According to Shashi Joshi, CPGB Member of Parliament 
Shapurji Saklatvala had “struck the right tone” with the communists by identifying himself 
as a “Tilakite extremist” during his visit to the subcontinent in 1927.507 Before the 1929 riot, 
even the Ali brothers, protagonists of the khilafat movement, had by no means been 
ostracized from the fold of those with whom the communists—including the khilafat skeptic 
Dange—maintained political and personal ties: When Dange came out of jail in 1927, the 
“friends and admirers” assembled to welcome him included a number of khilafat volunteers 
led by Maulana Shaukat Ali himself. Obviously, the latter’s communal leanings made him 
deserving of communist criticism only when he applied them in the wrong, that is, non–anti-
imperialist context.508 
 
 
Synopsis of Chapter III 
 
In this chapter, subcontinental communism’s modes of analysis, its strategies of identifying 
revolutionary subjectivity and its efforts to distinguish the latter from— or link it to— 
religious militancy have been scrutinized. Central to it was the impulse to identify with 
grass-roots militancy and equate mass action with progressive motives. The original 
emphasis on mass politics and its religious motives, and the elevation of the community-
centered Akali and Moplah rebellions into role models for revolution emblematized this 
approach. 
Roy’s subsequent analyses of communalism were genuinely innovative. They 
undertook to identify its social basis. However, reducing communalism to ulterior motives 
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of certain elite factions led to its sustained de-ideologization. Roy’s criticism of 
communalism as a means rather than as an end in itself paved the way for an entrenched 
understanding of communalism not as an ideology, but as an “imperialist” and “reactionary” 
technique.  
At the same time, the high incidence of communal violence rendered his externalizing 
formulae increasingly unsatisfactory. The ensuing process of theoretical churning yielded 
different results. First, the Calcutta group responded with a qualified elevation of 
communalism, considering the latter as the best substantiation of mass struggle to be had at 
the time. Second, Roy made steps towards an understanding of communalism as a problem 
of national minorities. And third, a re-orientation set in towards a clearer identification of 
the revolutionary subject—towards the subcontinent’s proletariat, up to then virtually 
indistinguishable from the ‘masses.’  
This also included tentative criticism its of endemic religious outlook. Yet, the 1929 
Bombay riots highlighted the communist involvement’s limited educating impact. At the 
same time, it revealed its limited capacity for self-reflection. Nevertheless, the Bombay 
communists’ dismissal of the communal madness forms a stark contrast to the Calcutta 
group’s empathy for ‘their’ riots. Besides underpinning the party’s spatial and theoretical 
segmentalization, this highlights the different analytical perspectives of Eastern and Western 
revolutionary paradigms: If the latter maintained progressive revolutionarity against 
manifestations of communal militancy (whose proletarian agents nonetheless remained part 
of the communist struggle), the former affirmed revolutionary potential because of them.  
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IV Towards Acculturation  
 
IV.1 Sea Changes  
IV.1.1 A Lowering Tide 
 
Apart from an increase in trade union activity, the impact of the efforts to establish a proper 
communist party remained negligible. The CPI was still very much a formation without 
official program or clear-cut ideological profile, organizational structures to speak of, and 
with few connections to the communist movement outside the subcontinent.509 In view of its 
negligible role in subcontinental politics, the main instrument to achieve communist 
hegemony were the WPPs. Their first aim was to substantially expand the party’s 
constituency: Following its turn towards the East, the Comintern had realized that no 
revolution, neither proletarian nor national, was going to take place in the colonies and 
‘backward’ countries without mobilization of the peasantry. A sizeable section of the Theses 
on the Eastern Question passed on the IV congress concerned the “agrarian question.”510 Its 
contribution to overcoming the urban isolation of both CPI and WPP was limited since the 
peasantry remained largely outside their grasp. If the mobilizing potential inherent in the 
Comintern’s shift soon yielded remarkable results in parts of China and Southeast Asia, in 
case of the subcontinent its impact remained confined to regional pockets. 511 An example 
from Bengal illustrates how rural efforts at mobilization on a class base failed, and how they 
were rationalized. In August 1926, a Habi from Dinajpur bitterly wrote to Ahmad:  
I have also been trying my level best since 3 years for waking up the peasant class but all my 
endeavours have failed. I cannot make out how this sleeping class may be waked [sic!] up. […] 
The greatest of the difficulties is that peasants are illiterate. They cannot distinguish between 
good and bad.512  
The peasants’ failure to manifest their inherent revolutionarity in a positive response to 
communist mobilization yielded Habi’s regretful blaming of adverse conditions at the root 
of their supposed immaturity. However, their actual political self-assertion disproves his 
                                                 
509 Annual Report 1927, PCJ 1927/45, 1–6. See also Home/Poll/1927 Nr. 100. 
510 Saiyid, Exporting Communism, 41. 
511 A similar experience had already marked Swami Vidyanand’s efforts to initiate a supra-caste peasant 
movement in Bihar in the early 1920s. Poor high-caste peasants had stayed away, perceiving the mobilization 
for improving the lot of poor peasants and tenants as an attack on the high castes. Gulab drily summarizes that 
“despite the realisation of exploitation the pauperised peasantry did not develop into a ‘class for itself’”: 
Gulab, Caste and the Communist, 159–62 (quote); see also Khaled, A Study in Leadership, 38–42. 
512 Letter from Habi to Ahmad, 19 August 1926, WBIB File 168/22(i) SL 121/1922 (K. W.), 6. 
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conclusion: The contemporary “realisation of exploitation” on the part of the peasants was 
more acute—and articulate—than Habi was able or willing to countenance. The WPP’s 
optimism that widespread “backwardness” did not preclude revolutionary action was partly 
justified, albeit not in the communist sense:513 In the eastern tracts of Bengal (Habi’s area of 
activity), Muslim peasant leaders like Shamshuddin Ahmad and his brother Afsaruddin were 
about to prove that Muslim tenants and middle peasants could indeed be mobilized against 
landlord, trading, and moneylending interests if those were identified as Hindu interests. As 
a result of the greater appeal of an agitation inclusive of religion, the organization of 
peasants materialized in communally segmented bodies. The Bengal WPP, the best-run and 
numerically strongest section, found itself running against an impenetrable wall in the minds 
of the Muslim East Bengal peasantry, which by the late 1920s increasingly gave a 
communal answer to the social question.514 
Hence, the WPPs were not able to establish themselves in the countryside “even though 
they gave radical anti-feudal slogans.” The overwhelming opposition of many social 
groups—landlords, moneylenders, brokers, lawyers, and mullahs—and already-entrenched 
communal formations discouraged many an enthusiastic activist. As a consequence, the 
Bengal WPP soon lost its peasant wing. It was not even possible to find a secretary for the 
peasant section in 1928.515 Unable to penetrate to the lower stratum of rural society and 
maligned by the Hindu Mahasabha as protectors of Muslim communalism, the movement 
remained virtually barred from access to either community of rural society. Conversely, the 
communal polarization of politics took its toll on the WPP. Between 1926 and 1928, the 
Bengal unit’s Executive Committee lost all its Muslim members, confounding even the 
surveillance agencies.516 
Still, the WPPs were the best instrument to forge ties with grass-roots movements available 
to the CPI. Left-leaning historians tend to eulogize them, and some stipulate that 
subcontinental communists, left to their own ingenuity, had managed to devise effective 
                                                 
513 Sinha, The Left-Wing, 190. 
514 WBIB File 859/36 Rajshahi SL 199/1936, 17–24. See also Tajul-Islam Hashmi, Pakistan as a Peasant 
Utopia: The Communalization of Class Politics in East Bengal, 1920–1947 (Boulder: Westview Press 1992), 
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“Peasants and the Peoples of the East: Indians and the Rhetoric of the Comintern,” in International 
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515 CPI(M), History of the Communist, 169 (quote); WBIB File 210/27 SL 23/1927. 
516 WBIB File 320/26 SL 310/1926; on the ineffectiveness of communist peasant mobilization, see also the 
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means of intervention and establishing a mass base. Many portray the process that led to 
their dissolution in 1929 as an entirely external affair, a proof of the Comintern’s obnoxious 
influence.517  
Others, however, have pointed to an increasing estrangement of the subcontinent’s 
communists from bourgeois and left-wing nationalists alike, suspected to compromise with 
imperialism. According to this version, “sectarian tendencies” grew in strength in both CPI 
and WPPs in the late 1920s. The theoretical input from the simultaneous VI congress was 
not the cause of the CPI’s swing towards left extremism, but rather a reinforcing boost.518 
At any rate, the (unauthorized) CPI emissaries to the VI congress, notably Usmani, if 
anything reinforced the leftward push during the proceedings.519 
Convening in July and August 1928, the VI Comintern congress introduced a sea 
change in the policy of communist parties. Its political thesis declared that the capitalist 
system had developed to its final stage and faced imminent collapse. Communists 
everywhere were to cut ties with the ‘reactionary’ bourgeoisie and wage all-out struggle. 
This explicitly included ‘reformist’ leftists and social democrats—the “social fascists.”520 
With respect to colonial countries, the Chinese disaster of 1927 (where the Chinese CP, 
under Roy’s and Borodin’s joint guidance, had been all but dismantled by its former 
Kuomintang allies) greatly abetted the emergence of a militantly anti-bourgeois line.  
The consequences of this realignment were drastic. It isolated the communist sub-
cosmos and led to an often catastrophic loss of social and political foothold: In Europe, the 
Comintern line prevented united action against fascist groups, immensely facilitating the 
takeover of the Nazi Party in Germany. On the subcontinent, the severing of ties with 
bourgeois nationalism (that had “betrayed” the freedom struggle by the suspension of non-
cooperation in 1922) and moderate leftists were doubly felt. Not only did the communists 
boycott the popular civil disobedience movements of the early 1930s, but also did they 
                                                 
517 Bhagwan Josh, “Foreword,” in P.C. Joshi. K. Damodaran. A Documented History of the Communist 
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dissolve their links with all “counter-revolutionary” sections of society.521 This spelt the end 
for the WPPs. 
In a sardonic twist of history, the VI congress also heralded the end of Roy’s career in 
official communism just as the Comintern finally adopted the gist of his long-time anti-
bourgeois stance. Having risen steadily in rank, Roy had become a senior operative and 
authoritative expert on Asia by the second half of the 1920s. However, his refusal to 
cooperate with Stalin in the latter’s efforts to oust the Trotskyite opposition from the 
Comintern led to his speedy downfall. Unable to attend the VI congress because of illness, 
Roy was not re-elected into any major body. In 1929, the Comintern expelled him on the 
grounds of contributing to the paper of the “rightist” German communist opposition around 
Ernst Brandler and August Thalheimer.522 Returning to India in 1930, Roy’s involvement in 
politics continued on communist lines, but in a separate organization—the “Roy group of 
communists,” or “Royists.”  
 
 
IV.1.2 The Meerut Class 
 
The impending communist isolation was intensified by developments back home. About 20 
March 1929, the police carried out raids throughout British India and rounded up 33 CPI 
members and trade unionists on charges of conspiring to violently overthrow British rule on 
the subcontinent, and brought them to court in Meerut.  
However, trying them ultimately not only failed to eliminate communism, but also 
backfired in a number of ways. Even though the CPI went through a virtual eclipse during 
the proceedings, which lasted until 1934, the effect remained temporal. At the same time, 
the main purpose—delegitimizing communism in public—materialized in its opposite: 
Extensive media coverage of the trial popularized the accused and put them in the spotlight 
of public interest far beyond the subcontinent.523 There was overwhelming sympathy for the 
political prisoners, who in turn used the trial as a stage to popularize their ideas. Observers 
with a penchant for radicalism were encouraged: Spratt boasted that “on the whole, the 
                                                 
521 CPI(M), History of the Communist, 146. 
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demanding the release of the prisoners: See http://www.wcml.org.uk/contents/international/india/meerut--the-
workers-theatre-movement-play/?keyword1=Meerut&keyword2= (last checked 12 December 2014).  
149 
 
revelation of our secret methods caused people to admire us: we had done what most young 
men wanted to do.”524 A new generation of communist activists—among others, Ranadive, 
S. V. Deshpande, and R. D. Bharadwaj—appeared on the scene to fill the gap. 
Notwithstanding lack of evidence, the accused were sentenced to various terms of 
transportation, which were substantially reduced on appeal. Ahmad received the highest 
term—three years—and along with Dange and Usmani remained imprisoned, but all other 
accused were free by early 1934.525 
Apart from the increase in popularity, the trial at Meerut also turned out beneficial for the 
communist detainees in that it provided them with an opportunity many of them had not had 
had so far. As the accusations were partly based on the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, 
the under-trials had to be granted access to the ‘evidence’ in order to prepare their defense. 
Accordingly, they dug into Marxism and not only fortified their own theoretical position, 
but prepared elaborate statements to justify (and sermonize) their political activity. Dange’s 
statement alone went over 90 hours, and took three months to be read out. 
Langford James, the first chief prosecutor, directed his efforts towards isolating the 
communists from the values of subcontinental politics and society alike. He attacked 
communism for its anti-religiousness: Not only had the Bolsheviks no god; their propaganda 
aimed at the destruction of the belief in god, and they were calling for the murder of priests 
and the desecration of churches: “You are anti-country, you are anti-God, you are anti-
family.”526 
This was a potent charge pointedly pinning down the ideological and cultural dimension 
of emancipation as envisaged by Marx. The latter had denounced the “traditions of all dead 
generations” weighing “like a nightmare on the brains of the living” in the 18th 
Brumaire.527 However, the communists had to refute Langford James’s charges: Their 
envisioned revolution was primarily about the ‘masses’ and only indirectly about 
emancipation from tradition and custom. Accordingly, the communists among the Meerut 
accused had to—as (Western) Marxists—confirm and at the same time—as (Eastern) 
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revolutionaries—refute the suspicion of confronting the subcontinent’s vestiges of 
tradition.528  
In their statement, the under-trials dutifully reiterated Marx’s positions, only to put their 
implications at arm’s length from the agenda of revolution. For example, patriarchy and 
exploitation of women and children, both desirable aims, would end only with the advent of 
socialism and therefore didn’t warrant specific criticism. Similarly, while communists 
advocated the emancipation of women and demanded the abolition of “institutions as the 
‘purdah’,” this would be possible only after the socialist transformation. To address matters 
of family in its institutional form or even to abolish it likewise was not on the communist 
agenda.529 Little wonder, then, that despite numerous interactions with women, their 
inclusion in socialist and communist organizations remained a low-priority item. Rather, 
they remained all-male groups. 
The same ambiguity characterized the communists’ approach to religion. It was subject 
to the imperative to shield the ‘masses’ from the implications of radical criticism, which the 
party nevertheless entertained. Hence, the assessment that the subcontinent was in the 
“bounds of mediaeval superstition” had its culturally critical edge blunted by shifting the 
blame for this state of things onto imperialism. Even where the accused were clear that 
religion was not only a function of rule but also a problem in itself, an “intellectual obstacle 
to clear and scientific thinking. It obscures class differences. It enjoins obedience and 
submission to the oppressor in this world [.…] It is ‘the opium of the people’,” and “we 
cannot but oppose it. We do not disguise our opposition to all religions, and we cannot allow 
religious propaganda or the open observances of religious practices, by any Communist,”530 
the consequences drawn from this radical stance effectively neutralized it: 
We are not concerned primarily with religious propaganda though we do not [!] exclude it. We 
combat religion mainly by pointing out its reactionary role in political and social affairs, and its 
historical roots in exploitation and the subordination of class to class. We resist and expose the 
efforts of Imperialism to utilize both religious prejudices and religious institutions etc. for its 
own ends. […] We do not refuse co-operation with individuals who hold religious beliefs or 
even preach religion. We consider the economic and political struggle the important question, to 
which questions arising from religion must be subordinated.531 
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Thus, the communists could assure the watchful Comintern, Langford James, and not least 
themselves of their sincerity by sharply criticizing religion, while simultaneously reassuring 
the ‘masses’ and, again, themselves that such radicalism did not in the least detract from 
accommodation of reactionary forms of social identity and motives of political 
mobilization—after all, the real culprit was imperialism. This was no innovation on the part 
of the CPI; rather, the above passage quoted Lenin almost verbatim. Yet, the direct 
application of his postulates under subcontinental conditions emphasized their culturally 
relativist thrust. Separation of state and religion (now including education) and a “campaign 
of enlightenment” for emancipation from religious prejudices were to solve the religious 
question. The Statement even felt compelled to reemphasize that “we shall not persecute 
religious beliefs.”532 Anyway, it was a side issue: Out of the Statement’s total of 425 pages 
(in the Documents’ enumeration), four-and-a-half, or slightly more than one per cent, were 
dedicated to it. 
Accordingly, religion and communism interacted beneath grand policy. Mobilization 
efforts targeted not religion, but foreign rule and economic exploitation. Under capitalist 
auspices, notably the latter lost its erstwhile unmediated character through the gradual 
substitution of the contractual form for personal relations of exploitation, a development 
actively supported by communist organizers. To Dange, this even was a fait accompli: Since 
capitalist exploitation in itself was blind to differences of gender, caste, creed, or culture, 
subcontinental capitalists and workers had “the same social actions and reactions as those 
of other countries. The only difference would lie in the degrees of development. Therefore, 
the general form or method of our class struggle will be the same as in other countries.”533 
(emphasis added)  
Such epistemological idealism—as it was mainly in communist diction, notably the sort 
arrived at on the VI congress, that a world thoroughly unified on capitalist lines had 
emerged—points to a centerpiece of subcontinental communism’s meaning and highlights 
the trappings of a universal Western paradigm: The representation of society in categories 
whose empirical content corresponded only in a limited sense to their theoretical 
connotations created a semi-conscious illocutionary gap. The combination of concept and 
thing subsumed under it caused a degree of de-facto-autonomy not only of the categories 
against their communist appliers, but also of subcontinental communism as a whole against 
international communism. Under the rigid grate of Stalinization, the implementation of 
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Bolshevik doctrines acquired a resistive life of its own precisely because Dange’s extreme 
view was inherently unable to acknowledge that the subcontinent’s proletariat could in any 
way be different from others.  
Inversely, such monism laid the foundation for a communist “ignored knowledge” of 
the still strongly non-bourgeois character of social organization and accompanying ideology 
formation. Put pointedly, the CPI’s focus on bourgeois sociality tended to align itself with 
traditional, personal, non-institutional, and direct forms of social interaction empirically 
prevalent in the family, the community, and even the proletariat—against mediated, indirect, 
‘modern,’ and at least partly juridified forms of oppression and exploitation: 
Unconditionally close to the ‘masses,’ whose ‘backwardness,’ while often deplored, was 
never properly realized, and hence itself became part of the revolutionary project.  
 
 
IV.1.3 A United Front 
 
The remedying effect of the leadership’s post-trial release was limited. Although the party 
could finally constitute itself properly, that is, replete with a general secretary (Adhikari, 
replaced by P. C. Joshi in 1936), a Politbureau (consisting of Joshi, Ajoy Kumar Ghosh, and 
R. D. Bhardwaj), a Central Committee, and with clear affiliation to the Comintern, it was 
banned in May 1934.534  
To make matters worse, the sectarian political line permitted few connections to the 
outside world. Even though it had no apparatus worth mentioning, the party had a clear 
vision of its numerous enemies. The 1931 Joint Platform of Action, a forerunner of the first 
party program, summarily blasted non-communist political actors: The bourgeoisie’s 
“present ‘opposition’ represents merely maneuvers with British imperialism, calculated to 
swindle the mass of the toilers.” An even greater danger emanated from the INC’s growing 
left wing and its proponents such as Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose:535 “The most 
damning and dangerous hindrance to India’s revolution is the agitation of leftist elements in 
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the national Congress [….] The most ruthless fight against the ‘left’ national reformists” 
was necessary to rescue the Indian revolution.536  
This severely impaired the integrative potential of subcontinental communism and 
prevented it from responding sympathetically to the rising socialist current within the INC. 
Consisting of left nationalists and worker and peasant activists dissatisfied with Gandhi’s 
handling of civil disobedience in the early 1930s (foremost his readiness to forego militant 
forms of struggle for minor political concessions), this current materialized organizationally 
in the foundation of the Congress Socialist Party (CSP) at Patna in 1934. Although critical 
of Gandhism, it firmly rejected the CPI’s sectarian stance. Former executive board member 
Madhu Limaye even argues that the CSP would probably never have come into existence 
had the communists “adopted a friendly attitude towards nationalism and had taken part in 
the struggle for independence.”537 
However, once the Comintern discarded left-wing radicalism (see below) the CSP 
functioned as the umbrella under which communists worked inside the Congress. 
Differences between the two parties were pronounced, but not mutually exclusive. While the 
CSP aimed to “convert the Congress to socialism” and turn it into an instrument of struggle 
against the British and vested interests alike, on other accounts both operated on more 
related grounds.538 For example, the CSP accorded a similarly low degree of importance to 
issues of caste and religion. Its Socialist Programme for India almost echoed the CPI’s 
phrasing in that it demanded that the state should not discriminate according to caste or 
creed. The socialist addendum consisted in the provision that the state was to monitor that 
the lands of religious bodies were administered in a “religious spirit,” and in doubt impose 
its own interpretation of said ‘spirit.’539 
This demand to turn the state into an arbiter at the nexus of material and spiritual 
considerations reflected the aspirations of folk socialists, who held that an uprightly 
“religious spirit” in worldly matters would correspond to socialist principles. As against the 
bolshevized CPI, the CSP’s less dogmatic doctrinal corset permitted a much greater range of 
opinions. Sentimental grass-roots socialists coexisted with, for example, early proponents of 
‘socialism of the backward castes’ such as N. G. Ranga and vocal cultural critics such as 
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Jayaprakash Narayan. In general, many of the CSP’s cadres—even while criticizing the role 
of religion as supporting pillar of the present order—leaned towards a situated approach not 
dissimilar to the CPI’s early Eastern days, which enabled popular religious ideologemes to 
resonate more perceptibly.  
Two examples illustrate the party’s integrative power. A long-time left activist, early 
correspondent of Roy, and key figure in the young CSP (who, by association with his 
erstwhile student Usmani, had also been implicated in the investigations leading up to the 
Kanpur Conspiracy Case), Sampurnanand published Samajvada (Socialism) in 1936. The 
book sought to reconcile a Marxist apparatus of analysis with the homage to the 
metaphysically absolute (that is, god) and establish socialism on the basis of the Vedas. To 
Sampurnanand, there was no essential difference between Marxist and Vedantic socialism, 
as the “practical programmes were very much the same.” Notwithstanding the Vedas’ caste-
based notions of social order, Sampurnanand saw “no need for Indian revolutionaries to take 
up cudgels against religion.”540 Even as he attacked the role ethics, god, religion, law, and 
the state were playing as “handmaids of the possessing class,” for him their truth lay 
elsewhere: While the dialectic processes as described by Marx operated in the material 
world, the Brahma of the Vedas was the ultimate reality. Consciousness was not determined 
by being, but belonged to an independent higher sphere.541  
Bhagwan Das, a theosophist and senior CSP activist, conceptualized a less theoretical 
variety of spiritual socialism, “ancient scientific socialism.” Manu’s postulates and the 
ancient Hindu ideals of his provenience were to provide the central virtues of a socialist 
society. As much a Hindu fundamentalist as a socialist reformer, he held that Hinduism’s 
errors and injustices had accrued to it over time—and not been at the core of Manu’s rigid 
and un-egalitarian laws. On the contrary, the application of original Hinduism’s “eternal 
principles” would give rise to a just society conforming to subcontinental humanity. 
Rejecting the abolition of the family, private property, and religion on the grounds that they 
constituted elementary human needs, he advocated their ‘correct’ application, and in 
Singaravelu’s vein deemed the founding figures of great faiths—among them Buddha and 
Christ—”true socialists.”542 
Although neither the CSP’s program nor its leadership officially endorsed such views, 
the red line separating the party’s socialism from traditional belief systems was appreciably 
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thinner than in the case of the communists, and at any rate more permeable. Highlighting the 
priorities of the party, N. G. Ranga, an eminent organizer of the All-India Kisan Sabha and a 
leading figure in the CSP, in late 1936 expressed the hope that the elected provincial 
governments to be formed after the 1937 elections would undertake “a determined attack 
through […] even social and religious means [!] upon the many and varied privileges of our 
vested interests.”543 
Still, the concrete handling of religion by both left-wing parties exhibited a large degree 
of congruence. It appeared as problematic mainly as a tool in the hands of the ruling class, 
not as a harmful cultural fetter, indicating that to a certain extent a “United Front” between 
both did already exist in this field.544 As yet, such parallels were eclipsed by the CPI’s 
adamant refusal to countenance cooperation with any bourgeois or moderately left outfit.  
It was only when another sea-change occurred at the VII Comintern congress in 1935 that 
the political conditions for more connective work were created. General Secretary Georgi 
Dimitrov’s report declared that the communist movement had committed a number of errors 
deserving the label “sectarianism,” concretely 
overestimating the revolutionization [sic!] of the masses [.…] The power of the traditional 
contacts between the masses and their organizations and leaders had been underestimated, and 
when the masses did not break off these contacts immediately, the attitudes taken towards them 
was just as harsh as that adopted towards their reactionary leaders.545  
Furthermore, slogans and tactics had been unduly generalized to the detriment of individual 
requirements for revolution in each country. This change in orientation stemmed from the 
realization that isolation from and opposition to bourgeois and social democratic parties had 
spelt disaster for the communist movement in many European countries and colonies alike. 
The new approach crystallized in the call to form “United Fronts” for the attainment of a 
minimum program with as broad a section of the political spectrum as possible.  
In subcontinental terms, where there was no threat of a fascist take-over, this meant 
forming broad coalitions in the struggle for independence. The pamphlet The Anti-
Imperialist People’s Front in India cast the new line in a programmatic shape. Tellingly for 
the time, not a single CPI member was involved in its drafting. Rather, the paper 
materialized after its authors, CPGB leaders Bradley and Dutt, had held consultations with 
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Nehru in Europe. Both became convinced that an involvement of communists in the INC 
would meet with sympathy on its left wing. Therefore, they re-recognized the Congress as 
the most important agency to seek national liberation.546 
Many regard the changes in the wake of the VII Congress as amounting to a “total 
break with the past”547 and having ushered in “a completely new chapter in the history of 
the communist party of India.”548 This is true insofar as the rehabilitation of the INC and 
moderate leftists opened up many avenues for involvement and cooperation and contributed 
handsomely to the rapid advances of the party in the following years. Through the CSP, the 
CPI began to operate under the umbrella of the INC. Its broad involvement transformed it 
into a serious political force, notably after its quasi-legalization in the provinces where 
Congress ministries took over after the 1937 elections. For example, fruits of the integrative 
policies ripened in Bombay, where the local INC unit came under communist influence. The 
latter’s popular fundament manifested in the 1938 municipal elections, when all communist 
candidates won by singularly large margins.549 
However, concerning the status of religion there were few immediate consequences, not 
least since the understanding of what constituted revolutionarity remained more or less 
unchanged. The new line merely broadened the selection of political agents deemed 
appropriate for alliances and the furtherance of the revolutionary will of the ‘masses.’ 
Despite the acceptance of bourgeois national independence as an intermediate step, the 
cultural content of the envisaged revolutionary transformation remained substantially 
unaffected. The turning point came only in the aftermath of the 1937 elections, when the 
framework established by the VII congress interacted with the CPI’s analysis of post-
election developments to bring about a caesura and initiate the communists’ cultural turn.  
The upward trend in the CPI’s fortunes was reflected organizationally as well. The 
disunited sections in Bengal, Madras, Bombay, and the Punjab assumed a more uniform 
appearance (not least due General Secretary P. C. Joshi’s indefatigable touring between the 
groups) as the CPI gradually began to function as a proper party. Following the CPI’s 
opening up, membership expanded quickly. Many imprisoned terrorists, notably from 
Bengal, had already joined in the first half of the 1930s, and further spread their ideas 
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among jailed activists of the civil disobedience movements. The Cannanore prison was a 
particularly fruitful point of exchange.550 
Notably the involvement in the CSP contributed to the broadening of the communist 
base. Communist strength manifested in the election of four communists into the party 
executive in 1937, among them Sajjad Zaheer from Lucknow and Namboodiripad. Two 
entire CSP provincial units—in Andhra and Malabar—were communist rather than socialist 
in outlook, which became apparent when both broke away upon the expulsion of the 
communists from the CSP in 1940. Surveillance agencies nervously corroborated the CPI’s 
ascendancy.551 
And yet, there was more to it. The resurging CPI of the late 1930s had changed from its old, 
pre-Meerut self in more ways than organization, connectivity, and correct replication of the 
Marxist vocabulary of the day. Beneath the turbulent history of the CPI in the decade after 
the VI Congress, a tectonic shift occurred in the communist conceptualization of society. 
“Tectonic,” because this shift was as fundamental as it seemed inevitable: If communist 
mobilization in the 1920s had at times been both close to and sympathetic towards political 
manifestations of religious radicalism and its identitary connotations, the communities 
proper had remained outside the communist categorical horizon. In contrast, by the end of 
the 1930s communists participated full-bloodedly in the debates on the status of Muslims in 
the future subcontinental polity. The next section retraces the path that lead there. 
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IV.2 Reworking the Mass Perspective 
 
IV.2.1 Enter ‘Community’ 
 
The VI Comintern congress had profoundly readjusted the coordinates for communist 
orientation. As the bourgeoisie was lumped into the imperialist camp as a whole, the 
‘masses’ were the only agency to fall back on to as the workers and their organizations 
alone represented too small a part of society. Accordingly, the ‘masses’ had been deemed 
ready for the “destruction of all relics of feudalism” and to end the “the yoke of various pre-
capitalist (feudal and semi-feudal) relationships” together with imperialist rule and capitalist 
exploitation in one fell stroke.552 This thrust manifested in pamphlets such as the 1934 
Manifesto of the Anti-Imperialist Conference, which summarily claimed workers, peasants, 
and the petty bourgeoisie for the revolution. All of these groups purportedly were “in 
constant conflict with reactionary forces of the old semi-feudal caste society.”553  
Yet, given the experiences of the past decade the ‘masses’ could not without further ado 
be fashioned into bourgeois society’s revolutionary ‘other’ anymore. The Manifesto’s rigid 
separation of traditional religiosity and culture from its social agents had become 
unsatisfying. It was as evidently counterfactual as it was obstructive to a truly mass-oriented 
policy. Communist publications themselves occasionally exhibited few illusions about “the 
strength of backward traditions […] and semi-feudal relationships and habits of the village 
life” among workers, that is, the “masses.”554 
The resulting tension between the drive towards social and national emancipation, and 
the concomitant banking on the “masses,” whose revolution this was to be after all—
positions being no less the CPI’s very raison d’être than populist expediency—on the one 
hand, and the occasional acknowledgement of the non-revolutionary, communalized reality 
on the ground on the other called for a resolution in an inclusive version of communism 
accommodating both. For the sake of viability, revolutionary perspectives had to appropriate 
mass sentiments and popular tenets instead of conflating them with reaction. In other words, 
paying due homage to religious ideologemes and communities in a non-reactionary manner 
was gaining urgency on the communist agenda.  
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Contemporary negotiations on the subcontinent’s political future greatly influenced the 
recognition awarded and the heightened role eventually conceded to indigenous religious 
collectives. Most important was the pivotal role allotted to British India’s communities and 
their ‘representative’ organizations during the deliberations at the three Round Table 
Conferences held in London between 1930 and 1932. Elevated into authoritative positions 
to frame a constitution for British India, community leaders directly molded the reforms that 
materialized in the 1935 Government of India Act. It provided for an extension of the 
franchise and envisioned limited provincial self-government in British India.555  
The deliberations inter alia resulted in the promulgation of the Communal Award. 
Heeding the demands of communal representatives, its core feature consisted in the 
introduction of separate electorates for a multitude of groups and communities, among them 
workers, women, Europeans, Muslims, Sikhs, and many more.556 Gandhi’s desperate 
attempt to ward off separate representation for the “depressed classes,” that is, the 
untouchables through a fast to death led to the hasty conclusion of the Poona Pact with the 
Depressed Classes Association under Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar. It arranged for the 
reservation of scheduled caste seats within the Hindu contingent. Otherwise, the award’s 
provisions were largely implemented. The debates sparked by the demands of the most 
vociferous communities—notably Muslims, Sikhs, and the scheduled castes—thoroughly 
affected the modalities of political articulation on the subcontinent.557  
In the face of this development, communist commentators directed their fire largely 
against the reforms’ significance for the continuation and stabilization of the British Raj. 
Bradley was among the few who condemned, if late and briefly, the principle of separate 
representation as one of “the most reactionary features of the New Constitution.”558 The 
indigenous party, however, already leaned towards a different pitch. The Joint Platform 
indicated accordance with communal compartmentalization and, indirectly, the category of 
‘community’ itself by demanding the application of the right to self-determination to all 
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“national minorities.” The latter expression resurrected Roy’s mid-1920s placeholder term 
for minority communities.559  
To be sure, there were certain distinctions. Besides calling for unspecified “abolition of 
all inequalities imposed by the old social-religious system,” the Platform explicitly 
demanded the expropriation of, among others, “churches.”560 Even in the hypothetical case 
that this was a deliberately sloppy formulation aimed at covering up the intention to target 
the property and privileges of all religious institutions, there still was a clear determination 
to at least appear committed to the conservation of ‘indigenous,’ presumably less 
objectionable ones. After all, the Platform didn’t demand the confiscation of lands of 
temples, mosques, or any ‘indigenous’ religious organization, although their holdings far 
exceeded those of Christian bodies. Similarly, the pamphlet singled out Christian 
missionaries as personae non gratae, condemning them as “direct agents of imperialism.”561 
The less domesticized approach of the CPI’s Calcutta unit, whose 1933 pamphlet The Indian 
Revolution and Our Task had called for the expropriation of temples and mosques as well, 
did not resonate in the party’s grand strategy.562 
The Comintern was similarly mindful of the need to proceed cautiously in matters of 
culture, although it refrained from direct affirmation at this stage. Its guidelines for 
mobilization among subcontinental workers recommended to “deprecate tactfully the 
influence of religion,” while most other injunctions chose a considerably ruder pitch 
(“denounce the capitalists,” etc.).563 Gopalan, quite probably the most popular of all 
communist leaders, later emphasized this point. Empathy and understanding were the way to 
go: “We must strive to understand fully the good and the bad points of [the workers’] lives. 
This should be accepted initially. After that, if the bad elements are pointed out, they will 
genuinely attempt to rectify them.”564 While Gopalan’s approach was ostensibly subject to 
the aim to convince the prospective revolutionary subject of the erroneousness of religious 
outlook, the “initial” concessions he envisaged rather evoke the impression that the journey 
had become the reward:  
Just as Bharatheeyan’s ashes, sandalwood-paste and chanting of the Geetha have helped the 
growth of the peasant movement, a comrade who argued against God’s existence in the peasant 
committee was able to wreck the local committee [….] Especially while working among the 
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middle classes, one had to be very careful. We had to convince our audiences that we shared the 
same ideals [!] and aspirations as they.565 
K. B. Krishna, a little-known party member from Andhra, in the early 1930s went one step 
further in approximating religious currents to the socialist cosmos: In a religious society 
molded by Brahmins, social movements “naturally” assumed a religious form. Buddhism, 
for instance, had represented a “social revolution” in its context, which was why (!) social 
revolution “took a religious turn.”566 From there, short-circuiting—rather than associating 
more loosely—communal assertions and social revolutionary aspirations was not far off. 
Krishna is an interesting case in that he represented the type of ‘new’ communism that 
was to achieve—and articulate—the movement’s situatedness under the increasing 
significance of community politics. In Krishna’s case, this occasioned a keener sense of 
ideological as apart from material motives, such as in his observations of “community-ism” 
at the Round Table Conferences. Even while emphasizing its petty bourgeois character as a 
struggle between “advanced and backward professional classes of different faiths,” Krishna 
was aware that the strife had developed a life of its own. After all, evident lack of success 
could not deter staunch communalists:  
The objects for which they sought communal representation were, and are, not realised by this 
device. But they did not care, because their interest in the removal of causes for which they 
pleaded protection was not keen. […] When once the principle was recognised, it was demanded 
more and more. Everything was looked upon from a communal view.567 
And yet, strikingly, Krishna saw no need for criticism, but ontologized this development as 
an essentially unproblematic part of the phenomenon called “India.” At any rate, it didn’t 
count among the Dangers of Indian Nationalism: Pondering whether and how India was a 
nation, Krishna reasoned in 1932 that in view of the many things in common between the 
two great religious communities, “on the whole religion lays more emphasis on unity than 
on diversity in India.” In Krishna’s perspective, this was a good thing regardless of the 
religious framework. And on the caste system he commented that however pernicious its 
social effects were, it also had advantages: “It absorbed all elements of the population under 
one fold. It maintained Indian traditions [!]. It made group life rich and varied [!!].”568 
This cynical phrasing revealed that Krishna found little fault with the existence of the 
old social order, which he viewed primarily as cultural glue holding together a body of 
“Indian traditions” worthy of protection. To be sure, no programmatic text of the CPI ever 
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openly endorsed his stances. Yet, they provide important clues to the currents of thought 
that would lead to the short-circuiting of national and religio-communal considerations in 
the 1940s occasioned by the gradual accommodation of the category of community in 
communist theorizing. This process centered on, but was not limited to, the subcontinent’s 
Muslims. 
 
 
IV.2.2 Approaching Islam 
 
In furtherance of certain strands in Bolshevik revolutionary tradition, subcontinental 
communist reservations against even remotely anti-imperialist and non-bourgeois assertions 
of Islam had ever been minor. As a matter of fact, this common characteristic constituted a 
bond between the CPI and the early Bolsheviks: Just as the penchant for linking communist 
anti-imperialism to Muslim identitary notions marking notably the Calcutta group’s 
approach in the early 1920s had been anticipated by the same, only greater penchant 
exhibited by early Soviet nationality policy, it was international communism’s organs that 
conserved the CPI’s claim to the appropriation of committedly Muslim political subjectivity 
at a time when the party itself was defunct. 
A Community of Resistance 
Thus, extremist nationalist-turned-communist émigré Virendranath Chattopadhyaya proved 
that he had grasped the gist of subcontinental communism in a series of reports in Inprecorr 
on the 1930 tribal revolt in the NWFP. The NWFP was a much-neglected backwater of 
British India without any appreciable amount of infrastructure or avenues for political 
participation. What little education work had been done had largely been taken up by 
religious dignitaries of the likes of Maulana Obeidullah Sindhi, whose influence emphasized 
Islam’s anti-British and anti-Western thrust. Accordingly, the formation of political will 
among the NWFP Pathans was firmly rooted in fundamentalist religious sentiments and 
aspirations from an early stage.569 
During the first civil disobedience movement in 1930, a wave of non-violent mass 
protest under the guidance of the “Frontier Gandhi,” Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, gripped 
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Pathan areas.570 According to Chattopadhyaya, their anti-British militancy elevated the 
Pathans above their reputation as “backward” and fanatical in matters of faith. He discerned 
a veritably “revolutionary” movement, whose characterization revealed much about 
Chattopadhyaya’s own notions of practical progressive transformation: Members of their 
organization, the “Red Shirts,” called themselves “‘Servants of God’. Recruits are sworn in 
on the Koran to follow the teachings of Islam, to live a pure and righteous life.” While he 
conceded that “these objects are anything but revolutionary,” both the “terrible economic 
conditions” and the low social position of the protesting population apparently went a long 
way to making amends. Thus, he commended for the volunteers marching from village to 
village, shouting “Inquilab zindabad” (“Long live the revolution”) and forming local 
committees. From there—despite, or even because of the yet strong “religious illusions” 
among the peasantry—, these “revolutionary activities” would eventually spread to Pathan 
army units, or so Chattopadhyaya hoped.571 
Et voilà a concrete example of an alternative to Gandhian civil disobedience more 
amenable to communist tastes in the Comintern’s sectarian “third period.” Little did it 
matter that the main ideological theme of the Red Shirts consisted in a “revival of the 
Muslim Pathan identity.”572 Despite the admission of non-revolutionarity, communist 
reflexes worked, and sensed revolution whenever Muslims raised radical, anti-colonial 
slogans. Chattopadhyaya’s assessment remained uncontested even decades later when 
Namboodiripad nostalgically harked back to the virtues of “an entire people [the Pathans] 
rising against imperialism.” Their ethno-cultural merits shone in comparison to the INC’s 
bourgeois civil disobedience.573  
The subtle appeal of the ‘Muslim option’ permeated even communist commentaries 
detached from subcontinental day-to-day politics, such as ex-muhajir Rahmat Ali’s treatise 
on communalism. Published in 1933 as his PhD thesis at the Sorbonne, it opted for a direct 
class approach, stipulating that inter-communal conflicts occurred only where class and 
religious constellations coincided, and chose his examples accordingly—in the main 
Kashmir, the (eastern) Punjab, and east Bengal. There, as well as in most cities, a Hindu 
stratum of moneylenders, landlords, and bourgeois confronted a substantial “élément 
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musulman” concentrated in the dispossessed workforce, the service industry, and among 
poor peasants and tenants.574  
Although he also included opposite constellations, Rahmat Ali’s conclusions led him 
away from an impartial assessment. While his tendency to identify the socially 
disadvantaged position with Muslims largely corresponded to subcontinental reality, his 
sympathetic comments on the identitary moves of the Muslim bourgeoisie recalled Tatar 
Muslim communist Mirsaid Sultangaliev’s designation of “Muslim peoples” as “proletarian 
peoples”: As they supposedly had reason to fear their demise, the Muslim bourgeois “ne 
firent que leur devoir” by insisting on communal safeguards. To Rahmat Ali, it was 
perfectly understandable that they had aligned themselves with pauperized Muslim 
intellectuals and the peasants exploited by Hindu moneylenders for the realization of their 
class aims in communal terms.575 Similar empathy for processes of communalization were 
absent in his references to Parsees, Sikhs, and of course Hindus—not surprising for 
someone who had deemed the quran as the “history of the revolution” from an early stage in 
his political career.576 
 
Ahrar Socialism 
Before the rise of the Muslim League, the Ahrar movement provided the best link for 
rooting communist themes in the Muslim field. With the united front policy emphasizing 
broad anti-imperialist alliances from 1935, the Ahrars counted among the formations 
eligible for support as they were deemed to vent progressive aspirations of broad population 
strata.  
The Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam (League of Freedom-Loving Muslims) had been founded in 
1930 by Muslim nationalists from the Punjab. The Ahrars’ aims were to liberate India from 
British domination while avoiding a “Hindu raj.” Instead, they envisioned an “Islamic 
system” for Muslims, and demanded the Muslim community’s material uplift. The Ahrar 
agenda also called for equal distribution of wealth, the abolition of untouchability, universal 
respect for religion, and freedom for practicing sharia law. Clearly, the Ahrar leaders 
“concentrated their political energies on the defense of Islam.”577 
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Accordingly, Ahrar campaigns exhibited a clear religious list. For example, Ahrars 
participated in the “Muslim Bazaar Campaign,” which called for villagers to supply 
themselves at Muslim shops only, and mobilized Muslims against the Hindu village elite. 
They also staged campaigns against social evils such as dowry and untouchability, both of 
which they by and large associated with Hindu culture. “In their doctrinal training, the MAI 
[Majli-i-Ahrar-i-Islam] […] strictly followed Sharia’t.” Their stance towards deviations 
from Sunni Islam was harsh: Shias, Ahmadis, and more liberal and inclusive Muslims such 
as Jinnah were victims of Ahrar ostracism.578  
However, the Ahrars had something to offer to the communists. Their flag was red with 
a white crescent and star upon it, an obvious aesthetic similarity to the CPI’s own red-white 
hammer-and-sickle banner. Hierarchy in the MAI was strict and centralized. Another area of 
agreement between Ahrar Islam and communism was the movement’s pronounced 
egalitarianism. Since many of the MAI leaders came from lower social strata, socialist ideas 
held considerable attraction for them. According to Awan, the Ahrars even “had a vague 
idea of class struggle and the orthodox Marxist ideology.”579  
As the Majlis-i-Ahrar received communist blessings as an agent of mass progress, it 
garnered communist sympathy beyond what had hitherto been allotted to Muslim 
organizations. In the Punjab, CPI and Ahrars joined in an alliance with the INC and the CSP 
to contest the 1937 elections. The Ahrars’ call to Muslim workers at Kanpur to support the 
1937 and 1938 general strikes elevated them considerably in communist opinion. A certain 
Yusuf—a leading Kanpur trade union activist and CPI member popularly known as “the 
‘Maulana’”580—commended the Ahrars as a “Left Muslim organization” with a positive 
influence on the workforce.581 National Front, the CPI’s organ in the late 1930s, included 
them among “progressive Muslim political organizations” seeking to integrate Muslims into 
the national movement. After the outbreak of the war, CPI publications praised them for 
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their anti-enlistment campaigns among Muslims. Already in 1937, Ahrars and communists 
had cooperated to the same effect in the League against Fascism and War.582 
In these admittedly scattered but representative (if only for the lack of critical) 
references, the Ahrars figured as an ally in key political areas. The religious and communal 
dimensions of the movement were by no means problematic. It is an indicator for the 
intermediate period of accommodation of ‘community’ in the mid-1930s that the Ahrar 
campaigns’ Muslim framework went unheeded in communist commentaries. This pointed to 
an emerging alternative take on the matter—a non-problematic view on Muslim communal 
assertions—gradually manifesting itself in communist diction.” Far from a negative attribute 
attached to community-based formations in opposition to communist notions of society, the 
attribute “Muslim” came to be used ever more frequently in a neutral, purely descriptive 
sense. A communist viewpoint was increasingly prepared to countenance the inclusion of 
not merely Muslims, but a Muslim entity in both its social utopian vision and the short-term 
goal of building a comprehensive national community.583 
However, political constellations on the subcontinent had not yet developed to a point to let 
principled support of Muslim communal aspirations appear as a historical necessity. Other 
options remained viable paths. This is illustrated, for example, by the avid communist 
support to the Congress’s “Muslim Mass Contact Campaign” in 1937/38. It had been 
devised by Nehru and INC strategist K. M. Ashraf in the wake of the 1937 provincial 
elections, where the Congress had emerged victorious, winning 711 out of a total of 1585 
assembly seats and an absolute majority in five provinces out of eleven. Even if the results 
in Muslim constituencies were meagre—it had managed to win only 26—, the Muslim 
League had tallied only 109 of the 482 reserved for Muslims and was a far cry from being 
the representative of Muslim opinion it aspired to be.584 
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The INC’s left wing claimed the victory. It had been on the ascent since the mid-1930s, 
borne out by the election of the left candidates Jawarhalal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose 
as INC presidents in 1936, and 1938 and 1939, respectively. Notably Nehru’s tenure had 
initiated an appreciable change in the Congress’s agenda and appearance (if not necessarily 
politics) towards a socialist, and also more determinedly nationalist profile. Encouraged by 
the success of a leftist program in the general constituencies, many in the Congress sensed 
the opportunity to finally rally the subcontinent’s Muslims to the national mainstream: By 
appealing to them to support the INC’s social and economic reforms in the provinces where 
it formed the ministries. 
 Accordingly, the Congress refused to form coalition governments with the landlord-
backed ML and initiated a broad campaign to win over Muslim peasants, workers, and petit-
bourgeois, whom the League regarded as its own constituency. Sympathizing with its aims 
and similarly relying on the pull of a progressive agenda, the CPI supported Muslim Mass 
Contact. Yet, it resulted in failure for two main reasons: Not only did the League respond 
with the development of an assertive, identitary, and populist Muslim image, but also did 
Congress ministries everywhere fail to deliver on the promised reforms in the agrarian and 
labor sectors. Sarkar aptly summarizes that “secularist and radical rhetoric [of the INC’s 
campaign] in the end merely alarmed Muslim vested interests without winning over the 
Muslim masses.”585 
At any rate, the communists’ active involvement was not as principally opposed to the 
recognition of Muslims as a separate and distinct ‘national’ minority as it may seem. Nor 
was switching over from one to another hectic, irrational, or arbitrary. After all, both 
approaches had been attempts to solve the underlying problem: The CPI’s identification of 
political ‘backwardness’ among Muslims and their accordingly “reactionary communal 
leadership” had ever hinged primarily not on a lack of unity with Hindus or the mainstream 
national movement, but on the perceived absence of a strong anti-imperialist current among 
the Muslim organizations. Unity beyond communal lines was a secondary consideration, not 
least because the collective practice of anti-imperialism itself promised to provide a firm 
ground for unity. Therefore, it seems plausible that the CPI would eventually be prepared to 
campaign in unilateral support of emphatically Muslim anti-imperialism—even once it was 
clear that the INC’s inclusive take on national unity had failed. 
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Outside the CPI’s immediate purview, this transformation of community identity and 
politics into vehicles of progress had materialized as early as summer 1938. In the midst of 
the Sino-Japanese war, New Age published an article praising “the Chinese Muslims” as a 
bulwark against Japanese expansionism. It emphasized their full-blooded Muslimness, and 
raved that they had “been living a life very much unto themselves, preserving intact their 
customs, traditions and rituals which their ancestors brought with them from the Near East 
1,300 years ago.” Evidently swayed by collective traditionalism, New Age held the fact 
“noteworthy” that one of Chiang Kai-Shek’s generals was a “staunch Mohammedan.”586  
Such assessments form a contrast to the as yet more cautious identitary praise of other 
indigenous communities, such as the Sikhs. On the occasion of the release of a number of 
Babbar Akalis from prison in 1938, Sohan Singh Josh hailed their revolt of the early 1920s 
as “open rebellion against British imperialism” that—as Josh felt the need to emphasize—
had had no truck with communalism, particularism, or religious reaction whatsoever.587 Yet 
even if the opposite had been the case: The strand in subcontinental communism that short-
circuited manifestations of grass-roots communalism with progressive motives was still very 
much alive. Ajoy Kumar Ghosh acknowledged that his identification of an “urge for liberty 
[…] as strong as in […] British India” in the princely states rested on the activity of 
“communal movements.” Still, he declared them to be basically “economic and political in 
character,” aspirations simply “diverted into communal channels by reactionaries.” In 
contrast, his criticism was directed at Gandhi for hamstringing Congress support to such 
movements.588  
 
 
 
IV.3 The Reversal of Communalism 
 
In 1937, a certain M. N. Roy published The Historical Role of Islam. The treatise considered 
Muslims an integral part of the “Indian nation” and Islam itself of “immense revolutionary 
significance” with “great cultural consequences.” Roy’s positive assessment rested on the 
premise that by way of its “irrationalism par excellence” it had “destroyed the basis of all 
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religions,” including its own.589 Nevertheless, his attacks on “disgusting” Hinduism coupled 
with praise of Islam’s tolerance and Muslims’ noble demeanor in conquest went down well 
with Muslim intellectuals about to politically assert their religious identity.590 Following the 
treatise and his break with the INC in 1939, which he (much like Jinnah) accused of 
fascism, Roy’s prestige among Muslim intellectuals had risen to considerable levels by the 
early 1940s. This materialized in frequent invitations to lecture at conferences of Muslim 
organizations in order to “inspire the Muslims […] with your inspiring ideals, ideas and 
personality […] in the interest of and [sic!] Islam.”591 It was only consequent, then, for him 
to consider the League “not a communal but a genuine anti-imperialist organization.”592  
To the contemporary communist press, Roy’s appraisals were a testimony to his 
ongoing betrayal of the revolution.593 This could hardly have been otherwise as Roy had 
been a renegade to “official” communism for close to a decade. Then again, the transition of 
the CPI to a thoroughly positive appreciation of Muslim culture and ‘national’ community 
formation had not yet been completed. For this to happen, four preconditions had to be 
fulfilled, all but one growing out of the fast-changing constellations on the subcontinent 
after the 1937 elections: The rise of the Muslim League, the related shift in the communist 
perception of communalism, the ML’s adaptation of a nationalist agenda, and the sea-
change in the CPI’s stance towards the war after Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 
1941. Coupled with the party’s theoretical tradition, these developments would converge in 
the ‘nationality period’ of the 1940s. 
The first precondition was the Muslim League’s rapid increase in membership, organization, 
and political weight after the 1937 elections. If it had been all but extinct throughout the 
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better part of the 1930s with All-India membership at a low four-digit number, and further 
devastated by a catastrophic performance in the elections, the sustained turn towards 
assertive Muslim identity politics occasioned an astronomical rise in the League’s prestige 
and following. The All-India 1938 Patna session committed it to independence and 
introduced a new pitch of far-reaching communal demands coupled with acerbic attacks on 
the Congress, culminating in the call of “Islam in danger.” Soon, Jinnah’s public 
appearances drew more people than even the khilafat campaign at its height, with a 
procession of four kilometers greeting his arrival at the 1938 ML regional session in Sind. 
Nehru admitted grudgingly that for the first time in its history, the League had won the 
support of substantial population segments and developed into a mass organization.594  
This development attracted the communists’ keen interest—not only because it raised 
concerns about the subcontinent’s political future (or rather: augured the failure of the 
Congress vision of an Indian nation), but also because of the new dimension of mass 
politicization of Muslims: As the outcast Roy had put it, ‘bad’ or reactionary philosophy 
could not give birth to a progressive social program attractive to the broad population.595 
The increasing support of the “downtrodden masses” signified that the ML’s agenda met 
their needs. Together with the lingering communist attraction to Islam’s perceived strand of 
resistancy, this formed a powerful allure. 
The second precondition evolved in response to the ML’s phenomenal ascent, which 
triggered a process of fundamental transformation in the communist assessment of minority 
communalism and its political agents manifesting in a streak of innovative texts on the 
matter in the party press of the late 1930s. Initially, the question of cultural consciousness 
surfaced anew, enabling Ranadive to arrive at a remarkable admission: “The communal 
outlook cannot be blown up by a mere championing of economic demands.” Furthermore, 
the religious cleavage was centuries old; its legacy went on reproducing itself even without 
bourgeois interference. As yet convinced of the redeeming, universally secular quality of 
mainstream nationalism, Ranadive attacked the Congress strategy of limited cession to 
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communal demands: “The existing policy of communal appeasement only stimulates the 
disruptive tendencies.”596 
Yet, the skeptical thrust of Ranadive’s position—echoed in exhortations on the grass-
roots level to steer clear from bigots and landowners as assembled in the ML597—proved 
untenable for ‘productive’ policy formation. With the Congress and the League negotiating 
for an anti-British pact in June 1939, the tenor in National Front reflected the fast-changing 
communist stance towards Muslims. Instead of exclusive community formation on the part 
of the minority, it was the outlook and “atmosphere” underlying the Congress’s inclusive 
nationalism that increasingly came under fire: “It cannot be too strongly emphasised that 
without removing from the Congress its semi-religious ideology and atmosphere, it is not 
possible to overcome the hostility of a large section of Muslims.”598 Now the INC was 
criticized for not doing enough to remove Muslim anxieties. Just one week later after the 
breakdown of INC-ML talks, Ghosh pushed the evaluative change further by demanding “a 
bold declaration by the Congress […] to concede to the Muslims their communal demands.” 
It was no longer viable to deny the ascent of the Muslim League, which—purportedly under 
pressure from its new mass base—was fast becoming an anti-imperialist force, to a crucial 
factor on the subcontinental political stage. Under these circumstances, a united front with 
the League could be a “weapon for checking communal disorders and for immediately 
drawing even those Muslim masses which were still under communal influence into active 
political struggle.”599  
Ghosh’s own earlier meditations had spearheaded this shift. Already in September 
1938, he had problematized the ML’s “reactionary” character as an ally of imperialism, 
while the “Muslim masses” had essentially gone over to anti-imperialism. That they had not 
joined the mainstream national movement was a cultural problem on the INC’s part: Ghosh 
considered not the INC’s subservience to capitalist interests, but its “communal outlook” the 
chief obstacle to a rapprochement with Muslims. This outlook manifested in ostensibly 
degrading practices such as the use of the address “Shri” for Muslims. In this, he 
demonstrated a degree of cultural sensitivity reminiscent of early 21st-century identity 
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politics and called for “purging the Congress completely of Hindu atmosphere” and “going 
more than half way to meet the communal demands of the Muslims.”600 
The logic of this approach entailed a reconsideration of the principled opposition to 
those earlier termed “Muslim communalists.” Leaguers increasingly lost their pariah status 
in communist circles. For instance, Hasrat Mohani, expelled from the CPI in 1927 because 
of his ML membership, was elected to the Kanpur Mazdoor Sabha’s general council on a 
communist ticket in 1938—while head of the local League. In the same year, the CPI also 
endorsed Mohani’s candidature for the Congress Working Committee, and refuted the 
CSP’s allegations of a “communist-communalist alliance”: Mohani was defended as a 
veteran trade union activist with a comprehensive record of united working-class 
organization.601 
In the same proportion as communist perception of communalism changed the need to 
cater to perceived Muslim group sentiments increased. National Front went ahead to 
demonstrate the latter’s desirable extent: Ghosh’s contribution mentioned above had been 
furnished with a caricature showing British imperialism setting its Muslim League dog on 
the Congress cat. A few issues later, the paper supplied a wordy excuse, apologizing for 
having hurt Muslim religious sentiments by casting “their” political organization into an 
avatar considered unclean in Islam: “We sincerely regret the pain we may have caused to 
some of our readers through our ignorance.”602 The difference to the mid-1920s is telling: 
While in the case of religious provocation on the part of Calcutta activist Abdul Kader a 
public rebuke by a prominent non-communist had been needed to silence him, communism 
of the late 1930s had acquired a sufficient degree of empathy to indulge in ready self-
criticism upon the self-admission of violation of Muslim feelings. 
In his 1939 pamphlet Communal Unity, Ghosh averred the need for an extensive 
catering to what he viewed as Muslim interests: 
It must never be forgotten that the Congress has to go out of its way to win the confidence of 
Muslims. Special efforts must be made to enable the Muslims to grow [!] their cultural and 
general backwardness. Muslim grievances with regard to cow slaughter, music before mosques, 
etc. etc., wherever they exist should be immediately remedied.603  
Ghosh’s ambiguous use of “grow” probably revealed more about the thrust of his 
suggestions than he was aware of. It was only the INC that needed to relinquish its “Hindu 
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outlook” and abandon all “semi-religious ceremonies at Congress functions. […] Nothing 
must be done which in any way hurts the sentiments of the Muslims.” All INC publications 
ought to appear in Hindi and Urdu alike, indicating that the communists had grasped that the 
issue had long outgrown its religious limits and developed into a culturally comprehensive 
confrontation. Yet, even such a “correct approach […] is not enough.” It was to be 
complemented by the consequent implementation of a pro-peasant program convincing the 
Muslim farmers of their economic and political congruence with their “Hindu brothers.”604 
Ghosh has to be credited with at all reiterating the communist materialist agenda. Even 
so, the hierarchical inversion in his line of argument is significant. Materialist criticism no 
longer formed the starting point; it had become an adjunct to a policy of communal 
placation. It further unfolded as the frame of reference of communist campaign politics 
gradually shifted towards an emphasis on collectives defined by culture (as in ‘nationality’) 
as against those of class. In the process of theoretical churning occasioned by the rapid 
developments on the political stage, the sustained discovery of Muslim politics also worked 
to erode the classical dichotomy between (the League) leadership and mass following. Even 
while the former was under the sway of groups “afraid of democracy, afraid of mass 
organization, afraid of mass struggle,” guest contributor S. Mahmudazaffar urged in 
National Front that it was high time the communists took the League seriously: 
As a matter of fact it is patently wrong to characterize the League to-day as a reactionary 
organisation. And the more we do so, the more we shall drive the Muslim masses away from the 
anti-imperialist struggle. The Muslim League is to-day a genuine mass organisation. The 
Muslim masses believe that they have to win their independence from British Imperialism 
and from Hindu capitalism. It is our job to draw them into our struggle and clarify their 
political formulation. This cannot be done if we continue to insult the Muslim masses by 
calling them reactionaries, […] if we continue to deny them the right to organise, if we 
continue to neglect their livelihood, their languages, their education, their culture.605  
This was a far cry from the long-time derogatory stance that had brushed aside the League 
as having been founded “on the advice of government,”606 and until recently attacked it for 
its “openly and aggressively splitting tactics.”607 Then again, the ML had not yet disposed 
over a mass following, which changed only with the shift to aggressive communal assertion 
in its politics. Nevertheless, in communist eyes the sheer size of its flock ennobled the 
League—reactionary as it might appear upon first glance—to the rightful representative of 
“true” mass aspirations. The space for its criticism shrank in proportion as the 
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accommodation of political, cultural, and downright communal expressions of the “Muslim 
masses” successively became part of the communist project responding not to subjective 
willfulness, but to the objective compulsions of history. 
Alongside the League’s reevaluation, the emphasis on “culture” formed the most 
striking feature of Mahmudazaffar’s contribution. It explicated what had so far been only 
implicit: An affirmative approach to Muslim culture as a factor in its own right; and it was 
not a coincidence that it was Mahmudazaffar who went ahead with its formulation. He had 
been a founding member of the Progressive Writers’ Association (PWA), set up in 1936 as a 
literary organization of writers and poets with socialist and communist leanings. Many of its 
members were sympathetic towards or active in the CPI, most prominently Sajjad Zaheer 
(1905–1973), who rose to eminent positions in both bodies. Like Zaheer, Mahmudazaffar 
hailed from the upper strata of Lucknow’s respectable ashraf community, but while he 
didn’t immerse himself in party politics, both ultimately converged in their interpretation of 
the PWA’s cultural agenda.608  
Superficially, the latter seemed unfit to relate to collective religious revivalism in any 
sympathetic way. On the contrary, unlike much of mainstream nationalism and its socialist 
and communist incarnations the PWA didn’t content itself with the simple Manicheism of a 
struggle between a ‘good’ suppressed nation and exploited ‘masses’ on the one hand and 
‘evil’ foreign oppressors, landlords, and capitalists on the other. The progressive writers’ 
horizon recognized the need to counter “reactionary and revivalist tendencies on questions 
like family, religion, sex, war and society.”609 The criticism of colonialists and exploiters 
was to be matched by a cultural critique of indigenous society.  
This approach has led some to stipulate that at its heart the PWA was not just 
areligious, but bitterly opposed to every form and practice of religion, let alone politicized 
one, as an effluence of superstition and backwardness.610 Yet, the founding manifesto’s 
definition of “progress” contained loopholes for modernized communal mass formations. 
Even though writers were to wage a literary struggle against “social backwardness,” their 
prime task consisted in expressing “the changes taking place in Indian life.” The elaboration 
of this statement emphasized its vitalist and even decisionist connotations: “All that drags us 
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down to passivity, inaction and unreason we reject as reactionary. All that arouses in us the 
critical spirit, which examines institutions and customs in the light of reason, which helps us 
to act, to organise ourselves, to transform, we accept as progressive.”611  
To what extent these formulations lent themselves to their apparent antithesis—a 
separatist mass movement based on communal identity—, Mahmudazaffar and, later, 
Zaheer would demonstrate themselves. In line with the communist editors, the former’s 
contribution to National Front deemed it self-evident to bless the actual political “changes 
[…] in Indian life” with the “light of reason,” with the object in question being an 
appreciably active, self-organized movement of Muslim religious and ‘national’ awakening. 
On the same token, he paid homage to the “customs” of Islam and to the creed as an 
“institution.” It was precisely the left’s vanguard on the literary and cultural front that 
supplied the CPI’s vocabulary for its looming plunge into full-blooded religio-cultural 
affirmation. 
Again, in order to integrate assertions of Muslimness into the political discourse and 
soften their edge, concessions on the INC’s part were the way to go. The rationale behind 
this approach was intriguing and revealed a peculiar adaptation of Hegelian dialectics: 
Mahmudazaffar stipulated that the League would abandon its communal stance only if its 
mass base grasped its erroneousness—a development apparently best fostered by prodding 
the INC to placate the ML, that is, convincing Muslims of the falseness of their leaders’ 
demands by supporting them.612 
The third major prerequisite for the transformation of the communist perception of 
communalism was the adoption of a nationalist paradigm by the ML in 1940. While 
undeniably also a “bargaining chip” in the League’s struggle for the recognition as 
representative of collective Muslim interests on an All-India level, the notion of a separate 
“national” Muslim identity was not an opportunist ad-hoc invention. On the contrary, 
different versions had long enjoyed a measure of popularity among Muslim intellectuals. 
Eminent among them was the poet Mohammed Iqbal, who as president of the ML’s 1930 
session had first articulated the idea that the “life of Islam as a cultural force […] largely 
depends on its centralisation in a specified territory.”613  
However, it was only in the wake of the 1937 provincial elections that Muslim 
separatism could assume a concrete political shape. Still from a position of marginality, the 
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League’s 1937 Patna session had sounded the attack on the INC, with Jinnah accusing the 
Congress of systematically destroying Muslim culture wherever it formed the 
government.614 This new pitch reflected vigorous contemporary discussions among the 
Muslim elites on questions of federation and separatism. In March 1939, Liaquat Ali Khan, 
one of Jinnah’s lieutenants, voiced the opinion that British India could be divided “in a 
suitable manner” if “Hindus and Moslems cannot live amicably in any other way.”615 
Abetted by the INC’s failure to implement an egalitarian social agenda, the identitary and 
radically anti-Congress slogans considerably enhanced the League’s standing beyond its 
traditional upper-class constituency. Its position further improved after the outbreak of the 
war, when it signaled to the government its readiness to maintain peace and stability if 
Muslim demands were met. Viceroy Linlithgow accordingly declared that “full weight 
would be given to [the Muslims’] views and interests” in any negotiations on the 
subcontinent’s political future.616 
Whatever Jinnah’s motives were: Before the background of British support and the 
Congress’s refusal to negotiate on his terms he decided to push ahead by expounding the 
“two-nation-theory” at the League’s Lahore session in March 1940: “It has always been 
taken for granted mistakenly that the Musalmans are a minority [….] The Musalmans are 
not a minority. The Musalmans are a nation by any definition.”617 Hinduism and Islam were 
not so much religions as different models of social organization. The resolution demanded 
the constitution of “geographically contiguous units” to be  
demarcated into regions which should be so constituted […] that the areas in which the Muslims 
are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be 
grouped to constitute ‘Independent States’ in which the constituent units shall be autonomous 
and sovereign.618 
As against a politically centralized India, this solution would enable both communities to 
live each according to their ways. Even though the resolution made no mention of religion 
(or Islamic law for that matter), and fundamentalist Muslims continued to attack Jinnah and 
the League as irreligious, its identitary tenor left few doubts about its inclination. Jinnah 
called on Muslims to organize “as servants of Islam,” had reiterated the importance of 
Islamic law back at Patna, and exhorted them to “observe Islamic simplicity on all social 
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occasions, and to abandon all un-Islamic ceremonies and customs.”619 Even so, this was a 
significant approximation to a communist system of coordinates. The articulation of 
religious identity in national (and, therefore, anti-imperialist) terms not only connected to 
the CPI’s united front line, but also to the strand in South Asian communist thought that 
long—and with increased vigor since the late 1930s—had viewed inter-communal conflicts 
as a problem of “national minorities.”  
Typically for the odd game of contrasts characterizing much of the political activity of 
the Congress and the CPI since the civil disobedience movements, the INC’s response went 
down an entirely different path. It refused to take Jinnah and the Muslim League seriously—
Nehru deemed the communal cleavage “a side issue [that] can have no real meaning in the 
larger scheme of things.”620 Hence, the ML’s political project asserted itself outside the 
Congress grasp. During the war, the League formed ministries in a number of provinces 
where INC-led governments had resigned, and kept on winning by-elections for Muslim 
seats. The persistent increase in the League’s standing among Muslims embarrassed the 
Congress approach and revealed that it had no recipe to address the challenge.  
The last piece in the mosaic that completed the transformation in the communist perception 
of communalism was provided by the fundamental change in the evaluation of WWII after 
Nazi Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union. In the first war years, the CPI had staunchly 
opposed the “second imperialist war” (Molotov).621 Capitalizing on Linlithgow’s “tactless 
obstinancy [sic!]”622 of slighting the Congress upon bringing India into the war, the CPI 
severely criticized the INC’s initial line of extending moderate support to the war effort 
even while its provincial ministries had resigned in protest. The confirmation of the 
Congress position in the March 1940 Ramgarh resolution met with vocal resistance from the 
communists, who called for an immediate mass upheaval against British rule. Accordingly, 
Ramgarh initiated a period of repression of the CPI under the Defence of India Rules.623 
Although once again exposed to a government clampdown, the party’s consisted call to 
utilize the war crisis for national independence won it a measure of sympathy in wider 
                                                 
619 Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan 2:324, 339 (quotes); see also Patrick French, Liberty or Death. India’s 
Journey to Independence and Division (London: HarperCollins 1997), 125. 
620 Singh, The Origins of the Partition, 1. On the incompatibility of the INC’s and ML’s visions for an 
independent subcontinent, see French, Liberty or Death, 112–13, 134, 223; Sarkar, Modern India, 408; see 
also Chandra, History of Modern India, 319. 
621 Quoted in Roy, The Communist International (Bombay: 1943), 59–60. 
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nationalist circles. However, this was to undergo a sustained change in the wake of the 1941 
Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. Contrary to its earlier advice to sabotage war efforts, the 
Comintern now called on its affiliate parties to help increase war production of the Allies. 
This was a tough nut to swallow for many communists, especially in the colonies. Under 
pressure from both the Comintern and its ‘mentor,’ the CPGB, the CPI could not maintain 
its anti-war stance for long.624  
Accordingly, the Politbureau’s December 1941 resolution initiated a U-turn and 
heralded a phase of communist efforts to maintain political and industrial peace, for which 
the CPI was rewarded with legalization in July 1942. Notwithstanding the comrades’ 
considerable agony, the party’s commitment was now unequivocal: The war had become a 
“people’s war” against fascism, the “worst form of imperialism.” The subcontinent would 
liberate itself by participating in and helping win the war. National unity was the need of the 
hour; the CPI exhorted the Congress to resume the provincial ministries and form a united 
front with the League.625 This latter provision contained the missing piece in the rebranding 
of communal particularism as ‘Muslim nationalism’: The CPI could hardly prod the INC to 
recognize the League as an equal if it did not do so itself, and if the Congress counted as a 
movement with legitimate national aspirations, so did the League. Thus, the peculiar post-
1941 constellation made it plausible for the party to acknowledge programmatically what 
had dominated communist meditations on the communal question since the late 1930s. 
 
 
Synopsis of Chapter IV 
 
The period from 1928 to the late 1930s witnessed a profound change in the CPI’s political 
and cultural situatedness. The party’s political language became current in the idioms of 
(religious) ‘community’ alongside, and even superseding, those of ‘class.’ A number of 
factors had fueled the transition. First, the realization that an exclusive focus on the 
categories of class and even nation had failed to resonate on a sufficient scale. This was the 
case especially in the countryside: The Workers’ and Peasants’ Parties had been virtually 
eclipsed by the time of their dissolution in the wake of the VI Comintern congress. Second, 
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the communist approach to religion had proven out of congruence with subcontinental 
society. The programmatic Western failure to acknowledge the formative influence of 
religious ideologemes seemed at odds with the established modes of policy articulation. And 
third, the Comintern’s 1935 shift to the united front line had opened up avenues for 
substantiating these insights politically. The Congress Socialist Party, an important host 
organization for the communists, set examples for the amalgamation of religious and radical 
left-wing ideologemes—tendencies reciprocated in the CPI by the meditations of K.B. 
Krishna and others. 
The 1937 elections resulted in efforts by the Muslim League to rally Muslims under the 
banner of an increasingly ‘nationalized’ separate Muslim identity. The CPI responded with a 
fundamental reappraisal of the communal problem as a nationality problem. Under the 
“people’s war” line from 1941 onwards, new political imperatives (namely inner peace to 
help the war effort) finalized this shift. Therefore, the transformation in the CPI’s appraisal 
of communalism—now an essentially justified proto-nationalist sentiment—constituted a 
situated response to domestic and international developments. The latter converged with 
inner-party strands of thought and theory traditions committed to acknowledging and 
accommodating existing patterns of ‘mass’ outlook. The result was by no means illogical 
within a subcontinental communist universe. This turn substantially affected and 
simultaneously explicated what communism was to mean in a subcontinental context: The 
resolution of the tension between Eastern accommodation and Western rejection of religious 
categories as authoritative instances of community formation in favor of the former. This 
implicated abandoning a culturally transformative social vision.  
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V The Communist French New Wave. Nationality, 
Community, and Culture 
 
V.1 Integral Revolution 
 
No Muslim can look us in the face and say that we have not 
suffered and fought for his cause more than he has himself. 
—P. C. Joshi626 
V.1.1 Pakistan and Indian National Disunity 
 
The release of communist cadres in May 1942 and the party’s legalization two months later 
profoundly enhanced its scope for intervention and political activism, even if only under the 
self-ordained restriction of supporting the war effort. Nevertheless, CPI membership rose 
sharply—from a low four-digit number in 1942 to several tens of thousands five years later, 
excluding front organizations.627 Communist fortunes also profited from the INC’s 
disappearance from the political stage for the remainder of the war after its ban following 
the August 1942 “Quit India” resolution. The communists opposed it tooth and nail, 
claiming that the movement was “NOT a struggle for National Govt. or for freedom. It is a 
provocative attempt by the bureaucracy to plunge the country into an orgy violence, 
lawlessness, and anarchy.”628 Statements along these lines created wide-spread hostility 
among Congressites and contributed to the post-war rupture between INC and CPI. 
For the time being, the CPI did its best to fill the resulting gap with its own brand of 
nationalist politics: The first ever spell of legal communist activity on subcontinental soil 
was also the first period marked by a self-confidently “indigenous” policy under the 
prevailing “people’s war” line. More precisely, the groundwork done on the acceptability of 
collective Muslim religious and cultural demands in the late 1930s could now blossom into 
the sustained short-circuiting of all sorts of national and religious aspirations in the 1940s. 
The cornerstones of the new line, officially enacted in September1942, had already been 
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627 Available studies differ considerably. Franda’s estimate is among the most conservative ones with 1,000 in 
1942 and 20,000 five years later: Franda, “Radical Policies in West Bengal,” 190–1. Gopal Singh goes with 
the CPI’s own claim to 25,000 members in 1944: Singh, Politics of Sikh Homeland, 124. Maitra puts 
memebership at 15,000 by 1943 and 30,000 at the end of the war: Maitra, Marxism in India, 198. On the upper 
end of the spectrum, Kutsobin sees the membership rise from 4,000 in 1940 to 80,000 in 1945: Kutsobin, Ajoy 
Kumar Ghosh, 41, 55. 
628 Fight Anarchy Rally the People, WBIB File 854/36 SL 213/1936, 132. An overview of the movement and 
its repression is provided by Sarkar, Modern India, 388–405.  
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laid down during illegality. An October 1940 conference of leftist students imagined 
independent India as a “voluntary association of regional states.”629 The October 1941 Party 
Letter envisaged that in a free India, all nationalities (15 were explicitly mentioned, among 
them Tamils, Oriyas, Gujaratis, and Western and Eastern Punjabis) were to be guaranteed 
equal linguistic, cultural, educational, and educative rights. The subcontinent was going 
through a process of awakening of nationalities; this was “the essence of the communal 
problem in its new form.”630  
This insight provided the rationale for the accommodation of religious identity 
formation under the rubric of nationalism—however, a combination as yet unsavory to 
communist tastes: The document ostracized the “reactionary leadership of the minority 
nationalities” for demanding “separation on the basis of religion” as in the campaigns for 
Pakistan and, interestingly, Dravidistan. Instead, the CPI envisaged granting the right to 
“free and independent development” to every nationality.631 Clearly, while the communists 
grappled with the articulation of communal demands in the framework of religious politics, 
their version of ‘scientific’ Marxism enabled them to differentiate between essence and 
appearance, and view the aspirations as justified by rejecting only their ‘wrong’ communal 
expression.  
Equally importantly, the need for broad-based national unity under the “people’s war” 
line rendered the ML an indispensable ingredient to the communist national stew from 1942 
onwards: The call for unity of INC and ML—remarkably, not of Hindus and Muslims—
became the CPI’s mantra until the end of the war. To achieve it, the League’s demands, 
technically viewed as the “distorted” expression of the Pakistan campaign’s “healthy” 
essence, were to be met in order to form a sustained national coalition.632 It would not 
merely increase war production but also, despite the separatist gist of Jinnah’s demands, go 
a long way towards demonstrating unity and political firmness—against Great Britain as 
much as against Japan, which by mid-1942 had perceptibly knocked at the subcontinent’s 
doorstep. 
Moreover, notwithstanding its dubious concept of Pakistan the Muslim League was the 
only organization other than the CPI voicing the perceived aspirations of Muslim 
‘nationalities.’ By spring 1942, it was well on its way to being elevated into the Muslim 
counterpart of the Congress, such as when General Secretary P. C. Joshi called for the 
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formation of Congress-League coalition ministries in the provinces. They would symbolize 
Hindu-Muslim unity and, of all things, defeat the “communal reactionaries who disturb 
communal harmony.”633 Consequently, it would be “wrong and unrealistic [!]” to dismiss 
the League, the “political organisation of the second largest community in our country […] 
as a ‘reactionary, communal organisation’.”634  
Joshi’s above comment had referred to the INC, which was doing just that: In the same 
measure that the CPI gathered momentum in its bid to devise a national solution to the 
communal problem, the INC refused to countenance negotiations with the League. 
Particularly Gandhi had given up the idea of a settlement before independence, reasoning 
that unity would not proceed but succeed freedom. This was quite a departure from his 
earlier position, continuing the game of contrasts between INC and CPI: If Roy had rejected 
Gandhi’s insistence on communal unity as a prerequisite for independence as over-
emphasizing an artificial conflict in the 1920s, Gandhi’s resignation was now considered an 
“admission of bankruptcy, […] a complete lack of faith in the people and their healthy 
patriotic instincts” by Ganghadar Moreshwar Adhikari, the architect of the CPI’s 
‘nationality line.’635  
On his part, Adhikari exhibited remarkable views of these “healthy [...] instincts.” In 
sharp contrast to established communist tradition, he came round to acknowledge that 
regionally, ethnically, and religiously divisive ideologies were part of the prospective 
revolutionary subject’s political self-assertion: “It is often stated that the masses have no 
communalism [….] But in actual practice, as the general national anti-imperialist upsurge 
spreads deeper into the masses, it finds an echo in the growing up of sectional, communal, 
and provincial patriotism.” However, this manifestation was mere appearance, “a distorted 
expression of an otherwise healthy growth, viz. the masses of the individual nationalities 
awakening to all-India anti-imperialist national consciousness.”636  
In other words, what had counted as reactionary ideologies as long as their proponents 
could be confined to the bourgeois camp, at least in communist theorizing, grew into a 
matter of urgency for the vanguard of progress when it finally came round to admit that 
broad strata of the population were involved. Adhikari, consequential in judging phenomena 
according to their social location, identified two fundamentally different issues: While the 
ever-greedy bourgeoisie had merely been divided by growing competition for jobs and had 
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devised communalism as a means of struggle, the spread of the national movement had 
politicized even the “peasant masses of the most backward nationalities and communities,” 
rendering the movement for independence a “rich pattern of a multinational movement.”637 
For theoretical support, Adhikari referred back to a 1925 speech by Stalin that had predicted 
the emergence of a plethora of hitherto unidentified national communities in the event of a 
“‘revolutionary upheaval’ in India.”638 
The extension of equal support to Congress and League therefore transcended political 
imperatives of “people’s war” in that it corresponded to sociological parallels: The League 
was “to the Muslim petty-bourgeois mass what the Indian National Congress is to the Indian 
masses in general.” Since both embodied the political expression of the same social forces, 
their aspirations had to be on the same footing:  
To the Muslim masses, therefore, it appears that the Muslim League leadership is fighting not 
only for the complete independence of India from imperialist rule but also for freedom and 
equality to territorial units which are predominantly Muslim and for the protection of the rights 
of Muslim minorities in other provinces in relation to culture, education and language. Thus [!] 
the rise of the Muslim League influence cannot be regarded as a reactionary phenomenon.639  
Therefore, Adhikari rejected the view that religious differences, or “irrational, obscurantist 
and fanatical elements” among Muslims were responsible for the deadlock between 
Congress and League. Instead, a perception of the League leadership as bourgeois and of its 
role towards imperialism as “somewhat analogous” to the one of the Congress would allow 
for a “very simple solution to the communal problem in its new phase [….] We must put 
before each Muslim nationalist [!] a picture of free life [!] in his homeland, in the land of his 
forefathers, among his fellow-nationalists.”640  
Thus, the awakening community consciousness among the subcontinent’s Muslim 
population was not a sign of its backwardness, but of its avant-garde position, which could 
be welded into a “firm anti-imperialist unity” with likewise developments in other 
communities.641  
The translation of the League’s slogan into communist vocabulary occasioned several 
remarkably honest realizations. Adhikari’s concession that Muslims had participated in the 
khilafat movement largely due to the “religious pull,” and that on a general plane it had not 
been “the concrete democratic demands of the masses that united them in the [non-
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cooperation and khilafat] struggle, but [religious] demands of the leaders” entailed 
dismissing as the “vulgar economic way” the classical communist view of the matter.642 The 
spread of nationalism to the peasantry then had “necessarily” obsolesced overarching unity. 
It was arguably a related kind of necessity that channeled Adhikari’s recognition, that 
Muslims demanded “full and unfettered political and economic existence,” into his 
reassurance to Muslim communities that there would be guarantees for their “cultural 
rights.”643 The communo-national question inevitably reared its cultural head. 
Consequently, the resolution On Pakistan And National Unity, passed at the plenum of the 
enlarged Central Committee in September 1942 and confirmed at the 1943 I party congress, 
committed itself to multiculturalism by declaring that the “basic rights of the communities 
and [!] nationalities must be an essential part of the united national front”:644 
Every section of the Indian people which has a contiguous territory as its homeland, common 
historical tradition, common language, culture, psychological make-up [!] and common 
economic life would be recognised as a distinct nationality with the right to exits [sic!] as an 
autonomous state within the free Indian union or federation and will have the right secede from 
it if it may so desire.645  
Adhikari justly asserted a “radically revolutionary turn to the whole problem of communal 
unity.”646 The thrust to fundamentally reconfigure the communist approach to questions of 
community and nation in terms of culture operated even under the unitary locutionary 
surface of the relevant documents, which were generally far from acknowledging the 
Pakistan movement’s religious and separatist agenda. A rigid façade of nationality 
vocabulary concealed the actual dynamism and adaptability of contemporary communist 
theorizing on the ‘nationality question,’ which actually was very much tailored to respond to 
what were deemed concrete manifestations of national consciousness, and rejected “static, 
non-historical” points of view.647 If anything, the problem is that these new developments 
were welcomed and embraced rather than criticized. 
To be fair to the CPI’s transformation, it needs to be emphasized that it wasn’t designed 
exclusively to accommodate Muslim sentiments. Even as the League’s Pakistan demand 
presented the most glaring manifestation of collective separatism, the communist 
perspective identified numerous related developments. With the spread of political 
consciousness to all parts of the country, the peasantry everywhere went with the (regional, 
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communal, religious) bourgeoisie and supported their demand for linguistic and cultural 
rights. Examples “deeply rooted in the masses of the peasantry and the people” included the 
campaign for a separate Andhra province, for a Samyukta Karnatak, and the movement of 
the Oriyas.648 
In his report to the 1943 I party congress in Bombay, Adhikari reiterated the core 
principle at work by averring that “to ignore this pride and love [for one’s own culture and 
language], this aspiration, of the various sections of our people, to brush them aside saying 
these are provincial prejudices or communal demands, is to ignore a growing reality.”649 Put 
differently, parochial communal demands could not be ‘real,’ and historically formative 
processes could not be communal prejudices. In the effort to wrest progressive surplus value 
from the current of history, Adhikari saw the main task in demonstrating the “outmoded 
ways of thinking” of traditional Congress notions of national unity and conveying these 
prophetic insights to the intractable “ordinary patriot:”650 “We, the Communists, are able to 
see our way into the future by means of our theory and ideology. […] The slogans of our 
national movement […] should be such as will take us on along with the stream of future 
historical development and will assist such development.”651 This assertion articulated the 
primal communist endeavor to gain sovereignty over history by keeping up with the times 
and passing off its results as conforming to the communist vision.  
Of course, this affected the very vision itself, and the measures to be taken to attain it. 
Adhikari insisted that the self-determination of nationalities be looked upon as a “political-
revolutionary question, not a constitutional question.” In other words, rather than as a 
danger to unity the communists viewed the right of separation as the strongest “unifying 
bond.” There was a historical misperception behind this concept: Although the traditional 
(Congress) approach to prevent the subcontinent from being partitioned on religious lines 
had indeed proven inadequate, by acknowledging both separate identity and possible 
secession the communists promoted the very differences that were to lose their potential for 
conflict in a better society according to their own tenets.652 
On the other hand, the allegations often leveled at the CPI’s stance ex posteriori—that it 
had misimplemented Leninist nationality policy and fueled divisive sentiments, that it was 
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guilty of a “mechanical” transfer of Soviet theorems,653 which had been “of course 
wrong”654 and in “total disregard of Marxism-Leninism”655—tend to ignore the 
contemporary setting. Notably the short-circuiting of communal and national aspirations 
was not necessarily wrong. Lenin had time and again insisted on pondering the “concrete, 
historical, specific features of the national movements.” This the CPI had assiduously done 
when the League adopted the two-nation-theory. In view of the Pakistan campaign’s “multi-
class character,” marked by a “heightened consciousness of Islamic brotherhood” in which, 
in Ian Talbot’s words, “individuals thought of them as Muslims first and then Punjabis, 
Pathans and Bengalis,” their conclusions were not unrealistic.656 Furthermore, 
subcontinental communists were not the only ones to subscribe to dubious concepts of 
nationality. In 1948, long after the end of the CPI’s ‘nationality period,’ the Soviet journal 
Bolshevik endorsed the struggle of Kashmiri Muslims against the Hindu maharaja on the 
grounds that they were “an oppressed nation in their own country.”657 
Before this background, British assessments of the communists as “first and last 
opportunists,”658 whose advances towards the ML were “little more than a temporary 
expedient to sustain the smokescreen of the ‘unity campaign’,” demonstrate the low degree 
of understanding of the modalities of communist policy formulation.659 Rather than grasping 
for every straw, communist dedication to apparently quaint “national” movements derived 
from the conviction to execute the laws of history, and hence to advance their own cause 
together with the one they championed. 
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V.1.2 Celebrating Muslimness 
 
While the subcontinent’s Muslims were not alone in being embraced by the communists, it 
was what was deemed the awakening of “Muslim nationalities” where communist 
communophiliac euphoria really came into its own. ‘Euphoria,’ because the party’s 
commitment underwent a qualitative change around 1943, when the task to expound the 
position on Pakistan and self-determination passed from Adhikari to Sajjad Zaheer, an 
accomplished Urdu writer, founder member of the left-wing Progressive Writers’ 
Association, and the most outstanding Muslim intellectual in the party.660 It was under his 
guidance that the acculturation of communism to the subcontinent’s Islam reached its apex. 
Zaheer expanded Adhikari’s approach in two ways: First, by clarifying the communist 
stance on Pakistan—the “demand for self-determination” of which was “a just, progressive 
and national demand,” and even “the positive expression of […] freedom and 
democracy.”661 Second, he channeled this unequivocal political commitment into a 
comprehensive turn towards Muslim culture and religion. This was in unison with General 
Secretary Joshi’s simultaneously implemented (see chapter V.1.4) vision of an integral 
revolution.662 It constituted an undertaking to achieve communist hegemony over, and hence 
necessitated acculturation to, the social and cultural dimensions of the subalterns’ life in 
preparation of the final take-over. Along with Joshi, Zaheer went about to rethink and 
overhaul traditional political and social commitments by fashioning the communist course 
of action in analogy to Antonio Gramsci’s concept of ‘hegemony’ (although they were in all 
probability ignorant of it). Gramsci had polemicized that in advanced capitalist societies, 
communists could not achieve victory by clinging to the “fatalism” and “economism” of 
Marxist historical materialism. Unable to revolutionize society through a quick strike in a 
“war of maneuver,” they needed to entrench themselves in civil (as against bourgeois 
political) society and conduct a “war of position.”663 This required that the communist 
analysis and message conformed to the non-economic life-world of the revolutionary 
subject, too. Yet, while for Gramsci the latter had been the proletariat, on the subcontinent 
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the only eligible population segment with appreciable clout were the ‘masses.’ Their 
politicization along communal lines henceforth manifested itself not only in political 
demands, but also in direct religio-cultural accommodation and affirmation. Zaheer’s task 
consisted in growing “the seed of a genuine urge” recognized by Adhikari.664 
Therefore, he first operationalized Adhikari’s discovery of a ‘national’ content of 
communalism as an apology of much of subcontinental Muslims’ recent political history. 
Already the formation of the League early in the 20th century had been a reflection of the 
fact that the Hindu-Muslim problem was “not the creation of imperialism.” Consequently, 
Zaheer traced the ML’s demand for separate representation to the ever “backward and 
undeveloped” condition of the Muslim community as a whole.665 In the khilafat movement, 
“the Muslims” had fought, “though in a vague and still undefined manner, for the freedom 
of the Muslim peoples.” While Adhikari’s account had admitted rather than celebrated the 
preponderance of religious motivations, Zaheer went a step further by connecting past 
political assertions of Muslims directly to the millenarian goal of national freedom. He 
concluded that the “progress of the Muslims and the Muslim League, from separate 
electorates […] to self-determination and Pakistan, is […] the growing expression of the 
various stages of national, democratic and anti-imperialist urge” of India’s “Muslim 
peoples.”666 
Constructing and identifying with a glorious Muslim past chimed with long-standing 
traditions in parts of the CPI. Under the auspices of the East Pakistan Renaissance Society, 
an inter-party meeting including Congressites, Leaguers, and communists was held at 
Calcutta to debate the question of Pakistan in September 1943. Muzaffar Ahmad’s “most 
inspiring contribution” unequivocally extolled “the old and brave fights waged and led by 
Muslims against imperialism, their sacrifice, courage, suffering in the Wahabi, Moplah and 
Khilafat movements and called on those present to live up to these traditions.”667 The 
pronounced religious character of their anti-imperialist militancy either did not disturb 
Ahmad’s appraisal, or—more probably—even was at the very heart of his embrace. 
Typically for Ahmad’s perception of Muslim resistancy, its most assertive manifestations 
were unfit for adversely affecting inter-communal relations. 
On his part, Zaheer cemented the link between a Muslim identity and anti-imperialist 
resistancy by considering the execution of their subversive national destiny a duty of all 
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Muslims worth their salt. In a commemoration of the passing of the Pakistan resolution, 
Zaheer decreed that “the slogan of Pakistan is as dear to the heart of a Muslim, as that of 
Swaraj to those under Congress influence.”668 Not even the League’s view of the CPI as just 
another Hindu party could disquiet communist dedication. In July 1943, People’s War 
proudly printed a statement of ML leader Liaqat Ali Khan (whom the paper invariably 
referred to with his honorary title, “Nawabzada”) commending the CPI for “trying to 
convince the Hindu masses of the justness of the Muslim demand of Pakistan” and hoping 
that it would succeed in converting “the Hindus” to their views.669 Earlier in the same year, 
People’s War had printed a letter to the editors encouraging both “Muslim patriots” and 
communists to persist against hostile feelings between the communities and continue the 
campaign for unity—”you work in the Hindu masses […] and we will also fight among the 
Muslim masses for the same cause.” The paper urged “all patriots to read the letter over and 
over again.”670  
To be sure, characterizations of the CPI as a Hindu party were not unfounded. The first 
post-legalization Party Letter had contained a questionnaire intended to apprise the upper 
echelons about the local units’ activities and composition. Apart from women, students, and 
youths, Muslims also were a category of interest. The results were sobering: Only five per 
cent of party members were Muslim—even less than in the INC.671 Simultaneously, the 
party undertook to expand its constituency among Muslims active in the League, such as by 
setting up a communist-inspired “Progressive League” with a socialist agenda inside the 
ML. However, as the latter largely resisted infiltration attempts even as the deputed 
communists ardently subscribed to the League’s identitary thrust, in the process becoming 
“more Muslim than the Muslims themselves,” by 1945 all the CPI had to show were a few 
sympathizers and scattered local cells within the League.672  
As if to compensate for these deficits, the party responded with heightened appeals to 
the religious and cultural aspects of Muslim political aspirations and by approximating them 
to the communist project. On the occasion of the League’s Karachi session in December 
1943, the CPI asserted that Muslims had “every right to demand” from the League, “on the 
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basis of the very Islamic traditions of which you are rightly [!] proud,” that “rich and poor 
be treated alike.”673 The communists had even more ontologizing clichés in store, which 
came remarkably close to ideologemes of the colonial order: In the runner-up to the 1944 
talks between Gandhi and Jinnah, Joshi averred that the acceptance of Pakistan would make 
India stronger, as independent and strong Muslim states on the frontiers would constitute its 
“best defence.”674 Apparently, the party had discovered its pet ‘martial race,’ whose 
allegedly superior militancy would translate into fierce determination to keep the 
subcontinent safe from outsiders. 
Communist empathy, however, did not remain confined to the level of declarations. In 
mid-1943, People’s War made concrete plans for an Urdu edition of the paper to meet the 
needs of the “Muslim patriots”; in 1944, it introduced a weekly rubric, “Muslim World,” 
under which news items from Muslims politics and culture were published for the better part 
of the ensuing two years.675 People’s War itself turned towards promoting Muslim culture. 
The editorial of the 17 September 1944 issue consisted of a kitschy poem-pledge vowing to 
build “a new heaven in a new India” under the heading “I’D Mubarak.” Next to the piece 
were printed pictures of Muslims in traditional attire with captions along the lines of 
“heritage of beauty from the Muslim past.” The poem’s author was Kaifi Aimi, a young 
poet with strong left leanings who had undertaken to convey the paper’s Eid greetings to its 
Muslim readers. Furthering the communists’ heady identification with everything Muslim, 
he wrote of the “Crescent” that would soon rise over the “minarets of Victory and Liberty,” 
and looked forward to the celebration of next year’s Eid in Pakistan, a “land of good 
omen.”676  
The communists themselves certainly did their part to actively ensure the realization of 
this “omen”—which was an affair of the League, not the CPI, and had been termed 
misguided at the 1943 party congress. Yet, communists prominently participated at the 1944 
Pakistan Day celebrations, conveyed fraternal greetings at rallies, and even staged them on 
their own: The CPI’s Bombay unit, not satisfied with the ML’s efforts, organized several 
gatherings on Pakistan Day, inviting veterans of the khilafat movement (who duly 
emphasized the glory of past Muslim struggles), and called on the audience to buy Muslim 
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League flags from League volunteers at the venue.677 In the spirit of the Central 
Committee’s injunction to party members to “unite all the Muslims in the Muslim League,” 
in some instances support for the ML went as far as encouraging involvement where its 
organization was weak or missing.678 Thus, in October 1944 a Juku from Bankura wrote to 
Niru Banerjee in Calcutta, reporting that there was “nothing known as ‘League’” in his 
district. However, he was in the process of setting up contact with “some Muslim youths,” 
presumably in order to awaken them to the ML’s campaign, or even to organize them 
himself.679 
Such episodes from the party base rather render it difficult to conceive that advances 
towards the League could also go too far for the taste of the CPI leadership.680 Yet, in a rare 
case of excessive zeal, the communist All-India Student Federation’s (AISF) Punjab section 
managed to achieve just that in its cooperation with the League’s student wing, the Muslim 
Student Federation (MSF). For the provision of food relief for famine-stricken Bengal, both 
bodies had edged closer in 1944, which had required “utmost tact” on the part of the AISF. 
However, its leadership exceeded its measure of discreteness when it struck a secret deal 
with the MSF in November 1944, recognizing it as the sole representative of Muslim 
students and being recognized vice versa as the sole representative of “nationalist” ones. 
This caused some uproar in the AISF and the parent party because of both excessive secrecy 
and the implied unconditional support for Pakistan—which, however, was considered 
problematic only insofar as it would alienate many Hindu students.681 
Support of the MSF persisted as it engaged in increasingly violent altercations with the 
INC-affiliated All-India Student Congress (AISC) towards the end of 1945. With the AISF’s 
helpless calls to conduct discussions on Pakistan “subject to the elementary rules of decency 
and democracy”682 going unheeded, neither a “rowdy demonstration” against nationalist 
Muslims in the INC on the part of the Aligarh MSF nor even “crudest anti-Hindu speeches” 
of League politicians at MSF gatherings could elicit communist criticism. Conversely, 
Nehru alone was attacked for labeling the MSF “communalist.”683 
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In such an atmosphere, it was not surprising to see the Moplah rebellion reappear as 
well. On the occasion of the uprising’s impending 25th anniversary, P. C. Joshi paid tribute 
to the courage and determination of the 1921 rebels during a tour in Malabar in March 
1946.684 A couple of months later, Namboodiripad authored a commemorating article in 
Deshabhimani, the local communist organ: The CPI remembered “wholeheartedly and 
respectfully the great bravery and revolutionary skill” of the insurgents, who had risen 
against the “Satanic rule” (!) of the British. Namboodiripad reserved his “utter endless 
disgust” for the reprisals during the British counter-insurgency campaign, which could be 
compared to only “the bestiality of fascism.” The Congress’s allegation of religious 
fanaticism had been motivated by cowardice and the desire to stay aloof.685 While 
Namboodiripad had remained conspicuously silent on the motives or deeds of the rebels, his 
general secretary later filled the gap: The “Moplah peasants of Malabar, rising 
spontaneously against landlord and imperialist oppression battled fearlessly showing 
marvels of heroism, capacity for struggle and sacrifice.”686 Nevertheless, the rebellion ought 
to be called not “Moplah rebellion,” but “Malabar rebellion,” since “the glories of 1921 
were not the property of the Moplahs alone but of the district.” All Keralites ought to study 
the “historical lessons” of the great struggle.687 
 
Heretics 
The enthusiastic embrace of Muslim League politics and cultural themes of collective 
Muslimness naturally affected communist stances towards other politically active Muslims. 
The ML’s line, identified as the ‘correct’ one, became the be-all and end-all for other 
Muslims, even those whose articulation of anti-imperialism had earlier attracted communist 
sympathy. The Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam was a case in point. Their 1944 reappraisal by Zaheer, 
and his labeling of them as “progressive,” reaffirmed that communist benevolence extended 
to sectarian strife and religious persecution in the ‘correct,’ that is, anti-imperialist political 
context.688  
What wrought disfavor upon the Ahrars, however, was their reluctance to subscribe to 
Muslim nationalism, and their opposition towards the ML. When the Ahrars joined an anti-
League (that held the ministry) block in Bengal in early 1944, the communist pitch shifted 
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perceptibly: They preferred Fascist powers to colonial rule, and instead of supporting the 
League’s demand for self-determination they advocated an obscure “divine kingdom.”689 
Things became worse when Ahrar leader Hafiz Ali Bahadur Khan labeled the League “un-
Islamic.” Determined to ward off such allegations, People’s War responded not by asserting 
the merits of the ML’s agenda, but by accusing the Ahrars of themselves betraying their 
vision of a “divine kingdom of Islam.” In addition, the paper assuagingly printed statements 
from high-ranking Muslim Leaguers denying their stance being un-Islamic by referring to 
rulings of the ulema.690 This episode closed the Ahrar chapter for the CPI. 
As only “the growing influence of the League means growth of democracy among the 
Muslims,” it was not surprising that the CPI was just as reserved towards organized 
nationalist Muslims as the ML.691 A report on the 1944 Delhi Muslim Nationalist 
Conference, a gathering of nationalist (that is, non-separatist) Muslims of all shades, 
criticized the proceedings as “vitiated in as much as [the conference] distrusted Jinnah and 
was biassed [sic!] against the League.” The Muslim Majlis, constituted at the gathering to 
arrive at a settlement with the Congress on its own if Jinnah failed, met with communist 
rejection. Its approach fostered disunity and “reaction” (!) within the Muslim camp.692 
Instead, Muslim nationalists were urged to be “realists” in the same fatalist way as the 
CPI: “They must see that the great majority of the Muslims of India are rallied under the 
leadership of the Muslim League [that] has come forward as the champion of the anti-
imperialist aspirations of the Muslim people.”693 Note the singular. Accordingly, the Azad 
Muslim Board, formed out of the ranks of Congress Muslims and independent Muslim 
nationalists whose avowed objectives was to counter separatist Muslim League propaganda 
among Muslims, met with communist condemnation. Adhikari echoed the League paper 
Dawn’s interpretation by labeling the undertaking a disruptive and “provocative form of 
anti-League ‘mass contact’.”694 Maulana Abul Kalam Azad’s initiative for a movement of 
nationalist Muslims in mid-1945 was likewise greeted with skepticism as it would be a step 
towards an “anti-League Muslim front.” The nationalist Muslims’ efforts would be better 
directed towards explaining the League’s position to Congressites.695  
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Mock Debates 
Considerations of pro-League loyalty dominated even the CPI’s reactions to the most 
glaring administrative outage of the League during the Second World War: The Bengal 
ministry’s failure to implement effective anti-famine measures as the disaster unfolded from 
summer 1943 onwards.696 At the grass-roots level at least, criticism had been quite 
outspoken, with an activist from Bankura confessing to a comrade in Calcutta in September 
1943 that “I think we are supporting the League blindly.”697 Another party worker vented 
her conviction that “the Muslim League will do nothing for the country,” indicting a 
measure of disillusionment with the League and skepticism towards the CPI’s leniency 
towards it.698 Yet, even grass-roots criticism pertained to the question of supporting an 
obviously incapable administration rather than to the issues of religion and nationality. 
Conversely, the latter pervaded—and tempered—even managerial criticisms from 
upper party ranks. B. T. Ranadive commented that the League ministry’s inability to provide 
relief to the “death-stricken sons of Bengal” was even less comprehensible because of the 
“millions of Muslims” affected.699 This allows the suspicion that he might have been more 
sympathetic if the government had concentrated its efforts on starving Muslims. Zaheer 
opposed the central government’s intention to send officials to take matters in their own 
hands as illegitimate encroachment on indigenous self-government. Instead, he contented 
himself with bemoaning that the good name of the League was “dragged into the mire.”700 
After all, the crucial matters in a communist universe were self-determination and national 
unity, for the attainment of which even a veritable cataclysm could be countenanced. 
Although overcoming the famine through the combined efforts of INC and ML was 
desirable, S. G. Sardesai cynically reckoned that in doubt a couple of million fatalities 
would achieve the same result: “Through the common suffering of the Hindu and Muslim 
masses of Bengal will emerge an all-India Hindu-Muslim unity which so many other issues 
have till now failed to bring.”701 
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It was not until 1946, when communal tensions were building up to a dangerous level, 
that an apparently serious challenge to the CPI’s approach to the ‘nationality question’ 
emerged. Significantly, it emanated not from party ranks, but from CPGB theoretician 
Rajani Palme Dutt. His most recent oeuvre on the subcontinent, 1940’s India Today, had 
indicated the low impact he attributed to “Communal Divisions” by dedicating not even 20 
pages (out of over 500) to the issue. Dutt reiterated the classic Marxist view: The “so-called 
‘communal organisations’ are in reality small ultra-reactionary groups, dominated by large 
landlord and banker interests playing for the support of the British Government.”702 While 
joining in the criticism of the INC’s Hindu tinge, Dutt deprecated the “artificial division of 
the single Indian people into two ‘nations’.”703 
Skeptical towards Adhikari’s brand of nationality politics all along, he had temporarily 
acquiesced to the CPI’s line and urged the British government to negotiate with “all political 
sections and leaders” on the subcontinent instead of only the Congress.704 Yet, Adhikari’s 
meditations had been considerably radicalized by Zaheer; emergency “people’s war” 
policies were not supposed to continue after the war; and finally, alarmed by a bitter letter 
from Nehru complaining that the communists had become “full blooded supporters of 
Jinnah’s demands,” Dutt came out in 1946 to accuse Jinnah (who had rejected a plebiscite 
on Pakistan in Muslim majority areas) of pursuing “a reactionary obstructive tactic which 
plays into the hands of imperialism to […] prevent a democratic solution of the Indian 
question.”705 This was coined on the CPI, for which Z. A. Ahmad had insisted on terming a 
plebiscite “undemocratic” in a discussion with a consternated Nehru, who thereupon had 
written to Dutt.706  
However, even while attacking the CPI’s nationality policy Dutt underlined his own 
agreement with the communist take on emancipation. He himself subscribed to the “genuine 
national”—not just anti-imperialist—“content concealed behind the Pakistan demand.”707 
(emphasis added) His dismissal of the League’s separatist campaign as “basically opposed 
to the programme of national self-determination” directly challenged Zaheer’s obverse 
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appraisal, but otherwise merely rephrased the CPI’s technically still authoritative 1943 
resolution on Pakistan. Both agreed that the ML’s theme was religious, not nationalist, and 
as a “communal organisation” it emphasized the “political backwardness” of Muslims. Even 
Dutt’s concrete recommendation was similar to Adhikari’s: A “broad united national front 
for Indian independence” with “wide sections of the Moslem League.”708 
His intervention caused considerable uproar among subcontinental communists, many 
among whom felt relegated to the receiving end of colonial relations of dominance. This 
testifies to the degree to which the CPI had become immersed in and convinced of its 
culturally situated implementation of the “nationality policy.” In its course, the avowed 
intention to steer clear of cultural matters as impartial midwife of an ‘objective’ process of 
history had been transformed into heady alignment with a communal awakening ‘from 
below.’  
To an extent, this was true even for the accuser. The CPI’s reply that Dutt had 
overemphasized both the ML’s “communal and un-democratic aspect” and ignored that the 
“freedom-loving Muslims are behind the League” on the one hand illustrated the party’s 
firm commitment. On the other, it preached to the converted: Dutt himself agreed that the 
League was the “main freedom organization of the Muslims.”709 Accordingly, he identified 
“strong popular democratic currents” within its fold following the ML’s sweep of the 1946 
polls (in which it won 76 percent of the Muslim vote and almost 90 percent of the Muslim 
seats).710 And eventually, Dutt demonstrated his own consonance with the CPI’s nationality 
concept by admitting the “multi-national character of the Indian people,” which made for 
great differences between “a Pathan, a Bengali and a Sikh [!].”711  
 
 
V.1.3 The “Sikh People”  
 
In fact, by 1946 Muslims were not the only religious collective sanctified with a national 
aura anymore. It was only consequential that the rationale that had led the CPI to refashion 
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Muslim communal separatism into the right of “Muslim nationalities” to self-determination 
manifested itself in other instances as well. Taking up demands voiced notably by the 
Shiromani Akali Dal, the 1942 resolution On Pakistan and Indian National Unity had also 
counted the Sikhs among the diverse nationalities constituting India.712 
The dynamic unfolded by the Pakistan campaign had awoken fears of Muslim 
domination in the Punjab (a Muslim majority province) in some Sikh quarters. The SAD, 
the well-established political arm of institutionalized Sikhdom hitherto representing 
standard communalist politics centering on “adequate representation” for Sikhs, responded 
by reformulating its agenda in terms of nationhood similar to those of the ML.713 Alarmed 
especially by Sir Stafford Cripps’s readiness to consider the League’s demands during his 
1942 mission to British India, and lest the Sikhs receive the short end of the stick in the 
conflict between Muslim League and Congress, the SAD raised the demand for “Azad 
Punjab,” or “Khalistan”—a Sikh state in central Punjab. In case Pakistan materialized, the 
Punjab was to be partitioned in such a way that districts where the Sikh population was 
concentrated were to come under a separate administrative unit. For the achievement of a 
Sikh majority, the scheme envisaged large-scale population transfers.714 
It was in response to this plan that Adhikari’s resolution had elevated Sikhs into a 
nationality. Yet, in view of the fierce hostilities between SAD and ML the question 
remained how this provision was to be realized together with the League’s Pakistan demand. 
Moreover, the problem already began with the CPI’s Punjab unit, whose sorry state did not 
allow for an effective implementation of this (or any other) policy. Reflecting the province’s 
make-up, the rural-urban divide also exacted its toll on the communist movement. Whereas 
the “official” CPI cells had been “largely urban, industrial and intellectual,” the Ghadrite-
based KKP, eventually forced to merge with the CPI in a “shot-gun marriage” under 
Comintern pressure in 1942, was “essentially rural, peasant-based and anti-intellectual.”715 
Under these circumstances, implementing the political strategy for the Punjab—
replacing the loyalist, agriculturalist, but supra-communal Unionist Party government with a 
united front of the INC, the CPI, the League, and the SAD—became even more difficult. To 
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begin with, the many quarrels and conflicting tendencies inside the Punjab CPI made for a 
heterogeneous show of the party. Cooperation with and antagonism towards the Akalis were 
never far apart, and often determined by the CPI-KKP rift. Matters were further complicated 
by the SAD’s preference of the Unionists over the ML, and the CPI’s support for the 
Pakistan demand (coupled with the rejection of Khalistan by leading Punjabi communists 
such as Harkishan Singh Surjeet) didn’t help in winning over the Akalis, either. Communist 
involvement in intrigues against the SAD leadership ultimately prompted the latter to 
declare the CPI enemies of the Sikhs out to destroy their community and culture.716  
Yet, on this point the Akalis erred profoundly. It was not just that the CPI could not 
afford to antagonize the Sikhs as a whole given its persistent lack of success in the 
organization of Muslim peasants as compared to Sikh Jats. The party itself had nothing to do 
with an anti-Sikh outlook, rather the contrary, as is borne out by the gradual conversion of 
the Punjab Kisan Sabha into a Sikh-only body.717 Notwithstanding political differences 
inside the party there was unity on at least one point: 
That they should cease to offend Sikh religious susceptibilities [….] [and] do anything possible 
to show their devotion to the Panth. The result was that no […] unreligious speeches were made, 
[…] religious festivals were celebrated and religious articles published in Communist papers.718  
Rather than a consensus enforced by central party directives, this was part of Punjab 
communism’s heritage, most pronounced in its rural wing. The old KKP had from an early 
stage fused socialist ideas with an egalitarianism articulated in Sikh terms, and succeeded to 
a certain degree in creating a symbiotic relationship between both. The free use of Sikh 
symbols in KKP contexts bore testimony to this. For Santokh Singh, an old Ghadrite and the 
Moscow-trained first editor of Kirti, there had been no contradiction between daily prayer 
and a religious outlook on the one hand and the practice of Marxism on the other. The urban 
comrades distinguished themselves by a similarly empathic strand. For example, their leader 
Sohan Singh Josh was the first to publicly advocate the Azad Punjab scheme at a rally in 
February 1943.719  
Yet, the deadlock over Pakistan convinced Adhikari (tasked with sorting out the Punjab 
mess) that more tangible concessions were needed. In 1944, he wooed—if unsuccessfully—
                                                 
716 Home/Poll/1944 Nr. 7/5 K.W.; see also Javed, Left Politics in Punjab, 191–2, and Sunanda and Basu, The 
Sickle and the Crescent, 89. 
717 This confirms Shalini Sharma’s verdict that cultural-communal reformulations of originally class-based 
communist policies were most successful with the Sikhs: Sharma, “Communism and ‘Democracy’,” 458. On 
the communist-led and Sikh-dominated Punjab Kisan Sabha, see also Home/Poll/1944 Nr. 7/5 K.W., 62–3; 
and Home/Poll/1945 Nr. 7/I & K.W., 10. 
718 Home/Poll/1944 Nr. 7/5 K.W., 7–8. 
719 “Assure Right Of Self-Determination,” People’s War, 28 February 1943. On Santokh Singh, see Bhagwan 
Josh, Communist Movement in Punjab (1926–1947) (Lahore: Book Traders 1979), 77. 
199 
 
for Akali consent to a possible Congress-League agreement that provided for “adequate 
representation” of Sikhs in Pakistan and veto rights in legislation concerning them.720 A 
year later, his programmatic pamphlet Sikh Homeland through Hindu-Muslim-Sikh Unity 
went the decisive step and translated the matter into communist vocabulary of the day: 
Whereas Sikhism’s rise had often been written as religious history,  
in reality it was the birth of a people—peasant tribes uniting themselves into a people—shaping 
their language—creating their first inspiring folk-literature—fighting to defend their way of life 
in their homelands. This popular upheaval, led by the Sikh Gurus, […] culminated in the 
emergence of the Sikh people.721 (emphasis added) 
Even as he deemed the demand for Azad Punjab “unjust” as it would comprise parts of the 
Muslim majority area, Adhikari envisaged a constituent assembly for the Central Punjab 
that was to decide on joining a “Pakistan Federation” or a “Hindustan Union.” In the zoo-
ified communist diction, this plan would provide for freedom for Hindus, Muslims, and 
Sikhs “in their respective regions.”722 
However, the scheme exhibited few inclinations towards emancipation from a 
community, as it declared the attainment of collective “freedom” a mandatory task for all 
members of the community in question. Much like in the case of non-League Muslims, the 
nationality mania’s intolerant flipside came down heavily on those Sikhs that had no truck 
with collective, “national” Sikh demands.723 With the Akali Dal patching up its differences 
with the Congress, Adhikari seized the opportunity to portray the CPI as the true champion 
of the demand for a Sikh state and the preservation of the rights, language, culture, and 
traditions of the “great Sikh people.” Hence, the slogan was to “Re-unite the Sikh National 
Movement,” a task the communist Sikhs alone could achieve, as they ostensibly continued 
the best traditions of the old Akali movement.724 This was remarkable as Adhikari went to 
the extent of pushing the demand for a Sikh nation-state unilaterally The CPI itself had 
become the guardian of ‘proper’ Sikh nationalism. 
The demands of the “Unity Platform” phrased Sikh aspirations in the unique blend of 
cultural, religious, and national idioms characteristic of subcontinental communism’s 
nationality vocabulary: Punjabi was to be an official language in Central and Western 
Punjab, and educational institutions in Sikh localities were to teach the Gurumukhi script 
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prevented in the communist plan; still, the commitment to the preservation of the “Sikh people” is too spirited, 
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(which was the best available approximation to an independent Sikh language). “Complete 
freedom of religious worship” and “complete freedom to administer their Gurdwaras as 
religious, cultural institutions” were to be guaranteed to Sikhs.725 The programmatic text 
The New Situation and Our Tasks from late 1945 envisioned “self-determination” for Sikhs 
in “the territories in which their historic homelands lie.”726  
However, there was a lot more open dissent on the matter in the party than in the case 
of Muslim separatism. CPI leaders such as Surjeet and Sajjad Zaheer opposed the “Azad 
Punjab” scheme, and a couple of months before the publication of Sikh Homeland, General 
Secretary P. C. Joshi had himself admitted that the Sikh issue illustrated the communist 
troubles to come to grips with the concept of nationalities. Still, he admired the ‘cultural’ 
status of Sikhism as a community with great historical traditions.727 On this point, at least, 
there was a consensus that conserved the key components of Adhikari’s contentious Sikh 
policy beyond the demise of the nationality line in 1946. Transcending the turn away from 
Sikh statehood, they resurfaced in the context of the CPI’s involvement in the movement for 
a Punjabi Suba from the 1950s. If communists eyed the SAD suspiciously, ‘original’ 
assertions of “Sikh culture” had never borne the smell of communalism.  
The logic applied in the elevation of Muslims and Sikhs to nationality status erased the 
boundaries between the national and the religious. It went to the effect that separatist 
religio-cultural aspirations constituted a strong case for considering the groups in question 
nationalities. However, there were also limits to such ‘national’ elevation. For once, the 
subcontinent’s Christian population, small in number and suspiciously sharing the 
colonialists’ creed, continued to exist outside the premises of nationally sanctified collective 
religiosity. To be sure, there existed no Christian bodies putting up such a demand. Then 
again, political positioning on communal grounds apparently was too much en vogue to 
ignore the minor protagonists, even if they didn’t rise to the same status as Muslims or 
Sikhs. Thus, People’s War published an anti-imperialist appeal of the Travancore state 
National Christian Youth Council for India’s freedom and self-determination, even casting 
the text in the shape of an oriental orthodox cross. Yet, Joshi countered the council’s regret 
that universal freedom for religious communities had not been explicitly acknowledged at 
the CPI’s 1943 party congress by outlining that the convention had not been concerned with 
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individual citizens’ rights.728 Evidently, there was no question of regarding Christians as a 
‘national’ factor, or as a distinct, culturally noteworthy collective deserving recognition and 
support. Instead, Christians continued to be eyed warily well into the 1950s.729 
Another group remaining outside of communist collective-mongering were 
untouchables—which is striking as their social position would have warranted affirmative 
action most. In fact, the party had mulled a more inclusive approach towards untouchables, 
substantialized in Ranadive’s call for a “Special Charter of Political and Economic Demands 
of the Untouchables” providing for separate electorates and even special educational 
facilities. Ranadive emphasized that these “just and adequate” demands had grown out of 
the “inhuman treatment” of the scheduled castes by Hindu society. Bearing out the 
contemporary priorities of the CPI, his approach didn’t even mention economic reform, let 
alone class struggle, as a solution to the problem.730 However, a combination of 
constituency overlap and a lack of anti-imperialist commitment in the most important 
political body representing untouchable demands—Ambedkar’s Scheduled Caste Federation 
(SCF)—led the CPI to discard advances to untouchables on a group level. Untouchability 
was to be overcome in the framework of existing (communist) institutions. Accordingly, the 
1945 election manifesto all but ignored the matter.731  
 
 
V.1.4 From Communism to Culture 
 
It has become clear that steering clear of cultural awakenings was no feature of a communist 
war-time policy framed by the “people’s war” line and the connected imperative of national 
unity. According to its own logic, it was only consequential that communism’s cultural turn 
extended beyond minority domains. Just as the CPI’s grand policy bore most trademarks of 
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a Gramscian ‘integral revolution,’ it was situated ‘organic intellectualism’ that governed 
communist efforts at acculturation to and self-localization in their environment, blossoming 
into a communist-influenced cultural movement from below. Its two main pillars were the 
encouragement and promotion of native culture (including religious themes) and the active 
dissemination of communist-informed folk art through the medium of the Indian People’s 
Theatre Association (IPTA). Growing out of a tradition commenced by the Progressive 
Writers’ Association, the IPTA’s foundations had been laid at the CPI Congress at Bombay 
in May 1943. From the metropolitan centers, the IPTA fanned out in the countryside 
through touring theater groups. Soon, branches existed in most parts of the subcontinent.732  
As the “cultural wing of the Communist Party” and to a large degree made up of party 
activists and sympathizers, its agenda consisted in “taking theatre to the masses.”733 It was 
not to be “a movement which discards our rich cultural heritage, but one which seeks to 
revive the lost in that heritage by reinterpreting, adopting and integrating it with […] our 
people’s lives and aspirations.”734 Hence, the IPTA’s efforts brought about a “new emphasis 
on Indianness, a new enthusiasm for the culture of the people.” While it developed different 
strands in its artistic formats, their common ground was the “express aspiration of reaching 
out to the people.”735  
Tailored mostly to a rural audience, the common approach consisted of remolding 
traditional folk theatre for purposes of political mobilization. Other occasions witnessed the 
adaptation of ‘naturalistic’ forms modeled on European lines and the beginnings of a 
subcontinental variety of epic theatre in the vein of Brecht.736 Condemnation of alien rule—
couched in anti-Axis propaganda during the war—complemented the wholesome praise of 
native culture. The IPTA’s legacy hugely influenced post-independence folk theatre, even 
though the All-India unit disintegrated in the mid-1950s—partly due to ideological 
fragmentation, partly due to government repression.737 
The communist press, spearheaded by General Secretary P. C. Joshi, supported the 
IPTA’s efforts by benevolently featuring manifestations of folk culture. In his report on the 
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All-India Kisan Sabha’s March 1944 session, Joshi almost exclusively featured the 
accompanying cultural festival organized by the CPI. The performances were important for 
the dissemination of propaganda: Their “effect on the peasant would be more than anything 
else that was said or done at the session.” The recipe was to employ the traditional forms of 
folk art—dances, songs and plays—”to which the peasant is traditionally used,” and fill 
them with a new content: “patriotic instead of religious themes.”738  
Thereby, Joshi acknowledged the origin and function of art in a traditional context. The 
principled affirmation of peasant life and outlook granted established and time-honored 
customs a new lease of life within the framework of communism. This was not a 
coincidence, nor was it a makeshift solution. Joshi, obviously fascinated by the spectacle 
and a soon-to-be expert, sharpened his skill for artistic criticism on the performances of the 
various folk art groups. For example, he commended the Andhra squad for undertaking to 
save regional culture from decay. The messages of the pieces and songs performed largely 
moved within communist precincts—agricultural laborers fighting for their rights, Soviet 
achievements, the Bengal famine, etc. The strategy paid certain dividends. For example, the 
audience’s eagerness to contribute to the Bengal famine fund after the performance of a 
“hunger dance” was so great as to force Puchalapalli Sundarayya to call for momentary 
restraint in the donations. Yet, the traditional form had simply been filled with a new 
content—and with respect to matters such as family and community the content was, in fact, 
not all that new.739 
In much the same manner, Joshi’s report on the Kisan Sabha’s 1945 session featured 
almost a full page of pictures—expensive print items—of the accompanying folk festival. 
Compared to the coverage of the cultural festival, the session’s programmatic proceedings 
had receded into the background. By then, no conference of peasants or trade unionists went 
without similar cultural decorum. The enthusiasm over ‘authentic’ culture permitted even 
avowed communists to indulge in ethno-zoological nosiness, such as when Joshi wrote 
excitedly about never having seen “real Manipuris” before, rejoicing that the peasant 
movement had eliminated “all traces of chauvinism” in folk culture.740  
Yet, far-reaching appropriation in itself could hardly purge it of “chauvinism” any more 
than modify the communist perception of what constituted chauvinism. A remarkable 
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reappraisal illustrates this: “The revivalist[s] gave us national pride [!] and anti-imperialist 
hatred by glorifying our own past from ancient days to our downfall [!].” Joshi went on 
listing stalwarts of non-chauvinism such as the Wahabi movement and the Deoband school 
among Muslims, and “Bankim [Mukherjee], Swami Vivekanad, and others” as their Hindu 
counterparts. If “even [!] Vande Mataram,” the INC’s national song, had “religious forms 
and imagery,” spiritual politics and Islamic puritanism apparently counted among the 
forgivable offences, at least having fostered “national pride” in “our own past.”741  
Yet, in contrast to nationality policy the embrace of majority culture generally was not cast 
in an emphatic pro-Hindu mold. (Instances such as Zaheer’s eulogy of Tulsidas, whose 
“whole genius” was “predominantly and overwhelmingly Hindu,” constitute the exception 
to the rule.742) The inevitable Hindu imprint of the communist turn towards majority culture 
was an adjunct to rather than the core of cultural affirmation. Principal acknowledgement 
and appraisal could be paired with criticism of concrete manifestations. For example, the 
resuscitation of the Mahayagnya festival in early 1944 gave reason for critical, if solidary, 
intervention. The problem was not that the festival was a reinstitution of an ancient ritual by 
a swami considered “a consistent opponent […] of all progress, political or religious.” 
Rather, the stumbling block was that the festivity involved the sacrifice of considerable 
amounts of foodstuff—a “criminal waste” in the face of the raging famine in Bengal. 
Therefore, CPI activists petitioned the organizers to reduce the waste, and formed “singing 
and collecting squads” touring the Mahayagnya grounds with “great” success. It was 
apparently great enough to compel the festival organizers to set up a tent for the usage of the 
communists, replete with the red flag on top—a symbol of felicitous intervention for the 
comrades, yet to the spectators arguably a sign of their self-conscious participation in a 
religious celebration.743  
Of the latter, examples are legion. In a pioneering study on the cultural situatedness of 
communism in Malabar, Dilip Menon corroborates the close entanglement of the CPI in 
local Hindu culture. The focus on national unity and communist participation in food 
committees had engendered cooperation with “‘communal’ groups” such as the League, 
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local Mahasabha circles, and various caste associations, and thereby greatly increased the 
party’s foothold in rural society.744 The local CPI’s hugely successful revival of ancient 
shrine festivals in response to the failure to gain access to temples for untouchables further 
abetted its success. By the same token, traditional social ties were resuscitated as the 
landowning upper castes (to which the CPI’s leading stratum belonged) continued the 
traditional practice of sponsoring such events. Menon rightly comments that “what began as 
an intervention in the interest of the party was transformed into something far richer,” that 
is, the acculturation of communism.745 The Kerala Progressive Writers’ Conference in 
January 1944 chimed in: Even as its manifesto cautioned against the virulent “destructive 
diseases” in the fibers of subcontinental society (particularly untouchability, superstition, 
and discrimination against women), the Keralites were exhorted to be “proud of their 
cultural heritage”—as if the “destructive diseases” had not arisen as a very part of it.746 
Of these “diseases,” the party was firmly dismissive, at least among Hindus. People’s 
War hailed the passing of the Draft Hindu Code, which sought to address gender inequality, 
aimed at the elimination of restrictions on inter-caste marriages, banned polygamy (the 
“most welcome step” of the proposed law), and tentatively veered towards a legal 
framework for the separation and dissolution of marriages. The paper’s polemic against the 
government for having been too lenient in the past in the name of non-interference in 
religious matters however seemed misplaced, for People’s War tellingly remained silent on 
the proposed law’s limitation to Hindus.747 The hardly less rigid practices in other 
communities apparently fell under the preservation of endangered nationalities. 
From a close-up perspective, the turn towards and also the increased readiness to 
criticize Hindu culture was due to its predominance in subcontinental society (in a way 
reminiscent of the role of the Russian component in Lenin’s conceptualization of Czarist 
Russia’s collection of nationalities). Yet, it also reflected the communists’ own life-world: 
Being a largely Hindu party, much of the experiences of its members revolved around 
matters, constraints, and predicaments connected with a deeply Hindu environment. The 
possibly alienating effects of a visit of close relatives to a comrade living in the peculiar 
environment of the Calcutta communist “commune” were among the less serious 
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problems.748 Graver matters such as questions of marriage held a greater challenge to 
communist progressive-mindedness. In June 1943, a Sudhindra Ray bewailed that the father 
of his betrothed comrade would agree to a marriage only if it was celebrated according to 
traditional Hindu rites.749 With a wild romantic escape out of the question—an option 
generally discouraged by the party—, he faced the choice to either compromise on atheism 
or forfeit his bride. In general, despite their criticism of prevalent cultural norms 
communists also tended to reproduce them, including patriarchal ones. Apart from an 
official party morality resembling the most conservative of moral regimes,750 this was also 
true for the way of handling private and family matters. In the above example, the conflict 
was slugged out only between the suitor and his prospective father-in-law, without any 
mention of the bride or her opinion on the matter at all. And back in 1936, a letter by 
Muzaffar Ahmad informed Philipp Spratt that he had finally managed to marry off his 
daughter in the traditional way.751 
 
 
 
 
V.2 The Nationality Meltdown 
 
The dividends of cultural politics were slow to pay. In the fast-changing environment after 
the end of the war, when the INC had re-entered the political scene, more tangible matters 
determined the communists’ political fate. Negotiations with the British for some form of 
self-government had been resumed, with the Congress-League seeming ever more 
irreconcilable. Constant quarrels over the composition and the functioning of new 
instruments of self-rule—the Interim Government and the Constituent Assembly—
exacerbated their differences. The 1945/46 elections confirmed the emergence of a 
‘Muslim’ against a ‘non-Muslim’ vote block, with over 86 and over 91 percent of the votes 
in the respective contingents going to ML and INC. Communal polarization operated at all 
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social levels. Everywhere, “sporadic but very striking” manifestations of anti-British unity 
were being rivaled and successively eclipsed by the rise of communal violence on a novel 
scale from mid-1946 onwards.752 
 
 
 
V.2.1 Rediscovering Communalism  
 
The CPI’s capacity to intervene in these developments suffered not only from its still limited 
organizational clout. Also, its attractiveness reached a long-time low during the post-war 
years for a number of reasons. First, the failure of the communist multi-nationality concept 
calling for one-and-a-half dozen constituent assemblies in an independent subcontinent to 
resonate became painfully obvious. This was exacerbated by the loss of any consistent 
political vision in the appraisal of the nationality situation. Bengal and the Punjab were 
especially delicate cases. A 1943 resolution had called for a division of the Punjab since 
“Western Punjabis (dominantly Muslims)” constituted a nationality of their own.753 A year 
later, Joshi extended the scheme to Eastern Bengalis, until then viewed as part of a united 
Muslim-majority Bengal, on the grounds of the “common bond of their folk culture, 
strengthened by the traditional Muslim culture.”754 In late 1945, with partition on religious 
lines becoming a palpable threat, Bengal was to remain united again,755 while Adhikari’s 
1946 short-lived concept for a Sikh homeland even envisioned an essentially tripartite 
Punjab.756 The result was that by the mid-1940s, few had a clear idea about the CPI’s 
agenda beyond a vague advocacy of Muslim separatism.757 
Second, there was the lack of a distinct political profile. Even though Stalin had 
dissolved the Comintern in 1943, the CPI in established tradition went with the advice from 
CPGB and CPSU.758 Both merely recommended reverting to the pre-war anti-imperialist 
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united front with the nationalist bourgeoisie. With resumption of the class struggle nowhere 
on the agenda, the CPI’s distinctiveness as a transformative political force failed to 
materialize. If the party later criticized itself for “tailing behind the Muslim League” during 
its ‘nationality period,’ after the war it factually tailed behind the Congress. The “frenzied 
excitement” (Nehru) and anti-British bitterness on the post-war subcontinent, augmented by 
the trial of officers of Bose’s Japanese-propped Indian National Army and the Tory 
government’s vague promise of independence in June 1945, hardly resonated in communist 
mobilization.759 
Third, relations between the Congress and the CPI had taken a serious downward turn. 
This was because of (1) the communist “people’s war” policy, which was widely perceived 
as anti-national and had culminated in much-resented communist opposition to the INC’s 
all-or-nothing 1942 “Quit India” campaign; and (2) the lurid divergence in the approach to 
the League and its Pakistan demand. Even Congress leftists sympathetic to the CPI were 
deterred by its constant reiteration of the nationality issue. In 1945, Nehru tried in vain to 
impress on the party that ceding to the ML’s separatist demands would tear the Congress 
apart. When a motion to bar communists from voting in all Congress bodies came up in the 
Working Committee in December 1945, they had no lobby left to prevent their factual 
expulsion.760 
Its new status as political outcaste did not prompt the party to revise its approach. 
Instead, it contented itself with a somewhat more sympathetic embrace of militant anti-
British struggles than the Congress, such as in the case of the February 1946 Royal Indian 
Navy mutiny. The August 1946 pamphlet For the Final Assault bore out the CPI’s 
indecisiveness between united front tactics and more radical working-class agitation; it was 
only with the resolution For the Final Bid for Power that class issues—spurred by the 
tebhaga movement in Bengal—again asserted themselves on the communist agenda late in 
1946. 
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1946—ironically, the same year which confirmed the ML’s electoral breakthrough to the 
long-claimed (and CPI-backed) status of representative of the subcontinent’s Muslims—also 
marked the end of the ‘nationality period.’ Despite its own poor showing in the elections 
(only eight seats in the provinces, none at the center, and 2.5 percent of the vote), the CPI 
initially hailed the “new anti-imperialist upsurge” and gloated over a supposed defeat for 
“reactionaries” in the Hindu and Muslim camps.761 However, the League’s continued refusal 
to enter into any lasting agreement with the Congress and escalating communal violence 
made a conciliatory approach less plausible than ever before—let alone an openly pro-
separatist stance that, if anything, further exacerbated tensions. Moreover, neither the 
limited success of communist advances towards the ML nor the similarly futile efforts to 
establish a foothold among its mass base rendered the ‘Muslim option’ overly attractive.762 
The framework of ‘nationality policy’ did not permit an all-out assault on 
communalism. Yet, rising communal antagonism peaking in the ML’s August 1946 “Direct 
Action Day” in Calcutta that left more than 4,000 dead prodded the party to withdraw 
support for Pakistan. Instead, it undertook anew to differentiate between the League 
leadership and its following. Falling back on old epistemological idealism, the CPI’s Central 
Committee contended in response to the “Direct Action Day” carnage that “the 
contradictions between the democratic freedom urge of the common Muslims and the 
bankrupt […] policy of the leaders of the League will come to the fore, more and more 
disillusioning the Muslim masses.”763  
First, however, it was the communists themselves who had to be disillusioned with 
nationality politics. In mid-1947, General Secretary Joshi still defended “Muslim self-
determination” on the grounds that viewing the subcontinent as a single unified nation was 
“obviously […] wrong.”764 Yet, an alternative line had already emerged. Rajani Palme 
Dutt’s 1946 intervention against the nationality policy, although too late to mend relations 
with the INC, had provided a point of departure. In Dutt’s reckoning, “social and economic 
aspirations against exploitation” motivated the “Moslem masses who have gathered under 
the League banner.” While partition on religious lines was to be avoided, the ML’s 
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following had to be approached with “sympathetic understanding” for the material and, 
ambiguously, “national” aspirations drawing them to the League.765  
Even though the retreat to the old Western revolutionary pattern was sounded in the 
vocabulary of the fading ‘nationality period,’ the halcyon days of subcontinental community 
politics were over. In what amounted to an admission of defeat of his policy, Adhikari’s 
review of the 1946 events concurred that the ML was deceiving the “anti-imperialist and 
freedom-loving Muslims” by attacking Hindus and the INC and pushing the “undemocratic 
and separatist demand of Pakistan.”766 Nevertheless, the real culprit had to be imperialism, 
which occasioned acrobatic reasoning: Alongside upholding “Muslim self-determination,” 
Joshi castigated the Mountbatten Plan to divide the subcontinent as a “desperate move 
against the freedom movement which,” in his opinion, stood “for the complete 
independence of the whole of the country.”767 However, Joshi’s main concern was not 
partition on religious lines and its probable consequences. Instead, he was concerned that 
the British would retain their influence through “new forms of indirect rule,” particularly in 
Pakistan.768 It was only Dutt who unambiguously stated that the looming partition would be 
“disastrous for Indian progressive development,” encouraging “particularism, reaction and 
communal antagonism” instead.769 
Renouncing all insights into the processes of Muslim identity formation his own party 
had recognized and fostered until recently, Joshi counseled that it was “only through utmost 
vigilance against reaction and a steadfast adherence to democratic policies” that the 
“exploited Muslim masses of Pakistan areas [could] achieve their real objective of freedom, 
democracy and prosperity.”770 With no trace left of the earlier realization of a broad 
politicization of Muslims along ‘national,’ that is, communal lines, Joshi simply exempted 
the agency of the “backward masses” from the unpalatable developments. As if nothing had 
happened, as if a broad movement with a separatist communal agenda had not arisen, as if 
elections had not been won, and as if the empirical reality of Pakistan was not about to come 
into being with consent and involvement of the ‘masses,’ he called upon them to “defeat the 
selfish and reactionary policies of their upper classes.”771 In what amounted to a declaration 
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of political bankruptcy, the party insisted on the eve of independence that only the “upper 
classes” had wielded the “poisonous weapon of preaching communal hatred” to disrupt the 
“natural [!] process of unity” of exploited Muslims and non-Muslims.772 
In the atmosphere of June 1947, with riots spreading over much of North India in the 
runner-up to the great bloodshed in the Punjab, these postulates sounded thoroughly 
misplaced. And yet, they were the only communist response possible if the core principle—
to remain with the ‘masses’—was to be upheld. The overall volatility of the situation had 
penetrated into communist theorizing, necessitating the replacement of the Eastern 
nationality policy affirming collective religious particularisms with Western preaching of 
unity on class lines. Communalism had to be reinvented, relocalized, and reasserted against 
entrenched patterns of communist communal empathy. The earlier stance of bending 
communalism into nationality formation had rendered the CPI unable to respond to its 
violent reassertion after the end of the war. Accordingly, the communists now had to direct 
their efforts, hitherto committed to the identification of progressive Muslim ‘national’ 
consciousness among the ‘masses,’ to the opposite: acquitting the bulk of the population 
from said consciousness, now figuring as narrow communalism, no matter how great the 
bloodshed.  
 
 
 
V.2.2 Massless Mass Frenzy 
 
Disregard for the rapid totalization of communal antagonism blossomed into the hope that 
‘true’ movements with a social agenda would usurp grass-roots unrest. The CPI again 
considered it only a matter of mobilization whether protest expressed itself ‘properly’ in 
economic demands or went down the communal road. Thus, Adhikari rejoiced in late 1946 
that “the shame of Noakhali and Tippera [Bengal districts badly affected by communal 
rioting] is being wiped out in the fighting unity of the Hindu and Muslim kisans in the battle 
for Tebhaga,” a peasant campaign in Bengal for an increase in the cultivators’ share of the 
harvest.773 It certainly was no coincidence that the centers of the new wave of labor unrest 
often lay in areas badly affected by communal violence, such as Calcutta and rural Bihar. 
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Yet Dutt’s sedulous claim that the working-class movement alone had maintained an 
unstained record of communal harmony was far from reality.774 Nevertheless, it was on 
externalizing Western lines that communist reception and assessment of the massacres 
accompanying the partition—becoming reality together with India’s and Pakistan’s 
independence on 15 August 1947—developed.  
The central motive was to muddle the fanaticized ‘masses’ through the communal storm 
and ward off epistemological challenges posed by direct exposure to the events. Armed with 
sufficient determination, not even the most horrifying atrocities could unsettle communist 
theorizing. An account by a prominent Punjab organizer—probably future General 
Secretary Ajoy Kumar Ghosh—is a particularly good example. Writing under the telling 
alias Dhanwatri (the doctor of gods in Ayurvedic medicine), the author drew up a ghastly 
picture of the situation in the province: “What happened in the Punjab cannot be called a 
riot. It was a regular war of extermination of the minorities” driven by “passions” and the 
“frenzy and savagery” of communal mobs. Among them were “trained bands equipped with 
fire-arms and modern weapons,” the “storm troops of the various communal parties.”775 
Following this lurid exposition, the mainstay of his report consisted in detailing British 
“devilish skill,” allegedly responsible for ruining the Punjab’s ostensibly harmonious 
communal relations “overnight” and engineering the involvement of government organs in 
the bloodshed.776  
The same pattern also characterized other statements. The Punjab CPI’s realization that 
instances where citizens defended the local minority community were only “isolated cases” 
was immediately rationalized into conspiracy theories: Certain concrete “enemies” were 
operating with “a definite plan and a definite motive.”777 Far from being involved, if only as 
consenting bystanders, the broad population were mere victims of the “MOST 
DIABOLICAL PLAN AGAINST OUR PEOPLE” unfolding in the Punjab. Unsurprisingly, 
its “leader, inspirer and organiser” was British imperialism; its aides “the Princes and big 
landlords.” Their aim was “to overawe the Government, to silence and even physically wipe 
out the forces of progress.”778 Other party sections, such as the UP unit, seconded the 
scheme of grand conspiracy: Although the Punjab was the victim of the “maddest and most 
immense communal frenzy ever known,” it was as incorrect as it was “unjust to fix the 
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responsibility for communal frenzy and bloodshed on the common people themselves, 
whether Muslim, Sikh or Hindu.” The instigators were imperialists, landlords, princes, black 
marketeers, and the “communal leaders” supported by all of them.779  
Such insistence on the principally pro-British orientation of the rioters and 
fundamentalists is remarkable. According to this logic, either Pakistan itself was ultimately 
a British project, or the “extreme communalists” would have had to oppose independence 
and opt for the continuance of colonial rule. Although neither conclusion was sufficiently 
plausible, the negative synthesis of both—that the modern nation-states of Pakistan and, to a 
lesser degree, India came into being under active involvement, and were accordingly shaped 
by popular ideas, of religious and communal extremists—was unthinkable for Joshi and his 
flock. The aperies inherent in limiting anti-religious criticism to the new countries’ 
“compromising” elite surfaced in the CPI’s assessment of the 1948 Pathan revolt in 
Waziristan and the NWFP. While the party pamphlet reproduced the insurgents’ demand to 
convert Pakistan into a sharia state without further comment, it castigated the repressive 
stance adopted by Pakistani authorities as contrived by British imperialism.780 
 
Under the Communal Swatter 
It is conceivable that such inclusiveness arose in response to the disintegration of the 
communist core constituency. If party communiqués maintained that the “workers, peasants 
and progressive intelligentsia” were “the most determined forces that resist all riots,” 
Dhanwatri admitted that solidarity and unity among workers had not lasted long.781 Once 
workers began to lose their jobs on communal grounds, doom was spelt for “the entire 
young Trade Union movement in Punjab.” All efforts to contain the madness were “but a 
drop in the ocean.”782 Although Dhanwatri insisted that working-class unity could hardly 
have broken “from within,” his disillusionment with the unfolding reality in the Punjab is 
palpable. There was every reason. The case of Ramesh Chandra, a trade union organizer 
from Lahore, illustrates the lost cause of communist intervention under the preeminence of 
communal confrontation. In a letter to Ranadive from February 1948, he described the 
                                                 
779 In the Name of Freedom, Honour and Bread. United Provinces Shall not Go the Punjab Way, PCJ CPI 101, 
2, 4. 
780 Who Rules Pakistan?, PCJ 1948/6, 7. The preceding leftward shift towards open revolution at the 1948 II 
party congress had not wrought about a change in the embrace of mass sentiments. See the “Political Thesis of 
the Second Congress of the Communist Party,” in Documents 5:598–600, and 630–1. 
781 Resolution on the Present Political Situation. 17 December 1947, WBIB File 35/26(i) SL 180/1926, 127. 
782 All quotes in “Beware!,” 384, 386. 
214 
 
agony in no unclear terms: Having opted to stay in Pakistan to disprove the communalists, 
he had discovered that conditions were beyond even his worst imaginations. After bringing 
his family to Delhi, he had returned to continue trade union work, but soon found that even 
moving freely was a luxury:  
Whereas one can move about to a certain extent, it is not possible for a nonmuslim to do any 
mass work […] the position was such that I should not even attend the delegates meeting of the 
west Pakistan TU Federation. My comrades think that the atmosphere was such that my name 
should not be proposed for the General Council [….] I am now completely demoralized.783 
Chandra’s letter closed with a request for transfer to Delhi. His experience was replicated in 
many East Pakistan areas, where the predominantly Hindu CPI unit found itself unable to 
reach out to the Muslim population. Its sullen pretension of “definitely anti-communal 
sentiments of the masses” would stultify itself in 1950, when most Hindu party members 
had to flee the communal riots and settle in West Bengal.784 
In fact, there was no dearth of reports about communists falling victim to fanaticized 
mobs. Inevitably part of a community themselves, they were often suspected of secretly 
working for another. During the August 1946 Calcutta riots, communists became targets of 
attacks. A year later, Ajoy Kumar Ghosh eluded death only by chance when fanatical 
Muslims attacked his train to Lahore and massacred the passengers. A December 1947 
circular of the East Punjab unit listed numerous comrades who had gone missing.785 
And yet: If not even the most horrible events and experiences could shatter the 
communist commitment to progressive mass politics, many proved to be equally undeterred 
in their relief efforts. The unwavering struggle of countless party members against 
communalism on the spot, and the faithful implementation of the party’s exhortation to 
become “model refugee relief workers” to whom “the question of communal peace is the 
question of [their] life” are rightly praised by Irfan Habib as an “epic chapter” in communist 
history.786 Javed concurs that communists stood out by their commitment to the protection 
of minorities and the conservation of peace in many localities, which underlines the 
subjective sincerity of their efforts to maintain communal peace.787  
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The events of 1947–8 also provided the party with a long-term opportunity to recover lost 
political ground. In contrast to the ‘nationality period,’ the CPI’s stance of blaming the 
mayhem of partition on imperialism and its domestic allies was again understandable to a 
wider political arena and created common terrain with left nationalists and socialists. CSP 
stalwart Lohia would accuse the Indian government of being an accomplice in the 
“imperialist and communal game to weaken the people by partitioning the country” in much 
the same manner as the CPI did from 1948 onwards.788 In fact, this has become the staple 
view in the Indian left since.  
Despite the haunting experience of partition and the programmatic turn away from the 
League in 1946, parts of the CPI found it difficult to chime with the new course. On 30 
November 1947, a well-attended joint conference of local ML and CPI units convened in 
Lalgola in the Murshidabad district, during which “some C.P.I. speakers characterised the 
Congress as a communal organisation.” Conversely, the Leaguers’ questionable promise to 
commit the paramilitary Muslim National Guards to the securing of peace was well 
received.789 However considerable the extent of communalism in the Bengal INC: Assisting 
the pot in calling the kettle black attested to the enduring pro-Muslim sentiment. In this 
sense, a 1951 appraisal of Joshi has its truth in that the “party of the proletariat was too 
weak and,” nota bene, too “immature to play any effective role” in the course of events. 
However, his claim that the CPI had ever been “the honest broker between the warring 
Congress and League leaderships” tuned out its own bias.790 
This very text of Joshi (which also has to be read as an ex post justification of his tenure 
as general secretary, rudely ended at the 1948 party congress with his ouster on the grounds 
of “reformism”) also exhibits an unusual degree of frankness on the CPI’s failed advances to 
the broad population before and during partition. Therefore, it shall here be quoted as an 
epigraph on communist mass-mongering. According to Joshi, the factual acceptance of 
partition as independence on the part of the ‘masses’ had demonstrated the extent to which 
they had been under the influence of the bourgeoisie. With this circumstance admitted, a 
remarkable degree of misanthropy manifested itself in Joshi’s closing verdict that the 
ensuing carnage was essentially well-deserved: “A people that hail treachery as liberation 
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can only learn through bitter experience and hard struggles.”791 Woe to the ‘masses’ that do 
not requite communist affection. It is, however, telling that Joshi carefully avoided to 
implicate his own, openly pro-separatist line for the disaster of partition. Ever since, it has 
been the ‘bourgeois’ orientation rather than the enthusiasm for religious mass culture that 
figures as problematic, highlighting the lasting impact of the ‘nationality period.’ 
 
 
 
Synopsis of Chapter V 
 
Reconciling (religious) communities to the constitution of a national whole surfaced as a 
plausible option for cutting-edge communist policy in the late 1930s. The means was to 
fashion the nation into a patchwork of communo-nationalities. Theoretical assistance was 
provided by recurring to Lenin’s nationality model, an approved instrument from the arsenal 
of real-life socialism. It legitimized both the developments on the subcontinent by casting 
them in Marxist idioms and the communist appropriation of this supposed current of history. 
The CPI modified Lenin’s model by two major departures, or innovations: First, by 
acknowledging religion as the basis of nationality. Second, by a degree of enthusiasm for 
the cultural—and religious—life of the “nationalities” that far exceeded both the 
requirements of tactical maneuvering and side-effects of mere political support.  
It was on this terrain that the CPI’s much-maligned “people’s war” policy proved 
innovative and committed. Evolving in close vicinity to, but ignorant of, Gramsci’s 
considerations on counter-hegemony from below, the communist French New Wave self-
consciously addressed specific constellations on the subcontinent in a highly situated way. 
This manifested both in the party’s essentially conservative interventions in the field of folk 
culture and its enthusiasm for identitary aspects of Muslim and Sikh nation building. 
Growing quickly into their new roles as ‘organic intellectuals,’ leading communists—
notably P. C. Joshi and Sajjad Zaheer—, but also the CPI as a whole reveled in native 
culture and religious community. The outrage at Rajani Palme Dutt’s modest critical 
intervention bore out the enthusiasm of many party workers for the policy. 
This is not to say that the CPI had finally become a unitary party. Lingering dissent in 
some party segments (notably in Bombay) and the worsening political climate brought about 
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a volte-face. In late 1946, the nationality policy was dropped. However, its affinity to 
religion and culture would outlast otherwise profound political reversals, such as the II party 
congress in 1948. And there prevailed consequential unity on the raison d’être of communist 
policy: Never to abandon the revolutionary subject—the “masses.” Perfect inner-party unity 
manifested in largely apologetic diction towards the fanaticized ‘masses’ as bystanders and 
perpetrators of the partition massacres.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
It is precisely because religion under communist auspices has ever been a heteronomous 
affair that it has been able to rise into a formative instance in communist praxis. Religion 
occupies a doubly subordinate role. In Marxist theory, it is reduced to a secondary 
phenomenon of production relations; and to a secondary consideration in communist policy 
designs calibrated on class and nation. Communist practice constituted a warped echo of a 
dictum of Marx: That the criticism of religion was “essentially completed.”792 On the merits 
of this philosophical fait accompli, communists viewed themselves either as enemies of 
religion, as atheists, or at least as areligious. All the while, religion was insubstantial rather 
than a dangerous adversary. This contributed to blurring the differences between anti-
religious campaigning, indifference, and fashioning revolutionary politics of the day 
according to religious motives.  
Marxist theory and communist practice alike denied religion a formative ideological 
influence which it could very well possess. This perceptive gap enabled it to become part of 
subcontinental communism, severely qualifying the latter’s areligious core. This recognition 
requires transcending the Marxist perspective, yet without settling on some other ostensible 
‘essence’ of history, such as pragmatics, or ideas, or even religion itself. If the latter two 
have occupied center stage in this study to the detriment of other aspects, much of it is due 
to their neglect in most available accounts, and of course constraints in scope and time.  
Even the most committed of Marx’s and Engels’s writings contain very little in terms of 
concrete directives. Both writers had been radical critics versed in philosophy and economic 
analysis rather than professional revolutionaries. For example, the Communist Manifesto 
had defined future communist society as one in which the “free development of each is the 
condition for the free development of all.”793 The vagueness of this and other slogans 
contributed substantially to the appeal of Marxian thought. And it encouraged the epigones 
of Marx and Engels to develop vastly diverging visions of revolution and post-revolutionary 
society. These visions discounted rather than precluded religion: Marx’s aphorisms had 
characterized it as an ideological reflection of the misery and oppression notably of feudal 
societies. As rationalization and enlightened thought spread alongside with capitalist 
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modernity, the power of religious consciousness would inevitably wane. Due to its position 
in the process of production exposing it to unveiled capitalist exploitation, the proletariat 
had supposedly shed its illusions on cheap consolation and was evolving the “proletarian 
consciousness” necessary for revolution. 
However, in the section on the commodity fetish in Capital Marx acknowledged that 
the very ideology characterizing the dominant social relations constituted a formidable 
obstacle to the attainment of such consciousness. Bolshevism’s solution to the problem of 
consciousness was both more consequential and more practical. Bolshevik parties imagined 
the working class as a sleeping giant whose ideological ‘backwardness’ was largely the 
product of bourgeois manipulation. Hence, they assumed the role of a radical progressive 
order, of missionaries of communism, who set out to exorcize the parasitic and artificial 
capitalist spirit. There were no second strings: The proletariat could be ideologically 
conscious or not yet conscious. It could, however, not possess a fundamentally ‘wrong’ 
consciousness. If it didn’t respond to mobilization efforts, the fault was either with the 
erroneous application of Marxist theory, mistakes in the propaganda, or the momentarily 
overwhelming influence of ‘reaction.’ Yet why such influence could be at all entrenched 
among the supposed revolutionary class, and what followed from this, the Bolsheviks and 
subsequent communists mostly would not answer.  
Nor did they recognize the need for the question. Marxist “science” had by and large 
displaced the vision of the transformation of philosophy into the proletariat’s self-conscious 
action already by Lenin’s early days as an agitator.794 After the revolution, Lenin became 
convinced that the communist triumph had been irrevocably proven by history. He called on 
the communists to champion “every popular movement.” The concept of national self-
determination immensely facilitated their appropriation. It had sprung from the urge to 
actualize revolutionary Marxism to the burning political questions of the turn of the century. 
While Lenin had avoided positive references to “national culture,” Soviet practice soon 
demonstrated the unfeasibility of advocating unfettered national development without its 
cultural adjuncts. Religion and culture became part of the communist project in the same 
measure that the (social-revolutionary) proletariat made way for the (national-revolutionary) 
‘masses.’ Early Soviet nationality policy, prominently devised by Stalin, substantiated this 
tendency. By blaming the vestiges of “social reaction” on Czarist rule, Stalin projected a 
‘healthy,’ progressive core of indigenous “suppressed nationalities.” In the East, the “free 
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development of each” individual as envisioned in the Communist Manifesto materialized in 
the “independent and free development of each” nationality. Notably in the case of Soviet 
Muslims, this concept had to an extent been infused with religious notions.  
Of course, there was also a political component. The grant of religious autonomy, 
including the practice of sharia, to the Dagestan ulema would not have materialized without 
their support in the civil war. Likewise, Bolshevik sympathies didn’t extend to those eager 
to pursue their “independent and free development” outside Soviet suzerainty. The Central 
Asian Basmachi rebels had to learn this the hard way. Nevertheless, the meaning and scope 
of emancipation acquired distinctly cultural undertones in the case of “suppressed” nations. 
Correspondingly, religion could transform from a focal point of anti-reactionary criticism 
into a component of national revival, or at least into a legitimate rallying point against 
imperialism. There was only one unequivocal and consistent injunction the CPI received 
from authoritative Leninist works and higher instances, notably the Comintern, alike. This 
was to get ever closer to the ‘masses’ and take up their demands and aspirations. Such a 
stance greatly abetted the accommodation of religion and culture trend and disfavored 
critical views on their specific character. 
Subcontinental communist approaches to religion by and large conformed to one of two 
revolutionary paradigms. These evolved out of the distinction (in itself a passing remark by 
Stalin rather than a concept) between a socialist, culturally self-critical revolution in the 
West and an anti-imperialist, culturally affirmative revolution in the East. Put pointedly, 
these paradigms represented opposite notions of religion. The Western one regarded it as 
falsified (that is, finished for all intents and purposes), whereas the Eastern considered it 
non-falsifiable (that is, a valid and at times indispensable reference value).795 This appraisal 
comes with three caveats. First, it is not to claim that communists mindlessly copied their 
revolutionary recipes and policies from the Soviet Union. Instead, the theme of adaptation, 
often creative, assumed primacy. Second, it is communist practice rather than their 
theoretical efforts that allow for the identification of these very paradigms. In fact, they 
never matured into explicit, authoritative doctrines. And third, their implementation was 
neither systematical nor straightforward. Although British India, being a colony, constituted 
a model case for the application of the Eastern anti-imperialist paradigm, conditions on the 
subcontinent often discouraged this approach. The existence prior to communist activity of a 
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broad bourgeois pan-communal anti-colonial movement was a formidable obstacle to direct 
communist appropriation of religious culture.  
Moreover: Even if interpenetrations of Marxist and religious elements in the 
articulation of the communist project remained palpable, the desire to transcend traditional 
forms and categories of politics was a core impetus for early communists. For example, 
communist stances on the Gandhian themes of spirituality and non-violence, which seemed 
to evoke the worst of the subcontinent’s past, ranged from skepticism to disgust. It was not 
only for political and doctrinal reasons, but also for biographical ones that the Hindu 
outlook and bourgeois politics of the INC were a bête noire to the CPI. Yet, there remained 
the issue of the INC’s immense popularity among the very populace the communists 
considered their own material for mobilization. Constellations along these lines invited the 
application of the Western paradigm: By separating leadership and followers it could 
fashion the mass following into unconscious partisans of the communist cause. This 
required sophisticated differentiation and autopoietic, adamantine clinging to the primacy of 
the underlying essence, invisible and revolutionary, against the contradicting, but 
insubstantial appearance on society’s surface.  
The most immediate implication of the Western approach was that subcontinental 
communist categories reproduced Marxist ones in form rather than in content. In the case of 
the proletariat, communists tried their best to write off an unbecoming ‘backward’ mind-set 
among the prospective revolutionary subject. Occasional acknowledgments of the actual 
ideological state of things remained isolated and marginal as they threatened the very raison 
d’être of the CPI. Not even the horrific 1929 communal riot among the Bombay workforce 
could unsettle these convictions. The result is an apparent mismatch between theoretical 
orthodoxy and empirical non-orthodoxy. However, it is this very mismatch that decisively 
governed the meaning of communism on the subcontinent. Subsuming the workforce under 
the general term ‘proletariat’ did not attested to ‘incorrect’ application of Marxist categories. 
Rather, it bore out their elasticity, let alone the difficulty of applying them ‘correctly.’ Part 
of the history of communist meaning has to be uncovered as the illocutionary divergence 
beneath the unitary theoretical edifice. 
The approach towards rising communalism by and large also falls under the Western 
paradigm. Glaringly embarrassing the wholesome Eastern approach, communalism 
actualized the necessity to criticize current religious ideologemes. To be sure, they were 
ideologemes of bourgeois, communal, or imperialist instigators only. However, at this point 
unitary opinion ended and different traditions developed. One branch, represented by 
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theoreticians such as M. N. Roy and Rajani Palme Dutt, gainsaid the popular dimension of 
communalism altogether. They imagined it as a conspiracy of concretely identifiable groups 
of ‘reactionaries.’ According to this interpretation, the latter hired goondas to start riots and 
spread terror in order to stabilize their dominant position.  
Another branch, more prominent among ‘communists on the spot,’ basically subscribed 
to this analysis. At the same time, these activists often tended to endow communalism ‘from 
below’ with quasi-revolutionary connotations. They were, after all, more familiar with local 
political climates and corresponding articulations of discontent. In the absence of better 
links to grass-roots politics, Muzaffar Ahmad even considered the allegation of 
communalism a deliberate slander of class struggle during the 1926 Calcutta riots. This 
approach was not confined to the Bengal communists. It occasionally surfaced to govern the 
appreciation of grass-roots movements throughout colonial times, such as the communal 
Moplah rebellion. From there, it was just a stone’s throw to the Eastern appropriation of 
communalism proper in a suitable theoretical guise—instead of only its concealed class 
essence. 
Before the ‘nationality period’ of the 1940s, the Eastern paradigm had been reserved for 
supposedly non-bourgeois, resistive, and minority identitary assertions ‘from below.’ It 
figured prominently in the attempts at defining revolutionary politics in the early 1920s 
when communists established a positive correlation between ‘revolutionary’ activity and the 
communal framework it manifested in. This was equally true for the struggle of the “heroic 
Sikhs” of the Akali movement to introduce Sikh in place of Hindu temple administration, 
the radically Islamic background of early associates of the Calcutta communists, and the 
initial embrace of the Moplah rebellion as a legitimate revolt of outraged Muslims. Even 
skeptical voices often suffered from religious bias, such as Dange’s lukewarm stance 
towards the Akali movement or Ahmad’s opposition to Roy’s wooing of Bengali Hindu 
terrorists. Both Dange and Ahmad clearly had fewer reservations towards their 
fundamentalist co-religionists. In Dange’s case, this translated into fervent reverence for 
Tilak’s militant, Hindu revivalist swadeshi campaign and firm depreciation of khilafat 
politics. The first half-decade of indigenous communism, at least until after the 1925 
Kanpur conference, materialized in close and often explicit proximity to religious notions 
and categories in its environment. 
During the party’s eclipse in the early 1930s under the double constraints of a sectarian 
Comintern line and government repression, communist approximation to subcontinental 
categories of political articulation underwent a theoretical revision. Fostered by the debates 
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surrounding the 1935 Government of India Act, a gradual reconsideration of ‘community’ 
materialized. Although the evidence is interspersed, it allows identifying a clear trend. It is 
discernible from K. B. Krishna’s qualified embrace of traditional indigenous culture, the 
criticism of only foreign religious institutions in programmatic party documents of the early 
1930s, and the gradual approximation to grass-roots communal Muslim aspirations in the 
shape of the Ahrar movement in the mid-1930s. 
Under the auspices of the Comintern’s 1935 popular front line, the CPI took up these 
cues in a process of reassessment of political constellations on the subcontinent. This led to 
a fundamental reevaluation and redefinition of communalism in the wake of the 1937 
elections. Prodded forward by the communal divide as evinced by the election results, the 
failure of the INC’s Muslim Mass Contact campaign, and the emergence of a nationalist 
profile of the League, the communists revised their earlier stance of dismissing the League 
as sectarian and anti-national. Initial exhortations to the INC to abandon its Hindu tinge and 
fulfil Muslim “communal demands” for anti-British unity culminated in the embrace of 
separatist League politics from 1942 onwards. They were viewed to represent the 
aspirations of awakening “Muslim nationalities.” The policy aimed to provide a sustainable 
solution to the acute problem of national unity and at the same time opened up the 
perspective of a truly situated brand of communism.  
This brand entailed undiluted appropriation of abstractly ‘national,’ but concretely 
communal expressions of Muslimness, Sikhdom, and even mainstream Hindu culture. 
During this pinnacle of communist self-Easternization, these expressions almost seemed to 
be congruent with emancipation proper. This went as far as castigating non-separatist 
Muslims for betraying ‘their’ nationalities’ self-assertion. In time, the practice extended to 
the “Sikh people,” apparently similarly deserving of a “homeland” of their own. The 
approach also manifested in communist embraces of grass-roots Hindu folk culture. All of 
this transformed the CPI’s activity into a distinctly Eastern variety of Gramscian meditations 
on building comprehensive counter-hegemony ‘from below.’ In fact, the only major 
‘subaltern’ minority group not approached in terms of nationality were the untouchables. 
Yet Ambedkar’s SCF framed its agenda in anti-Hindu rather than in anti-British terms. 
Under the primacy of anti-imperialism, this rendered the SCF an unattractive political 
partner. Also, untouchables made up a sizeable part of the CPI’s own working-class 
constituency. The party therefore leaned towards solving the question of untouchability 
within its own fold. 
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Under the nationality policy, addressing the revolutionary subject in terms of its cultural 
and religious environment formed a desideratum rather than an anathema. The communist 
critical voice already had been timid with regard to ‘mass culture’ in a Western paradigm. In 
an Eastern policy context, it changed its pitch into fervent acculturation. Yet, although many 
themes resurfaced, the ‘nationality period’ was not just a reiteration of the cultural 
situatedness of the first communist years. Most conspicuously, a qualifying and more or less 
elaborate theoretical scaffold replaced unmediated appropriations of ‘mass’ culture and 
outlook. It defined their assertion in terms of established Marxist categories. The Eastern 
policy of the 1940s was systematic and manifested in tangible political and organizational 
steps. Other than the more naïve revolutionary enthusiasm of the early 1920s, the theoretical 
lining of the ‘nationality period’ established pseudo-scientific communal zoo-ification in a 
communist horizon. On the eve of independence, the ‘nationality period’ acquainted the 
communists with the means and categories of community politics—a legacy they would 
draw on in a post-independence setting.  
Certainly, this does not mean that the inclusive Eastern paradigm had finally prevailed. 
The quaint and at times odd cohabitation of both approaches continues to distinguish 
subcontinental communism. Vocal opposition to the politicization of religion stands abreast 
with accommodation of ‘subaltern,’ often Muslim identity. Together, they constitute the 
historical misnomer that is the CPI’s anti-religious reputation: Pungent criticism of religion 
occurred mostly in connection with foreign rule or upper-class interests, real or perceived. 
Religion was considered problematic not as ruling ideology, but as a technique of rule. This 
indicates that the CPI was anything but aloof and detached from conditions on the 
subcontinental ground. Rather, its approach proved compatible to popular currents and 
ideologemes. 
If any kind of insight is easy to be had it is the a posteriori kind, which lends itself just as 
easily to fault-finding. Shashi Joshi’s verdict that Roy had exhibited “rigid, simplistic 
notions of ‘consciousness’” in his efforts to rouse the ‘masses’ against bourgeois non-
cooperation is certainly correct.796 Yet, together with the bulk of Marxist criticism of the 
CPI, it is not true in that it ignores both the historic dilemma and the contemporary power of 
communist weltanschauung. The externalizing Western paradigm governing Roy’s 
appraisals was a necessary idealist delusion for any communist. Acknowledging the bleak 
reality of dominant outlooks would have left little space for radical intervention. And unlike 
                                                 
796 Joshi, Struggle for Hegemony 1:52. 
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in other parts of Asia, the potential attraction of an Eastern paradigm’s comprehensive 
acculturation was circumscribed by a pre-existing national movement that had already 
appropriated religion and traditional culture. Invoking revolutionary mass consciousness by 
pen and referring to it in (later) practice created space, and justification, for communist 
activity. In theory, the latter quite ‘naturally’ resulted from the axiom that the potential for 
class struggle existed in every society. The result was a circular reasoning where the very 
presence of communists was a vindication of progressive forces of history, or in other 
words, resulted from objective historical constellations. Or as Dange put it later in a 
justification of political rapprochement with the Congress Party: “How can the whole thing 
be bourgeois when I am there.”797  
In the same interview, Dange also exposed the fateful logic behind communist self-
situation in a subcontinental environment. Echoing Lenin’s call to support “every popular 
movement,” he asserted that “if we don’t accept Mahatma Gandhi, Tilak and all that, then in 
that case we are not accepting the masses also. Because, then, we turn the masses into great 
bloody fools”—apparently the ultimate anti-thesis of communist politics.798 Reversely, 
according to Dange’s above credo it was the very presence of communists that indicated 
progress in whatever circumstances. 
Considering the above and the CPI’s track record and the criticisms often leveled at it, it 
follows that: If anything deserves to be called communist ‘ideology’ in the proper Marxian 
sense of the word (“necessarily wrong consciousness”), it is this fundamental conviction of 
inevitably standing for progress. It ensured that communists were, if at all, only gradually 
more committed to the divestiture of traditional loyalties and religious life-worlds than their 
bourgeois predecessors. If there was anything ‘wrong’ with the subcontinental communists, 
it was the entropic pattern of Marxist-Leninist reasoning, which accounts for people only as 
social measurements, or things, according to Max Horkheimer. And if there was anything 
‘un-Marxist’ about the CPI, it was its existence in circumstances rewarding adaptation to, 
rather than transformation of, what Marx had identified as ‘backwards’ in culture and 
society. The Communist Manifesto’s “free development of each” individual came to include 
its anti-thesis (that is, religious communities) as part of a ‘mass culture’ acknowledged as 
resistive—implicitly in a Western, explicitly in an Eastern paradigm. More than anything 
else, it is this constellation that contains the meaning of subcontinental communism.  
                                                 
797 Chandra, “S. A. Dange—An Interview,” in Sen, Indian Communism, 28. 
798 Ibid., 26. 
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